- Joined
- Feb 4, 2020
700k, which would include men outside of fighting age and people with disabilities, there is no reason necessarily to think that this has had a major impact on the availability of fighting power.@Mr E. Grifter
Nope, reply function still fucked.
The gender ratio of the retreating soldiers is lopsided towards women, but 10% still amounts to 700k men, and the more bandied about later stats of 20% is 1.4mil, this in a country with a 54% to 46% ratio of men towards women. There's a reason that a little before he made progress in Kharkov Zelensky was talking about mooobilizing women, after he'd already started it out with convicts and so forth. Fleeing the country as being evidentiary of patriotism about it by reducing your welfare burden, that in a state where the welfare packet is around a 100 bucks, is a joke. Though I'm all for it. I'm sure the Russian liberals fleeing right now are actually sleeper agents out to collapse the Georgian economy. Either way, Russian support for the SMO is in the 70-80% range on paper. The truth is the only way to see if there's a conscriptable population and a morale high enough to keep fighting is when it's tested shortly. Ukraine was expected to melt on contact and didn't, and its million man conscription march was expected to fail, but while there's less than a mil out there for sure, it was still enough to double or triple their starting army, which already outnumbered the contract soldiers sent as part of the SMO.
It's not the welfare costs in monetary terms, it's the requirement to sustain these people, house them, cloth them, provide medical services for them, educate them. The whole burden on the Ukrainian state for those 7 million people has effectively been palmed off to other nations. That frees up a lot of capacity to support the war. A tangential example you could point to was rationing in the UK in WWII, on paper it wasn't required as the UK could continue to import most of the food it wanted and it could afford to do so - yet it didn't, because they recognised their shipping capacity was limited regardless of the amount of money they could throw at it and therefore reducing food imports increased capacity for imports of weapons and other supplies for the war. So no, when we get to the specifics of what it requires to sustain 7 million people, this will free a lot of capacity for the Ukrainian state that it would otherwise need to us to keep these people from dying.
Russians are not really switched on politically, and those that are tend towards being Vatniks. This is because of how the Russian state controls the media - so while I do not doubt those opinion polls are genuine, I will question what it tells us about the opinion of your average Russian. With such high support for the war, you wouldn't expect them to have bus people into their annexation concert, just look at the difference with their celebration for the annexation of Crimea - one is genuine, the other looks entirely staged. It is an indicator. People fleeing, that's another one. What we do not see are mass expressions of support, and interviews with most of these mobilised conscripts are people begrudgingly accepting their fate.
We do not need to pretend that, we know the majority of these "reservists" are people with very minimalist military training of dubious quality, and that they have not served in years. Military skills are subject to skill fade, and unless you were a long term professional soldier - not a conscript for a year who did basic training if that - your memory of what to do will be basically gone. You may be able to pick things up quicker than your average person, but these people are not soldiers. I have seen that sort of skill fade, the real wishful thinking is to pretend that it isn't there.Suppose we pretend that none of the reservists have any training to speak of and that Russia has now lost all of its instructors. Few have anything but wishful thinking to back it considering how a large portion of the reason posts are so undermanned is because contract soldiers have gone home since their deals expired and they weren't rotated. Even someone with completely basic training holding a gun can prevent losses of the kinds of Kharkov and Kherson. We're not talking about defeats caused by tactical or technological superiority, but by the lack of people of any kind. The Ukrainians flung people down a meatgrinder at Suhoy Stavok for a month plus to be shot, but because they could replenish them manpower wise and learn where to strike they could eventually pull it off. Kharkov was even more telling when you had stretches of essential logistical territory guarded by a couple hundred people. Numbers have a quality all their own, especially defensively, and the ones making the progress they are now aren't elite disguised NATO niggers or whatever, they're mostly territorial battalions with a few others spruced in, either with minimal military experience in the Donbass or none, just training over the course of the war.
There are trainers, but again very few because their standard training system requires people to get trained at their units which are mostly deployed. So they've had to scramble for other options. This means they either compromise massively on quality - having people without experience train them - or their training capacity will be extremely limited.
