- Joined
- Sep 30, 2019
Doctrines
How countries plan on using nuclear weapons
United States - The US nuclear doctrine is primarily counterforce, with a general "no cities" policy. Of course, the nature of counterforce targets means cities won't be completely safe, but one might suspect that the US would use lower-yield weapons on targets near cities. While one might also suspect that the US will not use nuclear weapons until one is used first, the US has declined to accept a "no first use" policy. The reason for that is the US's "nuclear umbrella," meaning our nuclear deterrent extends to our non-nuclear allies (Korea, Japan, NATO). The US arsenal is a triad, consisting of air, sea, and land-based weapons. However, the most numerous is the sea-based SLBMs, in part due to their survivability. Most of the US's arsenal is strategic. While there was an extensive tactical weapons program during the early Cold War, most of our tactical nuclear weapons have been decommissioned, as US conventional capability has improved and doctrine has switched to prioritizing high-accuracy conventional weapons.
Russia - Russian nuclear doctrine is more opaque than that of western nations. However, from what is known and observed, Russian nuclear doctrine can be seen to have two goals: political coercion, and emergency tactical use. Politically, Russia uses its massive arsenal in an attempt to control escalation through threat of use. Adding to this, Russian doctrine allows for a preemptive first strike, likely in response to the survivability threat posed by the US' counterforce doctrine. Tactically, Russia possesses a large number of battlefield nuclear weapons, which may be used in emergency situations to make up for conventional inferiority. Given the Russian way of war seen in Ukraine, large-scale use can be expected to be largely countervalue, though counterforce targeting is likely included in a strike plan. Russia possesses a nuclear triad, though the bulk of its triad is in ground-launched ballistic missiles. Additionally, rather than relying on hardened silos, much of Russia's ICBMs are mobile, with the goal of improving survivability through mobility.
China - China's nuclear doctrine is in some ways transparent, but in other ways very opaque. China maintains a minimum-credible deterrent, and has a formal "no-first use" policy. However, due to the opaqueness of the Chinese government, the validity of these stances is heavily questioned. China is also undergoing a significant expansion of its nuclear forces alongside the general modernization of its military. It possesses a nuclear triad, though the SLBM portion of its deterrent is still undergoing modernization and construction.
North Korea - North Korea's arsenal is still small, limited in range, and at the moment lacks an SLBM component, making survivability low and vulnerable to counterforce. However, their doctrine is quite aggressive. It allows for preemptive use against the US and SK, as well as tactical use. As North Korea lacks counterforce capabilities, any strategic strike will likely be countervalue.
Israel - Israel's nuclear doctrine can be summed up in the "Samson Option." In short, if Israel is at risk of being completely overrun by a hostile foreign power, they will launch a full nuclear attack against said power. As most hostile nations are non-nuclear, such a strike will necessarily be countervalue. Israel has a nuclear triad, as well as a tactical nuclear capability.
India - India's nuclear stockpile is mainly in response to Pakistan's. They have a nuclear triad, but maintain only a minimum-credible deterrent, and are a no-first use nation.
Pakistan - Pakistan's nuclear program is largely in response to India's, and serves mainly to deter aggression from India. As India is a stronger military power, Pakistan maintains it would use nuclear weapons upon war with India to avoid an almost certain conventional loss. Pakistan has a nuclear triad, though lacks SLBMs.
France - France's nuclear program is a largely political one, intended to maintain French independence from the US nuclear umbrella. It is a largely countervalue force, and France uniquely maintains an open first-strike posture. However, it exists mainly as a political deterrent, and is restricted for use to protect their "vital interests," which is most likely territorial integrity and the safety of the population. France has a sea and air component, but lacks land-based nuclear missiles.
United Kingdom - The UK's nuclear stockpile is entirely consistent of SLBMs, and is minimum-credible. Standard of use is kept vague, they have neither a first use nor a no-first use policy.
