Culture What Moneyball-for-Everything has done for culture


The return of the World Series this weekend offers an opportunity to engage in America’s real national pastime: wondering loudly why people don’t like baseball as much as they used to.

Speaking personally, my relationship to the game these days is one of nostalgic befuddlement. The nostalgia part comes from spotless memories of watching Sunday Night Baseball on my parents’ couch, nestled between my dad and my dog: the chintzy ESPN graphics, the theme song that sounded straight out of a video game, the dulcet baritones of the announcers Jon Miller and Joe Morgan. The befuddlement part comes from the fact that, like a lot of people of my generation, I spend a weird amount of time wondering why I don’t spend any amount of time watching baseball anymore.

Possible reasons abound. After the steroid scandals of the 2000s, the stars of my childhood got dragged onto C-SPAN, ceremonially berated for cheating by grumpy old dudes, and blacklisted from the Hall of Fame. Kind of a bummer, to be honest. But on a deeper level, I think what happened is that baseball was colonized by math and got solved like an equation.

The analytics revolution, which began with the movement known as Moneyball, led to a series of offensive and defensive adjustments that were, let’s say, catastrophically successful. Seeking strikeouts, managers increased the number of pitchers per game and pushed up the average velocity and spin rate per pitcher. Hitters responded by increasing the launch angles of their swings, raising the odds of a home run, but making strikeouts more likely as well. These decisions were all legal, and more important, they were all correct from an analytical and strategic standpoint.

Smarties approached baseball like an equation, optimized for Y, solved for X, and proved in the process that a solved sport is a worse one. The sport that I fell in love with doesn’t really exist anymore. In the 1990s, there were typically 50 percent more hits than strikeouts in each game. Today, there are consistently more strikeouts than hits. Singles have swooned to record lows, and hits per game have plunged to 1910s levels. In the century and a half of MLB history covered by the database Baseball Reference, the 10 years with the most strikeouts per game are the past 10.

The religion scholar James P. Carse wrote that there are two kinds of games in life: finite and infinite. A finite game is played to win; there are clear victors and losers. An infinite game is played to keep playing; the goal is to maximize winning across all participants. Debate is a finite game. Marriage is an infinite game. The midterm elections are finite games. American democracy is an infinite game. A great deal of unnecessary suffering in the world comes from not knowing the difference. A bad fight can destroy a marriage. A challenged election can destabilize a democracy. In baseball, winning the World Series is a finite game, while growing the popularity of Major League Baseball is an infinite game. What happened, I think, is that baseball’s finite game was solved so completely in such a way that the infinite game was lost.

When universal smarts lead to universal strategies, it can lead to a more homogenous product. Take the NBA. When every basketball team wakes up to the calculation that three points is 50 percent more than two points, you get a league-wide blitz of three-point shooting to take advantage of the discrepancy. Before the 2011–12 season, the league as a whole had never averaged more than 20 three-point-shot attempts per game. This year, no team is attempting fewer than 25 threes per game; four teams are attempting more than 40.

As I’ve written before, the quantitative revolution in culture is a living creature that consumes data and spits out homogeneity. Take the music industry. Before the ’90s, music labels routinely lied to Billboard about their sales figures to boost their preferred artists. In 1991, Billboard switched methodologies to use more objective data, including point-of-sale information and radio surveys that didn’t rely on input from the labels. The charts changed overnight. Rock-and-roll bands were toppled, and hip-hop and country surged. When the charts became more honest, they also became more static. Popular songs stick around longer than they used to. One analysis of the history of pop-music styles found that rap and hip-hop have dominated American pop music longer than any other musical genre. As the analytics revolution in music grew, radio playlists became more repetitive, and by some measures, the most popular songs became more similar to one another.

