Russian Special Military Operation in the Ukraine - Mark IV: The Partitioning of Discussion

[Overly Serious]

The United States from 1776 till 1945 at minimum.

Made alliances with Colonial Empires and Kingdoms and Monarchies and Communist Regimes and all sorts of weird governments to keep American interests intact.

Its weird now that we got a bunch of cunts in charge that believe every nation should be a democracy.

If every nation becomes a democracy, that won't America feel no more special.

Feels like the history books or views of history are being sanitized by this cult.

The first friendship treaty that the United States, was made with the monarchy of Morocco.

I guess that push is related to the American crony capitalist obsession with GDP and develop everything and everyone is a consumer in any way possible.

Well there are two paths of reply I could make to that. One is to start exploring how much the USA exports democracy vs. how much it exports "democracy". When they back a coup in the Ukraine to remove the elected government that's the latter, not the former. It's democracy when America says it is, and not otherwise.

But the other path of reply is to question the nobility of their motives when it is democracy (to whatever extent). Democratic nations are typically more vulnerable to outside influence. If a non-democratic elite are on your side / buyable at cost-effective price, then you can use that against the will of the people. And the USA has been more than fine in doing so in many cases. But if the nation's elite are not on your side / too expensive to buy or hard to bully, then in a democracy you can try to use the people against that elite. And that's really what America means by exporting democracy. It is trying to use the people against a local elite that doesn't do what America wants.

Also, given the mountain of evidence for electoral fraud in the USA's last presidential election, they really should look at introducing democracy in their own country.

I sometimes watch Asia Defence Politics on the warn in the Ukraine. I'd say it was fairly neutral but its audience is more pro-Russian. The guy clearly tries to be as intellectually honest as possible which gains my huge respect. So he invited on some of the pro-Ukranian commenters to present their case. I felt obligated to watch it because I also make efforts to be objective as much as possible:

I didn't quite finish it because it's 40+ minutes long but from the outset the case wasn't really at the level I expected - don't know why. Reasons largely came down to atrocities the Soviets did back in the day and that international borders must be respected. For the former I don't see that this has bearing on rights or wrongs of the current case, unless you can make a case that they're repeating such things. And if you did, you'd probably at least as much look at the Ukraine in that regard with things like the Volyn massacres. For the latter, it's not my morality that says someone else (often dead) can tell a people that a line they drew on a map must always be respected. There's a moral AND LEGAL case for Russia's intervention under a duty to defend. One would also expect the first question at any NATO supporter who touts this line to be: "What about Kosovo?"

At any rate, I applaud ADP's intentions in setting this up and trying to make a case, but to get value out of it, more challenging questions need to be put to interviewees. I was particularly surprised by the younger two on the panel with this German student calling allegations of there being Nazis in the Ukraine as "propaganda". Of all the things that are easy to verify are true, the Nazi leanings of Azov et al. are pretty much at the top. He also came out with stuff like "framing the allies for Dresden" [WWII firebombing] which is actually alarming - what kind of revisionism is going on here?

Anyway, no great relevance but I watched most of it and was surprised how superficial this pro-Ukranian commentary was.

 

[Male Idiot]

Dresden didn't happen.
If it did, it was not bad.
If it was that bad, they deserved it.
The Yazzees bombed themselves REEEE!
NPC needs soy latte!

 

[Sir Joahim Browinson III]

But the thing is we cannot project power economically like China and Russia. In China, all business is subservient to government. Even if a private enterprise does something in another country, China could make demands and it would have to follow them, because it is still a state entity.

Russia also has a number of government-founded corporations that respond directly to it like Roscosmos, Rosatom and Rostech, so Russia also has the same benefit of corporate industry that China has even though in many regards it's less infuatial. The good thing is that both Russia and China actually hold power over their corporations, unlike the US where corporations basically puppet the government into going on retarded international ventures for their own gain.

 

[Harvard Covington III]

New York Times excoriates American mercenaries in the Ukraine as people who should “not be allowed anywhere near the battlefield” because those mercenaries “bicker and lie.”

The U.S. Volunteers in Ukraine Who Lie, Waste and Bicker - The New Yo…

archived 25 Mar 2023 12:01:03 UTC

archive.is

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/25/world/europe/volunteers-us-ukraine-lies.html

 

[Male Idiot]

Jew York Slimes? Reeee!

Average Chad Imperial Guard battlefield life expectancy: 15 hours.
The virgin hohol: 4 hours.

