Steve Quest (p/k/a Montagraph) vs. Nicholas Robert Rekieta & Rekieta Law, LLC (2023)

[AnOminous]

In my opinion it's mainly Nick's drunken retardation making this case super hard to loose early for monte. He just doesn't have room to embarrass himself yet. Overall, he didn't handle this lawsuit great either.

The main misstep was by his lawyer and it was filing that abjectly miserable opening complaint. That said he fixed it quickly.

 

[Useful_Mistake]

Appellate case has an update:


Chief Judge is unsure if she has jurisdiction:

 

[AnOminous]

Chief Judge is unsure if she has jurisdiction:

https://lommen.com/minnesotas-collateral-order-doctrine-turns-20/

Quick rundown on that doctrine for anyone interested.

It has a synopsis of cases where it has been applied either to deny or allow such appeals. If one of these exceptions somehow applies to this, I'm not seeing it.

Here's one on a vaguely related issue:

• In McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. 2016), the city had imposed an assessment on real property. The city moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff’s failure to file a written objection to the assessment required dismissal. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment and the city appealed. The Minnesota Supreme Court held the denial of summary judgment was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it would not be unreviewable after final judgment.

A SLAPP claim differs from this in that SLAPP confers something much more akin to an immunity (like qualified immunity) from suit than the denial of a motion for summary judgment, that is to say, the harm of a denial of the motion is a denial of the right not to have to stand trial at all. Unless this Colorado SLAPP statute applies, though, such a right does not exist, so neither would a right to appeal.

That's sort of an ouroboros but if the court doesn't even have jurisdiction at all, it should be treated simply as the denial of a motion to dismiss or summary judgment. So I don't see the court even getting there unless it either falls into the collateral-order doctrine exception (not seeing it) or some other extraordinary exception (fat chance).

 

[Useful_Mistake]

If one of these exceptions somehow applies to this, I'm not seeing it.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but this looks to be an incredibly bad start for Nick's already shaky appeal, correct?

 

[feral cat #6385]

https://lommen.com/minnesotas-collateral-order-doctrine-turns-20/

Quick rundown on that doctrine for anyone interested.

It has a synopsis of cases where it has been applied either to deny or allow such appeals. If one of these exceptions somehow applies to this, I'm not seeing it.

Here's one on a vaguely related issue:

A SLAPP claim differs from this in that SLAPP confers something much more akin to an immunity (like qualified immunity) from suit than the denial of a motion for summary judgment, that is to say, the harm of a denial of the motion is a denial of the right not to have to stand trial at all. Unless this Colorado SLAPP statute applies, though, such a right does not exist, so neither would a right to appeal.

That's sort of an ouroboros but if the court doesn't even have jurisdiction at all, it should be treated simply as the denial of a motion to dismiss or summary judgment. So I don't see the court even getting there unless it either falls into the collateral-order doctrine exception (not seeing it) or some other extraordinary exception (fat chance).

Can you fully translate archaic law talk into normal huma talk? What the fuck is a " collateral-order?"

COL A RECTAL ORDER? Sounds like something nick would enjoy.

 

[AnOminous]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but this looks to be an incredibly bad start for Nick's already shaky appeal, correct?

Worst would have been just curtly slapping it down in a one line per curiam. This way he at least gets to waste some of Monty's money.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but this looks to be an incredibly bad start for Nick's already shaky appeal, correct?

Worst would have been just curtly slapping it down in a one line per curiam. This way he at least gets to waste some of Monty's money.

Can you fully translate archaic law talk into normal huma talk? What the fuck is a " collateral-order?"

I linked to an explanatory article. At its very briefest, it is an exception to the so-called "final judgment rule" that you can only appeal an interlocutory order (an order made before the case is over) under a very limited number of circumstances, generally involving either an order about something separate from the actual main case itself and/or something that couldn't be appealed after the case because it would be moot.

It would really require pages of sperging to detail it much more than that, and the synopsis of Minnesota case law listing examples of it being applied is really the quickest way to understand it.

This is an example of a "brief" definition and isn't terribly more informative unless you already know most of what's being discussed in it:

collateral order doctrine​

Primary tabs​

The collateral order doctrine is an exception to the general rule against allowing interlocutory appeals (appeals on a temporary order issued during the course of litigation). This doctrine traces its origins to the case Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Co.
As a general rule, only final judgements are appealable. Nonetheless, as noted in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Co., some interlocutory decisions act as final judgments to certain rights. Therefore, interlocutory decisions are appealable under the collateral order doctrine if they fulfill three conditions:

1. The interlocutory decision conclusively determined the disputed question
2. The disputed question is important and entirely separable from the merits of the action
3. The interlocutory decision is effectively unappealable after a final judgment is handed down

For example, in Cohen an interlocutory decision regarding whether a New Jersey statute which required parties to offer a security interest before trial is applicable in federal court was subject to the collateral order doctrine and could therefore be appealed before the trial’s conclusion.
[Last updated in July of 2022 by the Wex Definitions Team]

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collateral_order_doctrine

My opinion is that 1 and 3 may apply but 2 definitely doesn't because a SLAPP motion is intrinsically linked to the merits of the action.