Or take film. As with music, you could certainly make the case that the communications revolution has created an abundance of video content that, in the aggregate, is fantastically diverse. But although the rules for making a viral video, or a critically acclaimed film, are deeply complex, blockbuster movies look a lot like a solved equation. In 2019, the 10 biggest films by domestic box office included two Marvel sequels, two animated-film sequels, a reboot of a ’90s blockbuster, and a Batman spin-off. In 2022, the 10 biggest films by domestic box office included two Marvel sequels, one animated-film sequel, a reboot of a ’90s blockbuster, and a Batman spin-off. Correctly observing that audiences responded predictably to familiar intellectual property, studios invested in a strategy that has squeezed original IP from the top-10 charts. Blockbusters are kinda boring now, not because Hollywood is stupid, but because it got so smart.

Is what I’m complaining about really a problem? Does it actually matter that people watch a lot of Marvel sequels, or that baseball no longer bestrides the national discourse? These issues don’t belong alongside wealth inequality, democratic continuity, or malaria on the spectrum of material problems. But I don’t want to hold cultural analysis ransom to the malaria test. The fact that movies and music aren’t as weighty as mortality is a part of why they are so important. As Larry Kramer wrote of sugar, culture might be the most important thing in life precisely because it’s about living, not just staying alive.

So yes, I care about the dark side of Moneyball. The Nobel laureate particle physicist Frank Wilczek once said that beauty exists as a dance between opposite forces. First, he said, beauty benefits from symmetry, which he defined as “change without change.” If you rotate a circle, it remains a circle, just as reversing the sides of an equation still reveals a truth (2+2=4, and 4=2+2). But beauty also draws from what Wilczek calls “exuberance,” or emergent complexity. Looking up at the interior of a mosque or a cathedral, or gazing at a classic Picasso or Pollock painting, you are seeing neither utter chaos nor a simple symmetry, but rather a kind of synthesis; an artistic dizziness bounded within a sense of order, which gives the whole work an appealing comprehensibility.

Cultural Moneyballism, in this light, sacrifices exuberance for the sake of formulaic symmetry. It sacrifices diversity for the sake of familiarity. It solves finite games at the expense of infinite games. Its genius dulls the rough edges of entertainment. I think that’s worth caring about. It is definitely worth asking the question: In a world that will only become more influenced by mathematical intelligence, can we ruin culture through our attempts to perfect it?

For once, I agree with the Atlantic. When everything is reduced to numbers, formulas, and other minutia, you can only see the price of everything and the value of nothing.
 
Good article. Puts words to something I've been thinking for a long time. Efficiency is no longer a tool to produce good outcomes, it's now an end unto itself, and damn the consequences. We were all worried about AI killing us all with a paperclip maximizer, when it turns out we already built our own without noticing.
 
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This is the reason why I subscribe to The Atlantic.

Even the times when I disagree with the author, there's almost always a good-faith effort at considering the question at hand.

Versus the NYT and the WaPo, which increasingly seem very disconnected with how people on the ground behave.

Like this article from the NYT about late-night talk shows and supposed liberal vs. conservative humor styles seems like a robot wrote it:

 
I'm not a sportsball person, I'm not a tv or movie person, and I can't figure out what the central theme or thoughts of this shithead author.
TLDR things become soulless Product™️ when you reduce everything down to statistics. Culture and experience are more than just the sum of their parts.
 
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I'm not a sportsball person, I'm not a tv or movie person, and I can't figure out what the central theme or thoughts of this shithead author.
Basically Moneyball was a "discovery" where you could reduce Baseball players and play to statistics and then optimize the shit out of it to have a massive advantage. Our culture in general is engaging in the same act of trying to optimize songs, films, etc. by reducing everything to trends and building up on it. Leading to every film/song/game feeling like the same god damn thing that a different company made. Though in that case the market usually chokes the pretender because you can only have very few Marvel/MOBA/<insert popular franchise or genre>
 
Basically Moneyball was a "discovery" where you could reduce Baseball players and play to statistics and then optimize the shit out of it to have a massive advantage. Our culture in general is engaging in the same act of trying to optimize songs, films, etc. by reducing everything to trends and building up on it. Leading to every film/song/game feeling like the same god damn thing that a different company made. Though in that case the market usually chokes the pretender because you can only have very few Marvel/MOBA/<insert popular franchise or genre>
It was developed by Oakland A's general manager Billy Beane (there's a movie about it starring Brad Pitt), but it evidently didn't work, because Oakland hasn't won a World Series in over 30 years.