The IG was against orks, kek. Imperial Guard is the redshirt faction known for being disposable and endless.

 

[ZMOT]

I was particularly surprised by the younger two on the panel with this German student calling allegations of there being Nazis in the Ukraine as "propaganda". Of all the things that are easy to verify are true, the Nazi leanings of Azov et al. are pretty much at the top. He also came out with stuff like "framing the allies for Dresden" [WWII firebombing] which is actually alarming - what kind of revisionism is going on here?

just leftie retardation, they're are as retarded as anywhere else.
however german lefties tend to be even worse on an emotional level where you just want to punch them because they carry this smug "reddit intellectual" aura with them (like I could immediately pick out which on it was on the thumbnail alone). if people think of retarded yuropoors that's who they have in mind.
just listen to his introduction "I'm writing my bachelor thesis" - in what dipshit? followed by "there can never be any justification for a country invading a neighbor besides genocide" so what about all the shit in the middle east? dude is old enough to know about libya, but of course this doesn't count either.
his whole argument for "not liking russia" is based on fucking feels, paired with either imbecility or ignorance, if not both. he's like those guys who clap at train station when refugees arrive and vote green because "it's good for the planet" (although I pick him more as an MBA retard which everybody loathes, so probably voting for the "economic liberals" fdp).

EDIT: in hindsight he might just be the average kraut normie leaning left because that's what he heard in university and on national tv. same type who would regurgitate nazi propaganda 80 years ago. rest still applies.

 

[Blewberry Nausea]

Holhols march on to dicktory!

Dresden didn't happen.
If it did, it was not bad.
If it was that bad, they deserved it.
The Yazzees bombed themselves REEEE!
NPC needs soy latte!

If Germany was worried about atrocities they could have not started two world wars.

 

[Male Idiot]

Holhols march on to dicktory!

If Germany was worried about atrocities they could have not started two world wars.

"He did it too" isn't an end all own. And the serbs (much stronk) started the first.

Wars bring atrocities. Anything else is more rainbows than a "Chris is doing better" or "Russia will run out of ammo two months ago!" thread.

 

[Blewberry Nausea]

"He did it too" isn't an end all own. And the serbs (much stronk) started the first.

Wars bring atrocities. Anything else is more rainbows than a "Chris is doing better" or "Russia will run out of ammo two months ago!" thread.

Agreed. I just think it is funny when Germany complains.

 

[Harvard Covington III]

Daily Update: March 25
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continue the special military operation.
A review of the figures indicates that at least 260 more Ukrainian soldiers have perished today for Zelensky's War.
​

️ In Kupyansk direction, aviation and artillery of the 'Zapad' Group of Forces have engaged the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine close to Dvurechnaya and Timkovka (Kharkov region). The enemy's losses in this direction amounted to 55 Ukrainian troops, two armoured fighting vehicles, and two motor vehicles.

️ In Krasny Liman direction, Ground-Attack and Army aviation, artillery and units of the 'Tsentr' Group of Forces have inflicted fire damage on enemy manpower and military hardware close to Chervonaya Dibrova (Lugansk People's Republic), Yampolvka and Terny (Donetsk People's Republic). More than 85 Ukrainian servicemen, two armoured vehicles, three pick-up trucks, and one D-20 howitzer have been destroyed during the day in this direction.

️ In Donetsk direction, the Russian troops supported by artillery of the 'Yug' Group of Forces eliminated more than 155 Ukrainian troops, three armoured vehicles, five motor vehicles, and one D-30 howitzer.

️ In South Donetsk and Zaporozhye directions, aviation and artillery of the 'Vostok' Group of Forces inflicted fire damage on the AFU units close to Ugledar and Novomikhailovka (Donetsk People's Republic). The total losses of the enemy in these directions amounted to 70 Ukrainian servicemen, three motor vehicles, and one D-30 howitzer.

️ In Kherson direction, Russian troops have neutralised up to 35 Ukrainian troops, ten motor vehicles, and one Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers during the day.

Operational-Tactical and Army aviation, Missile Troops and Artillery of the Russian Group of Forces have engaged 76 AFU artillery units at their fire positions, manpower, and military hardware in 112 areas during the day.