Also even if they decide they have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal, he could still lose that, and if he won it, all he would win would be a chance for a SLAPP hearing at the trial court, and he could (and probably would) lose that too.

 

[feral cat #6385]

Also even if they decide they have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal, he could still lose that, and if he won it, all he would win would be a chance for a SLAPP hearing at the trial court, and he could (and probably would) lose that too.

Thanks for the clarification. I hope Nick gets his SLAPP hearing at the trial court. So he will burn even more money on nonsense.

 

[Kosher Salt]

What I'm finding appears to be that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in adopting the collateral order doctrine, carved out an exception to it because it found that "a decision of the district court denying a claim of qualified immunity is, in effect, a final determination of a right separable from and collateral to rights asserted in the main action" (emphasis added). (Perhaps this isn't an exception so much as it's the court explaining why it thought the doctrine applied.)

https://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2002/c5011157.html

Qualified immunity is the right of a government actor to be immune from suit for actions taken in the course of their official duties, so I can kinda see why the court would determine that finding the answers to the questions "is this a government actor" and "did the claims at the heart of this action arise from the performance of the government actor's official duties" would be "entirely separable from the merits of the action". Under qualified immunity, even otherwise meritorious lawsuits against the government can sometimes be dismissed. So at a very basic level of reading, this definitely wouldn't apply.

However, the ruling also suggests that the court didn't find a rational basis to treat governmental entitles differently from nongovernmental entities:

"In Anderson we held that an order denying a municipality's summary judgment motion based on immunity from suit was appealable, but we made no determination that immediate appeal was available only to governmental entities or that nongovernmental entities should be treated differently. We perceive no rational basis for providing a governmental entity a right of immediate review of a determination relating to immunity that results in having to stand trial, but denying that right to a nongovernmental entity" (citation omitted).

...but at the end of the day, it appears that their solution to this dilemma was to adopt the collateral order doctrine. I don't know that the court has ever considered whether immunity granted by an anti-SLAPP statute would similarly be "separable from and collateral to rights asserted in the main action", but a fair answer would be that it's not.

I think the argument would be, "defendant's right to free speech is separable from and collateral to the plaintiff's right not to be defamed," but I think that the collateral doctrine rule would still be a hangup since its test involves whether the important question (of immunity from suit) is "entirely separable from the merits of the action"... and anti-SLAPP immunity seems inseparable from the merits of the action; its purpose is only to grant immunity against meritless lawsuits. The anti-SLAPP law has to try to balance both of those rights to determine which of them wins.

I'll be interested to see the arguments that they file in their briefs, though.

 

[AnOminous]

I'll be interested to see the arguments that they file in their briefs, though.

I would too, because Randazza will probably put some work into this. He doesn't work for free, but he doesn't take a ton of money not to work, either.

I commented earlier in this thread that one of the stronger arguments is that SLAPP is rather similar to an immunity argument, in that the right protected by SLAPP is the right not to have to stand trial at all, and this would be eliminated without the right to appellate review. Most SLAPP statutes, such as those in Texas (that we have seen in cases covered right here), give an immediate right to appeal upon denial of the motion.

So it would seem a right to appeal here would depend on the Colorado SLAPP statute actually being applicable in Minnesota.

I find this ridiculous, but then, razzle-dazzle Randazza still has to put in his two cents (and Nick's six figures or so).

 

[Strix454]

This all seems encouraging. An arcane secondary point of law to fight over in the court of appeals over the appeal itself that could potentially go even further up the courts. More complicated law nerding by Randazza and even more money out of Nick's pocket.

 

[feral cat #6385]

Nick is being just as much if not more so of a malicous Jackass as Ron Toye was in the Vic case.

 

[Balldo's Gate]

I commented earlier in this thread that one of the stronger arguments is that SLAPP is rather similar to an immunity argument, in that the right protected by SLAPP is the right not to have to stand trial at all, and this would be eliminated without the right to appellate review. Most SLAPP statutes, such as those in Texas (that we have seen in cases covered right here), give an immediate right to appeal upon denial of the motion.

So it would seem a right to appeal here would depend on the Colorado SLAPP statute actually being applicable in Minnesota.

It seems like they are not convinced at all that they have jurisdiction on this, but that they may end up having to go throughsignificant effort, like concluding that the anti-SLAPP is unconstitutional, to get there.