True, you don't need a bunch of home-run hitters to win games; there's more than one way to skin a cat. But in addition to Beane's apparent failure, there's a whole new industry in baseball called Sabremetrics, which delves deep into seriously autistic nitpicks, whatifs, and yeahbuts.

They will keep track of things like the spin rate of pitches, exit velocity of a home run, how likely a player is to exceed against their replacement, and a whole host of other useless numbers that nobody gives a shit about.
 
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This is a good article that describes something I think many of us have observed: everything feels shittier, more boring, less alive than it used to, even measured over the course of your own life.

In systems theory, there is the idea of “suboptimization”. Basically, it means that you are tweaking a system to maximize outcomes for one specific subsystem. And in systems theory, this is a terrible idea and you shouldn’t do it, because it tends to cause the system as a whole to destabilize.

I feel that you can see many examples of suboptimizing happening in modern western culture - advancing the goals of a smallish group of black race hustlers over the goals of a complex multicultural society, for instance. But also maybe in this thing where you advance one goal - winning ball games, or high box office returns for your studio - over the more holistic goals of a system entire, like “having a fun national sport that thrives for many years to come” or “having a flourish western popular culture that is vibrant and inventive”.
 
But also maybe in this thing where you advance one goal - winning ball games, or high box office returns for your studio - over the more holistic goals of a system entire, like “having a fun national sport that thrives for many years to come” or “having a flourish western popular culture that is vibrant and inventive”.
And therein lies the problem: It conflates autism about numbers with thinking outside the box or scientific management. You get into "analysis paralysis" and miss the forest for the trees.

Numbers may not lie, but they don't always tell the whole story.
 
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It was developed by Oakland A's general manager Billy Beane (there's a movie about it starring Brad Pitt), but it evidently didn't work, because Oakland hasn't won a World Series in over 30 years.

True, you don't need a bunch of home-run hitters to win games there's more than one way to skin a cat. But in addition to Beane's apparent failure, there's a whole new industry in baseball called Sabremetrics, which delves deep into seriously autistic nitpicks, whatifs, and yeahbuts.

They will keep track of things like the spin rate of pitches, exit velocity of a home run, how likely a player is to exceed against their replacement, and a whole host of other useless numbers that nobody gives a shit about.
Tbf, the moment others caught on the idea the original team lost the only advantage they have, especially as richer teams can just go Nigger-mon collecting to get the best team.
This is a good article that describes something I think many of us have observed: everything feels shittier, more boring, less alive than it used to, even measured over the course of your own life.

In systems theory, there is the idea of “suboptimization”. Basically, it means that you are tweaking a system to maximize outcomes for one specific subsystem. And in systems theory, this is a terrible idea and you shouldn’t do it, because it tends to cause the system as a whole to destabilize.

I feel that you can see many examples of suboptimizing happening in modern western culture - advancing the goals of a smallish group of black race hustlers over the goals of a complex multicultural society, for instance. But also maybe in this thing where you advance one goal - winning ball games, or high box office returns for your studio - over the more holistic goals of a system entire, like “having a fun national sport that thrives for many years to come” or “having a flourish western popular culture that is vibrant and inventive”.
The problem is that in case of games the optimization is natural and straightforward. But when it comes to films you need to optimise the amount of audience going to see the film, but instead what is optimised is how similar the film is to other popular films, which not only makes your film a worse version, but ignores the fact audience will change trends over time.
 