Air defence systems have engaged six HIMARS, Olkha MLRS projectiles and one HARM anti-radiation missile during the day. Moreover, 11 Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles including one Bayraktar TB2 were shot down close to Tokmak, Ivanovka (Zaporozhye region), Kolomyichikha (Lugansk People's Republic), Nikolskoye, Kramatorsk, Kirillovka, and Vladimirovka (Donetsk People's Republic).




In total, 404 airplanes and 224 helicopters, 3,573 unmanned aerial vehicles, 414 air defence missile systems, 8,399 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles, 1,072 combat vehicles equipped with MLRS, 4,428 field artillery cannons and mortars, as well as 9,114 units of special military equipment have been destroyed during the special military operation:


Significant fighting persists in Kharkov region as well as LPR and DPR:

 

[I faked the autism]

If Germany was worried about atrocities they could have not started two world wars.

Meths a hell of a drug, magnet bitch.

 

[The Foxtrot]

"He did it too" isn't an end all own. And the serbs (much stronk) started the first.

Wars bring atrocities. Anything else is more rainbows than a "Chris is doing better" or "Russia will run out of ammo two months ago!" thread.

I've lost more than one friend by pointing out that it's a war and collateral damage is unavoidable, especially when the Ukrainians are doing the same shit as the Palestinians and hiding military assets in civilian buildings.
The misguided idea my fellow Burgermutts have that war can somehow be separated from the civilians is infuriating. As is the "if the Russians want peace, they can just go home!", like it's a fucking video game.

 

[Rubick]

I think this was my favorite just for being an unironic LARP.

What I love the most is that they still keep bring Golf War up as some kind of proof of shining example of American armed forces its doctrine and equipment. Never mind that Iraqis under American training and using NATO equipment. Got completely curb stumped by ISIS on Toyota trucks armed only with portable weapons for the most part.

It's like Arabs suck at war. An excellent book on this subject

Here's few passages from it.

Spoiler: Lets start ! Iraqis vs Iranians

Finally, every Iraqi artillery operation required a great deal of time, a problem that eventually led Baghdad to invest heavily in multiple-rocket launchers, which at least could saturate an area with fire quickly.
Nor could the Iraqis compensate for these problems in their individual
combat arms by effectively combining them into integrated teams. As noted
above, Iraqi artillery was only capable of supporting maneuvering units
under certain very specific conditions.

Iraq also continued to experience problems coordinating the operations of infantry and armor. Tanks regularly operated without infantry support and vice versa. These problems resulted in the Iraqis losing a significant number of tanks to ambushes. In the most notorious example of this problem, the Iraqis not only employed an
armored division to assault the city of Khorramshahr (built on a marshy
island, as if urban terrain were not bad enough for armor), but they even
stripped it of its organic infantry elements before sending it in.

After the tanks were thrown back by the Iranians, Iraq was forced to airlift in
brigades of special forces and Republican Guards, give them a hasty course
in urban warfare, and then send them in to take the city.

Spoiler: Iranians butt fucking Iraqis with light infantry

The Iraqis also made it relatively easy for the Iranians to break through their defenses. Their failure to develop effective night-fighting capabilities, or even to take adequate security precautions at night, regularly gave the Iranians a key advantage in every breakthrough battle.
Saddam decreed that Iraqi units could not voluntarily surrender any Iranian territory, thus Baghdad's commanders were prevented from deploying in the most defensible terrain if it meant giving up conquered territory or from retreating in combat when their positions became untenable. Far more damaging to Baghdad's fortunes, however, was the failure of Iraqi units to guard their flanks, even when deployed in a contiguous line.

The Iranians would launch massive human-wave assaults against the Popular Army units, causing them to break and run. Iraqi commanders would take too long forming up and committing their inadequate local reserves - if they moved at all - and the Iranians would punch holes in the line. Iranian heavy forces would then pass through these gaps and into the operational depth of the Iraqi formations, conducting deep encirclements that frequently isolated entire Iraqi combat units.

The limitations on Iranian mobility and the fact that they too were not the greatest fighting force in the world meant that these exploitations generally moved slowly and
awkwardly.

However, Iraqi commanders generally would fail to commit their operational reserves quickly enough, and in those cases where they did muster a counterattack, Iraqi forces invariably launched a frontal assault without adequate infantry or artillery support that would be stopped by Iranian tanks, artillery, and hordes of infantry with light antitank weapons. Meanwhile, the Iraqi units on the frontline that were in the process of being
encircled-which often were Iraq's best combat divisions-would frequently sit in their entrenched positions, defending when attacked but unwilling to reorient their lines or counterattack the main Iranian threat, which was now behind them. The result was that fairly slow-moving Iranian infantry attacks supported by small amounts of armor and artillery were able to consistently break through Iraqi defensive lines and encircle their units, often including large mechanized formations.