This is not quite the most amusing course of events. which would be for the conclusion of this appeal to be that the Colorado anti-SLAPP law should have been applied and the case thrown back to Fischer to make a determination on that, have that determination be "no, even under CO law there's enough here for Nick to stand trial", have Nick appeal that and get slapped down by the court of appeals.

 

[Useful_Mistake]

I reread Nick's statement of the case. In it Nick asserts that two Minnesota citizens were sued. Who's the other one? I can't find anyone else bar his company. I'm not sure Rekieta Law, LLC counts as a citizen.


Am I missing something?

Edit: United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network considers LLC's as "persons" though separately from citizens.

https://www.fincen.gov/who-united-states-person

 

[Kosher Salt]

I reread Nick's statement of the case. In it Nick asserts that two Minnesota citizens were sued. Who's the other one? I can't find anyone else bar his company. I'm not sure Rekieta Law, LLC counts as a citizen.

I don't know if it's common for lawyers to refer to corporations as citizens of the state in which they're incorporated, but that was what I took it to mean at least.

 

[AnOminous]

I reread Nick's statement of the case. In it Nick asserts that two Minnesota citizens were sued. Who's the other one? I can't find anyone else bar his company. I'm not sure Rekieta Law, LLC counts as a citizen.

"Citizen" in a jurisdictional context generally means a corporation as well.

For instance: "In determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists, a corporation is considered to be a citizen of both its state of incorporation and its principal place of business." Most diversity cases have some sentence that reads like this, although this is just the first hit on diversity jurisdiction in a generic online law dictionary.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/diversity_jurisdiction

 

[mindlessobserver]

It still annoys me that our courts refer to corporations as citizens though. Citizens vote and hold elected office. A corporation is a legal construct. It would be more accurate to refer to a corporation as a "Subject Entity" then a "Citizen".

Alas, the abortion that is "Citizens United" continues to haunt our jurisprudence.

 

[AnOminous]

It still annoys me that our courts refer to corporations as citizens though. Citizens vote and hold elected office. A corporation is a legal construct. It would be more accurate to refer to a corporation as a "Subject Entity" then a "Citizen".

Alas, the abortion that is "Citizens United" continues to haunt our jurisprudence.

It's not a creepy euphemism, it's just that the language in the Constitution uses the word "citizen."

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

U.S. Const., Art III, § 2, cl. 1.

So, for the purpose of jurisdiction, corporations are "citizens." If courts hadn't ruled that, diversity jurisdiction wouldn't exist for corporations and that would be an absurd result.

 

[feral cat #6385]

It's not a creepy euphemism, it's just that the language in the Constitution uses the word "citizen."


U.S. Const., Art III, § 2, cl. 1.

So, for the purpose of jurisdiction, corporations are "citizens." If courts hadn't ruled that, diversity jurisdiction wouldn't exist for corporations and that would be an absurd result.

So the corporation NICK REKIETA and the individual Nick Rekieta are being sued? So, it won't matter if its and Admiralty Court or not? Does that mean Nick can't use the sovereign citizen defense. Regardless. I bet Darrel Brooks would get the same result for Rekieta at a fraction of the cost.

 

[Triple Flutz]

It still annoys me that our courts refer to corporations as citizens though. Citizens vote and hold elected office. A corporation is a legal construct. It would be more accurate to refer to a corporation as a "Subject Entity" then a "Citizen".

It helps to think of it as a legal fiction. Corporations don't get to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment, for example- rights can be seen as personal (as in, tied to physical personhood) vs general/universal, especially since the contrary in this case would allow corporations to behave in ways that happen to be detrimental to their employees but then pivot and use them as a shield (invoking layoffs, bankruptcy, loss of jobs, etc. as a shield against the consequences of their decision-making) but in certain aspects, they are regarded as persons or citizens, for example, in the fact that they are able to be parties to a contract and remain responsible for their own actions. As An0minous said, the citizen expression is due to the Constitution, and without the stated ''citizen'' part, the same thing applies in different jurisdictions, such as our neighbors to the North.

 

[prolapsed_cranium]

I linked to an explanatory article. At its very briefest, it is an exception to the so-called "final judgment rule" that you can only appeal an interlocutory order (an order made before the case is over) under a very limited number of circumstances, generally involving either an order about something separate from the actual main case itself and/or something that couldn't be appealed after the case because it would be moot.

Minnesota has some weird fucking procedures and rules.

This is an example of a "brief" definition and isn't terribly more informative unless you already know most of what's being discussed in it:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collateral_order_doctrine
My opinion is that 1 and 3 may apply but 2 definitely doesn't because a SLAPP motion is intrinsically linked to the merits of the action.

Also even if they decide they have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal, he could still lose that, and if he won it, all he would win would be a chance for a SLAPP hearing at the trial court, and he could (and probably would) lose that too.

That's where I am at with this: Nick wins on appeal (not likely) and goes back to the trial court where CO law is applied and the Judge still says "don't care"