It was developed by Oakland A's general manager Billy Beane (there's a movie about it starring Brad Pitt), but it evidently didn't work, because Oakland hasn't won a World Series in over 30 years.
I would argue that it's a bit unfair to say that it didn't work out. While you're absolutely correct that they haven't won a World Series in that time, they (management) always had to play at a big disadvantage due to their financial resources (much like how Tampa Bay and Cleveland have to.)

In my opinion, they did what they had to do: be creative and intelligent and they've done far better than what anyone could have expected. Moneyball, as in Beane's Athletics is soul, whereas its application in general culture is soulless. Or maybe I'm just romantic about baseball, whatever. :story:
 
The problem is that in case of games the optimization is natural and straightforward. But when it comes to films you need to optimise the amount of audience going to see the film, but instead what is optimised is how similar the film is to other popular films, which not only makes your film a worse version, but ignores the fact audience will change trends over time.
I also suspect there's a fear of sucking out loud that counterintuitively makes it all suck out loud.

I was going to sperg about film in response to your comment, but I decided not to.

There used to be this radio station near me. The format was generally what used to be called "Alternative Rock."

Their whole schtick was that if you thought a song sucked, you could text a number and some computer would calculate all the downvotes and if too many people hated a song, it would stop playing that song.

Utterly predictably, what used to very large playlist got winnowed down over time and the station basically became what one might call "Gen X Classic Rock."

Think less Phantogram and more Muse's greatest hits, less Violent Femmes and more the same fucking songs off of "10" or "Nevermind" that have been in heavy rotation for 30 years.

The fear of sucking made it suck.
 
Tbf, the moment others caught on the idea the original team lost the only advantage they have, especially as richer teams can just go Nigger-mon collecting to get the best team.

The problem is that in case of games the optimization is natural and straightforward. But when it comes to films you need to optimise the amount of audience going to see the film, but instead what is optimised is how similar the film is to other popular films, which not only makes your film a worse version, but ignores the fact audience will change trends over time.
Also hollywood is just weird. I dont know if its better or worse that they put computers and "algorithms" in charge remember how cut throat island killed pirate movies till pirates of the caribbean? Batman 1989 brought about super comic movie, and then Iron man in 2008 brought them back.

What about westerns they seem to come and go.

The thing about everything being the same is that anything different that bucks the trend will stand out (blair witch) then that becomes a trend.
 
It was developed by Oakland A's general manager Billy Beane (there's a movie about it starring Brad Pitt), but it evidently didn't work, because Oakland hasn't won a World Series in over 30 years.

True, you don't need a bunch of home-run hitters to win games; there's more than one way to skin a cat. But in addition to Beane's apparent failure, there's a whole new industry in baseball called Sabremetrics, which delves deep into seriously autistic nitpicks, whatifs, and yeahbuts.

They will keep track of things like the spin rate of pitches, exit velocity of a home run, how likely a player is to exceed against their replacement, and a whole host of other useless numbers that nobody gives a shit about.
The problem with Moneyball and everything around it(book, movie, etc) is how much they just discount how much talent was on that A's team. You watch the movie and you were led to think they won 100 games because they played Scott Hatteberg at first and he walked a lot. They never mention the A's had 3 ace starters in Hudson, Zito, and Mulder and had a 4th starter in Cory Lidle who had a a sub 4 ERA as well. They had a good pen with Koch, Bradford, and Rincon in the back end, they had Ted Lilly who went on to have a long and serviceable career as a starter and a bullpen piece. Offensively they had Eric Chavez who was an absolute beast at third, Mark Ellis had a great career at 2B, Miguel Tejada was an allstar at SS and had a HOF caliber career, Ramon Hernandez was a good, all star catcher. You had good players in Jermaine Dye, Carlos Pena, and Ray Durham, David Justice was on his last leg but was still an above average player.
 
You yanks and your wacky sports. On this side of the Atlantic the only reason someone would own a baseball bat would be to beat the shit out of people.
 
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