Russia - Russian nuclear doctrine is more opaque than that of western nations. However, from what is known and observed, Russian nuclear doctrine can be seen to have two goals: political coercion, and emergency tactical use. Politically, Russia uses its massive arsenal in an attempt to control escalation through threat of use. Adding to this, Russian doctrine allows for a preemptive first strike, likely in response to the survivability threat posed by the US' counterforce doctrine. Tactically, Russia possesses a large number of battlefield nuclear weapons, which may be used in emergency situations to make up for conventional inferiority. Given the Russian way of war seen in Ukraine, large-scale use can be expected to be largely countervalue, though counterforce targeting is likely included in a strike plan. Russia possesses a nuclear triad, though the bulk of its triad is in ground-launched ballistic missiles. Additionally, rather than relying on hardened silos, much of Russia's ICBMs are mobile, with the goal of improving survivability through mobility.
China - China's nuclear doctrine is in some ways transparent, but in other ways very opaque. China maintains a minimum-credible deterrent, and has a formal "no-first use" policy. However, due to the opaqueness of the Chinese government, the validity of these stances is heavily questioned. China is also undergoing a significant expansion of its nuclear forces alongside the general modernization of its military. It possesses a nuclear triad, though the SLBM portion of its deterrent is still undergoing modernization and construction.
North Korea - North Korea's arsenal is still small, limited in range, and at the moment lacks an SLBM component, making survivability low and vulnerable to counterforce. However, their doctrine is quite aggressive. It allows for preemptive use against the US and SK, as well as tactical use. As North Korea lacks counterforce capabilities, any strategic strike will likely be countervalue.
Israel - Israel's nuclear doctrine can be summed up in the "Samson Option." In short, if Israel is at risk of being completely overrun by a hostile foreign power, they will launch a full nuclear attack against said power. As most hostile nations are non-nuclear, such a strike will necessarily be countervalue. Israel has a nuclear triad, as well as a tactical nuclear capability.
India - India's nuclear stockpile is mainly in response to Pakistan's. They have a nuclear triad, but maintain only a minimum-credible deterrent, and are a no-first use nation.
Pakistan - Pakistan's nuclear program is largely in response to India's, and serves mainly to deter aggression from India. As India is a stronger military power, Pakistan maintains it would use nuclear weapons upon war with India to avoid an almost certain conventional loss. Pakistan has a nuclear triad, though lacks SLBMs.
France - France's nuclear program is a largely political one, intended to maintain French independence from the US nuclear umbrella. It is a largely countervalue force, and France uniquely maintains an open first-strike posture. However, it exists mainly as a political deterrent, and is restricted for use to protect their "vital interests," which is most likely territorial integrity and the safety of the population. France has a sea and air component, but lacks land-based nuclear missiles.
United Kingdom - The UK's nuclear stockpile is entirely consistent of SLBMs, and is minimum-credible. Standard of use is kept vague, they have neither a first use nor a no-first use policy.
General tips on surviving the apocalypse
The two major targets are population centers and silos. Depending on the war and the strategy employed, one might not be targeted, but it's better to be safe than sorry. As far as population centers go, the larger and more industrialized, the more dangerous. A small city will likely not get prioritized, but if you live in New York or LA, and suspect a war, it might be best to bug out.
In general, you're safest in a rural area, provided it's not near a silo site. Suburban areas may be safe as well, depending on their distance from a high-risk target. You're more likely to need to take precautions if you live closer to a major city
This applies largely to the US. In other nations, the situation is different. In a war between NATO and Russia, Europe is likely to be targeted; particularly the UK and France, but possibly also Eastern European nations. In a war between the US and China or North Korea, South Korea and Japan will likely be at risk. Again, stay away from major cities when tensions get high. In general though, nations not involved in the conflict are not at a high risk. Unlike what the media portrays, a "global thermonuclear war" will likely not really be "global."
In general, you're safest in a rural area, provided it's not near a silo site. Suburban areas may be safe as well, depending on their distance from a high-risk target. You're more likely to need to take precautions if you live closer to a major city
This applies largely to the US. In other nations, the situation is different. In a war between NATO and Russia, Europe is likely to be targeted; particularly the UK and France, but possibly also Eastern European nations. In a war between the US and China or North Korea, South Korea and Japan will likely be at risk. Again, stay away from major cities when tensions get high. In general though, nations not involved in the conflict are not at a high risk. Unlike what the media portrays, a "global thermonuclear war" will likely not really be "global."
