Is Defense Failing Because of Too Few Objections?
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IS THE DEFENSE FAILING FOR LACK OF OBJECTIONS?
On an entirely separate topic, I’ve been receiving a lot of comments and communications from folks who express great concern that the defense is failing Kyle Rittenhouse because of a purported failure to make sufficient objections to the state’s questioning of witnesses and presentation of video evidence.
Apparently, these concerns are being fostered by legal commentary and analysis being made about the case both others, including other lawyers, who are covering the Rittenhouse trial on the internet, much as I’m doing myself.
The first thing I should mention is that I don’t get anything but the most incidental exposure to other commentary and analysis of trials I cover, at least while I’m covering them. Just doing what I do, every day, to cover a trial like this is already a 5 am to 9 pm job—I haven’t time to look at other people’s commentary and analysis. That doesn’t mean it’s not necessarily good commentary and analysis, only that I wouldn’t know, personally.
That said, it seems to me as if people are looking at the matter of objections in a hyper-technical sense, as if every possible thing that could be objected to should be objected to, period.
And that’s just not how things work in a real-world courtroom.
Whether to object involves a great many factors, not all of them purely legal, and so there’s always a balancing of those factors by any attorney presented with the technical option of making an objection.
For example, not only is the decision to object invariably a balancing of some sort, many of the theoretical grounds for objecting are themselves a balancing. One of the most common complaints I’m hearing about this defense, for example, is that they are failing to object to evidence that is prejudicial.
OK, fine—but it’s a criminal prosecution, folks. In every criminal prosecution ever, the state is admitting evidence that is prejudicial to the defendant, if by prejudicial we mean “harmful.” And the state is allowed to do that—it’s their job. If they could only introduce evidence that was not harmful to the defendant, there’d be little point to prosecuting anybody.
The real question, legally speaking, is not whether the evidence is prejudicial, but whether that negative prejudicial character of the evidence outweighs whatever positive character the evidence might have—such as relevance, for example. Evidence that is highly prejudicial and only modestly relevant is likely to be deemed inadmissible by a judge—but evidence that is highly relevant and only modestly prejudicial is likely admissible. That’s the balancing, in that context.
But whether to object also requires balancing considerations outside of the technical.
For one thing, many people may not understand that in the process of direct and cross-examination, it is not that each party gets to ask the witness whatever questions might pop into their pretty little heads. Rather, each successive stage of questioning can only properly address issues that were raised in a prior step.
Imagine, for example, that on direct the state asks a witness about issues A, B, and C, but not about issue D. That means that cross-examination by the defense is limited to asking only about issues A, B, and C—because issue D was not asked about on direct, it cannot be inquired about on cross.
Now imagine that there are aspects of issue C that are very, very important to the defense—they want to dig into issue C with a bayonet and gut it, right in front of the jury. At the same time, there are some small facets of issue C where the evidence is arguably prejudicial or irrelevant some other legitimate grounds for the defense to object to the prosecution introducing issue C on direct in the first place.
Does the defense make a perfectly legitimate objection to issue C when the state tried to introduce it on direct—meaning, if the defense objection is successful, that issue C would be unavailable to them on cross-examination? Or does the defense accept the modest hit of whatever facet of issue C is unfavorable, so they can thoroughly eviscerate that issue on cross-examination in front of the jury?
UPDATE: But on this particular point, see comment below from chaswjd:
“Wisconsin does not follow the scope of direct rule for cross-examination. Wis. Stat. §906.11(2) (“A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. In the interests of justice, the judge may limit cross-examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct examination.”) If Judge Schroeder has not ordered that cross be limited (and few Wisconsin judges do) cross is a wide open field.” I share this in the interests of transparency, I myself am not in a position to either confirm or deny this is the case in Wisconsin, but it’s certainly possible, and I have no reason to think otherwise.
My personal inclination has always been to take a pass on the objection on direct so that I can have substantive fun on cross. And I expect we’re seeing quite a bit of that here, and will see more moving forward.
Of course, it’s possible that defense Attorneys Richards and Chirafisi are simply incompetent buffoons who have no idea what they are about and are simply flushing their defendant’s case down the toilet because of their ignorance of how to raise objections.
But that’s not the way I’d bet, based on my observations of their performance to date.
OK, folks, that’s all I have for you on this topic.