It's not entirely wrong that numbers might have benefits, especially for rear echelon and guarding - but, again how are these men going to be supplied, how will they maintain secure communications, can they mutually support one another or will they be easily surrounded and defeated in detail because they lack mobility or awareness of the battlefield? These are all things that untrained civilians with a gun cannot do, and unlike the Taliban or guerrilla movements they cannot evade capture by blending in with the locals because the locals fucking hate them. The Ukrainians also benefitted from the man portable weapons the West designed specifically to defeat an armoured Russian assault, the Russian equivalents are not as capable and I doubt their higher end ATGMs would be given to these conscripts. So no, they would be very vulnerable even around Kharkiv, because without secure Comms which Russia they wouldn't even be able to communicate they were being attacked.
Lets just consider a very basic scenario - food. You've just had an influx of 100k troops with basic training and very little in the way of people to show them the ropes. They don't have enough radios, and you have very stretched capacity for logistics. How do you know when they need food, ammunition or anything? Where are they, where do you find them? Do you have maps, are they in date, can you even read them?
If the answer to the above is, oh shit this was a rushed mess and we have no fucking clue, those men are not going to be any use to anyone in a few days time.
I said earlier that Russian forces aren't going to just stop existing, but that we will see a progressive degredation of capabilities. Missile strikes are a great example of this, their high end cruise missiles were used often and en masse early in the war, they did not perform well in fairness, but this is likely due to the fact Russia seem incapable of employing target acquisition in a timely manner - and I think the US fucked with their ability to use GPS so their accuracy was reduced from what was seen in Syria, but don't quote me on that - however they have since been using repurposed Anti Ship Missiles and S300 Missiles in ground attack mode. These are less than ideal, and not that accurate and as we are seeing they are increasingly being used as terror weapons - hitting apartments rather than targets of military value. This is exactly what we would expect as Russia has run out of it's top end capabilities and if we look at their Kalibre production capacity its nowhere near high end to make a material difference to the wars outcome. So now their once feared deep strike capability is basically just a terror weapon, and that will not have an effect on the wars outcome.The same applies to stocks, given the Russians are still chucking missiles six months after they're supposed to have run out, and that same unit with the rusted AKs got a new one, much like the hohols with their rusted panzerfaust and decayed Polish Tanks, we get to the point I mentioned last post, the Russians don't need to achieve parity per capita, they only need to be successful enough to overwhelm the force that's there. Fronts decided by 100 armored vehicles and 6k troops, as Kherson is right now, do not hinge on the possibility of millions of troops or existence of Soviet stocks of tens of thousands of old tanks and missiles, but by a fraction of those being usable.
Russia is already reaching deep into it's stocks, and the OSINT on available Russian tanks and AFVs in deep storage do not paint a picture of a nation that can keep this up. They've been confirmed to have lost 1,300 tanks already. Lets not get into tank crews and the skills required to drive the fucking things - so we are going to see less capable crews, with less reliable tanks that are less capable than what they had already lost. The idea they can sustain that is laughable, it's just not true.
We are going to have a mass army, that isn't equipped to fight a modern war and they will get absolutely smashed. You can talk about not requiring parity, but when capability becomes so lop sided the mass they bring will be almost useless. Thousands of untrained, unmotivated, badly equipped soldiers being throw into the fray with a supply system that already struggles to support the Russian forces that are already in the field will generate little in the way of useful combat power. Maybe you could stabilise a frontline, but once there is a breakthrough their lack of communications, training and effective weapons will leave them unable to react.
No, the one engaging in magical thinking is you - you look at Russia being a bigger country and think, well actually if we say even if they have 2 losses for each Ukrainian they will win. However, this is ignoring that combat power isn't a formula and the multitude of factors involved in producing it are hard to quantify - but the results are easy for all to see. So yes, could they field a bigger army? Sure, but is there any evidence they could train, equip and sustain it? I guess technically the jury is out, but the evidence seems to suggest a resounding no to that, if we mean giving them the very basic training and equipment required to fight in a modern high intensity battlefield. Given they couldn't even properly equip and sustain the 200k troops they have already sent in...Where you are right now is where a lot of people and whole agencies were at the start of the operation. You're looking at the numbers and they're very clear, but you're engaged in magical thinking as to how they don't actually apply. Luckily, these things are falsifiable. Morale'll be tested fairly soon by how the Russians react to the upcoming defeats in Kherson and Lysychansk and if they really fuck up Melitopol and the worth of manpower will be seen further into winter when the mobilized are actually due to come in.