THE UIGHUR FACTOR
Before 2009, any link between Uighur separatists and the al-Qaeda network was questionable.[8] However, following the 2009 Guangdong incident and subsequent disturbance, al-Qaeda took notice of China and threatened the nation for what may be the first time.[9] Uighur fighters had been found in Afghanistan in the years prior to 2009, and 22 had been captured by American forces, who ascertained that most of them had no connection whatsoever with al-Qaeda or the Taliban.[10] The explanation given by the Uighurs for their presence in Afghanistan, and the likely actual reason is that they were migrants leaving China, not militants hoping to fight in a war.[11] This claim is supported by the fact that many Uighurs have indeed left China to reach Central Asia.[12] The East Turkestan Islamic Movement and the closely related Turkestan Islamic Party had bases in Pakistan and some Uighurs had joined al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Prior to 2009, however, this figure was considered negligible and the majority of Uighur militants focused on developing their separatist ideology.[13] Following the 2009 incident, the security crackdown began to seriously push Uighur fighters towards more radical groups and ideologies abroad.[14]
The declaration of the Caliphate by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014 was soon followed by the first edition of the Islamic State propaganda magazine, Dabiq. This first issue, appropriately entitled “The Return of Khilafah” (Caliphate), includes an excerpt of a speech given by al-Baghdadi himself in which he calls upon all Muslims for their support and names multiple nations as enemies, including China.[15] Subsequent issues of Dabiq and its successor magazine, Rumiyah, were released in the Uighur language.[16]
Additionally, al-Qaeda followed the Islamic State announcement with its own condemnation of China in its magazine Resurgence.[17] This threat may be more significant to China because the Turkestan Islamic Party is now believed to have stronger links to al-Qaeda and China is becoming increasingly concerned with connections between its Uighur populations and radical groups in its Central Asian neighbors.[18] In 2016, a Uighur member of the Turkestan Islamic Party bombed the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan shortly after a call to action among Uighurs was made by al-Qaeda’s head, Ayman al-Zawahiri.[19] Then in February 2017, the Islamic State released a video designed to appeal to Uighurs. In it, a Uighur man pledges bayat, or allegiance, and condemns China. Only two days later saw the release of another video by the Turkestan Islamic Party, which by this point was believed to have strengthened its ties to al-Qaeda.[20] It is becoming clearer that globalized Islamic extremist groups are focusing on China and seeking to recruit Uighurs. The Islamic State has even gone so far as to produce an audio message in Mandarin, the official dialect of China, so non-Uighur Chinese may be exposed to their propaganda.[21]
Uighur leaders and spokesmen fear this propaganda which, along with other tactics, may be working. As Uighurs are under immense pressure to exit China, they may be persuaded or tricked into joining a radical Islamic group. One Uighur activist, Seyit Tumturk, stated in an interview at the end of 2017, “We (Uighurs) are losing the de-radicalization battle.”[22] Uighur community representatives in Turkey also state that some of those who have left China are being enticed by Uighur members of the Islamic State into joining the militant group and travelling to Syria.[23] An expert on Sino-Mideast relations, Christina Lin, has remarked that since the war in Syria began, the region has been the “forward front for China’s War on Terror,” while also noting the corresponding increase in foreign-based attacks in China. [24]
One estimate of the Uighurs in Syria to fight with the Turkestan Islamic Party reaches as high as 5,000 recruits; many of them are not religious fundamentalists but instead simply wished leave the conditions under which they lived in Xinjiang.[25] Despite their original purpose for joining the Turkestan Islamic Party in Syria, one consequence may be radicalization into Islamic extremism. Still, there does not seem to be a strong link between the Islamic State and the Turkestan Islamic Party, and Uighur members of both groups are discouraging potential recruits from joining the other.[26] This is likely due to Al-Qaeda’s position of non-support for the Islamic State, and the latter’s tendency to declare others as apostates.[27]
In total, the estimate made in 2016 was that just over 100 Uighurs had joined the Islamic State in Syria.[28] This is a relatively small number compared to the thousands of Uighurs believed to have joined the Turkestan Islamic Party. As the fighting in Syria and elsewhere draws down, many of these fighters may return to Xinjiang to attempt to continue the battle. China recognizes this, and in early 2017 President Xi Jinping stated the need for a “great wall of iron” in Xinjiang, while pointing to the potential threat from Islamic separatists and returning fighters.[29]
The current One Belt One Road initiative may also fuel internal pressure in Xinjiang as participatory countries, eager to cooperate with China, are restricting Uighur migration.[30] Southeast Asian countries including Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and others have been repatriating Uighurs to China, where they will likely have to face Chinese authorities.[31] This is removing an exit route for Uighurs who hope to leave Xinjiang, and forcing them to remain in place or depart through Central Asia where they may be enticed by radical groups. Those Uighurs who choose to remain in Xinjiang may also be targeted by radical recruiters and propaganda. Despite the drawdown of Islamic State forces in Syria and Iraq, where local forces are making headway in their respective conflicts, Uighurs may still remain the subject of propaganda and radicalization. After all, the Turkestan Islamic Party continues to exist and develop fundamentalist tones due to its relationship with al-Qaeda, and the Uighur population in general likely feels more pressure by the Chinese government and radical groups.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of Uighurs to extremist groups in Southeast Asia may mean that these two fronts will be connected and mutually supportive. In the Muslim-majority nation of Indonesia, for example, public sentiment towards Uighurs causes them to be somewhat welcomed even despite their extremist inclinations. In 2015, an Indonesian court convicted several Uighurs of terror-related activities in Indonesia but refused to return them to China, citing concerns for their well-being.[43]
These are not the only Uighurs to be related to terrorism in Indonesia. Several Uighurs have been discovered funding terror cells in Indonesia and involved in actual fighting.[44,45] Another group of Uighurs was arrested in the Philippines for using false passports, and after an investigation it was discovered that they may have been in contact with the Abu Sayyaf group, an affiliate of the Islamic State.[46]
In the past, extremist Uighurs were relatively isolated and reflected a separatist mentality, but the ISIS declaration of the Caliphate and the resulting global spread of Islamic extremism have created the opportunity for Uighurs to connect with other groups in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. While the main body of the Islamic State in Syria has not received significant Uighur support, they have focused attention on the Uighurs and sponsored a war where some could be trained, while also revitalizing Islamic extremism in the Pacific region. The Turkestan Islamic Party remains the key group for Uighur militants; however, their experience in Syria and their growing ties with al-Qaeda may be changing their narrative and connecting them to other groups.