A surprise nuclear attack is very unlikely. In other words, you are likely to see a nuclear war coming before it actually starts. It will likely be preceded by a period of intense conventional conflict, increasing tensions, and possibly even a tactical (battlefield) nuclear exchange. A responsible nation would likely issue a partial evacuation order for high-risk targets, but don't count on it. An initial exchange will likely be only a few weapons. If you're dumb enough not to evacuate before then and are lucky enough not to live in a target area, that's another good sign to bug out.
If you get advanced warning:
-Get to a basement or other underground shelter.
-Stay away from windows.
-Look away from the likely blast zone. There is a real risk of eye damage from the initial flash.
If you see the flash:
-Get away from windows. The blast wave will shatter them and you could end up with glass injuries.
-Duck and cover. It's not a meme. Ducking will protect you from the effects of the blast wave. Covering your skin will protect from flash injuries.
-Get to a basement or other underground shelter.
-Stay away from windows.
-Look away from the likely blast zone. There is a real risk of eye damage from the initial flash.
If you see the flash:
-Get away from windows. The blast wave will shatter them and you could end up with glass injuries.
-Duck and cover. It's not a meme. Ducking will protect you from the effects of the blast wave. Covering your skin will protect from flash injuries.
After the first blast, get underground as fast as possible. Nuclear strategy relies on "overkill," meaning that there will likely be a followup. If you can't get to a shelter in time, prepare yourself and remember to duck and cover.
After the exchange, stay completely in your shelter for at least three days, with protection less travel not being safe for two weeks. While fallout is more of a risk around silos (due to the attack likely being groundburst), it's better to be safe than sorry.
If you have to leave at some point between day 3 and day 14 make sure to wear plenty of layers of clothing, covering every inch of skin you can, and shed them at the entrance to your shelter.
After the exchange, stay completely in your shelter for at least three days, with protection less travel not being safe for two weeks. While fallout is more of a risk around silos (due to the attack likely being groundburst), it's better to be safe than sorry.
If you have to leave at some point between day 3 and day 14 make sure to wear plenty of layers of clothing, covering every inch of skin you can, and shed them at the entrance to your shelter.
Want to learn more about the bomb?
History
The Making of the Atomic Bomb - Richard Rhodes
Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History - Croddy et al.
Strategy
Escalation and the Nuclear Option - Bernard Brodie
Strategy in the Missile Age - Bernard Brodie
Deterrence - Lawrence Freedman
The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (4th Edition) - Lawrence Freedman
On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios - Herman Kahn
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy - Henry Kissinger
On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century - Jeffery Larsen
Arms and Influence - Thomas C. Schelling
War & Aftermath
On Thermonuclear War - Herman Kahn
The Making of the Atomic Bomb - Richard Rhodes
Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History - Croddy et al.
Strategy
Escalation and the Nuclear Option - Bernard Brodie
Strategy in the Missile Age - Bernard Brodie
Deterrence - Lawrence Freedman
The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (4th Edition) - Lawrence Freedman
On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios - Herman Kahn
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy - Henry Kissinger
On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century - Jeffery Larsen
Arms and Influence - Thomas C. Schelling
War & Aftermath
On Thermonuclear War - Herman Kahn
History
How India Got the Bomb
The Ultimate Guide to Nuclear Weapons
Prepping
Protection in the Nuclear Age
Strategy
Deterrence 101 (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3)
Nuclear Strategy for Beginners (Part 1, Part 2)
On Deterrence
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy, An Oral History (Part 1, Part 2)
Why One Nuke is Never Enough - Myth of the Overkill
How India Got the Bomb
The Ultimate Guide to Nuclear Weapons
Prepping
Protection in the Nuclear Age
Strategy
Deterrence 101 (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3)
Nuclear Strategy for Beginners (Part 1, Part 2)
On Deterrence
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy, An Oral History (Part 1, Part 2)
Why One Nuke is Never Enough - Myth of the Overkill
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