Spoiler: Iraqis learn but still barely manage

Of course, it is important not to lose sight of the large number of continuing
problems in the Iraqi forces despite their increasing success in stopping the
Iranians.

After all, the Iraqis were employing all the weaponry available to
a modern army to fight what was basically a light infantry force. They
generally outnumbered the Iranians, except temporarily at the point of
attack, where the Iranians might muster an advantage in manpower for their
human-wave assaults.

The Iraqis could bring to bear vastly greater firepower than the Iranians and were considerably more mobile than the Iranians. Still, Iraq felt compelled to resort to chemical warfare to break up Iranian attacks as early as October 1983. Indeed, especially in 1982 and 1983, many of the Iraqi victories were very close-run affairs, and there were a number of occasions where the Iranians looked like they were on the
verge of a major breakthrough. Given Iraq's daunting advantages in
technology, firepower, fortifications, and eventually weapons of mass
destruction, the question is not why Iraq was able to stalemate the Iranians,
but why it was so difficult for them to do so

Spoiler: "Intelligence" and general ineptitude

Tactical units still paid inadequate attention to reconnaissance, particularly to longer-range reconnaissance missions that might have given a better sense of Iranian intention.
Iraq's senior commanders began to demand more air force reconnaissance missions, but this seems to have helped only marginally.
The Iraqis did not do a very good job analyzing the information collected by reconnaissance flights, nor did much of the information make its way down to the field commanders. Iraqi signals-intercept capabilities were quite good and often provided a tip-off of an Iranian offensive, according to former Iraqi generals.

An even greater contribution to Iraqi intelligence came from the "finished intelligence" - that is, information that had been thoroughly analyzed, evaluated, and crosschecked with other sources - on Iranian preparations that Iran began receiving from the United States in the middle of this period. However, even this new source seems to have had limited effect on Iraqi fortunes because Iraqi soldiers and officers continued to distort information being passed up, down, and across the chain of command. Consequently, Iraqi tactical commanders rarely understood the full picture of Iranian activities in their sector and were constantly surprised by Iranian attacks. Similarly, lower echelons regularly claimed either that they had defeated Iranian attacks when they had not or that they were being attacked by far greater forces than was actually the case (to justify having been defeated). Given the behavior of their subordinates, it is not surprising that Iraq's generals were constantly
overreacting to some threats and underreacting to others.

Other Iraqi problems continued to manifest themselves acutely at tactical
command levels. Although Saddam's grudging depoliticization led to a
marked improvement in Iraqi operations at higher levels, Iraq's tactical
formations still could not effectively implement the operations devised by
their generals. Moreover, this came despite the conscious efforts of both the
regime and the senior officer corps to stimulate initiative, creativity, and
independent action among their subordinates. For example, the Iraqi
General Staff and Baghdad's corps commanders got very good at shifting
their mechanized reserves, concentrating them against an Iranian offensive
and then using them to counterattack an Iranian penetration. However, Iraqi
forces themselves continued to conduct these counterattacks abysmally.
Tactical commanders doggedly relied on firepower rather than maneuver,
and their counterattacks were too often frontal assaults in which Iraqi armor
simply collided head-on with the Iranian forces. Even within these attacks,
lower-level Iraqi formations rarely maneuvered in combat and instead
tended to simply line up and roll straight at the Iranians, trying to drive off
the enemy with sheer firepower. On those (increasingly rare) occasions
when they encountered Iranian armor, they tended to prevail only because
of overwhelming numerical superiority. When defending a sector of the
front, Iraqi mechanized forces sat passively despite the glaring vulnerability
of the Iranians to flanking armor attacks. Consistently, the Iraqis preferred
to remain in their defensive positions and blast away.

This unwillingness to maneuver resulted in battlefields strewn with Iraqi tanks and armour destroyed by Iranian antitank teams who swarmed over a position or infiltrated the Iraqi lines and then attacked the armor from the rear.

As the war progressed, Iraq's senior officers, despairing that their
subordinates would ever learn to use tactical maneuver, began to plan
counterattacks more carefully to employ maneuver at an operational level.

There was a limit to how much even the constant scrutiny of the general
staff and corps commanders could do to improve Iraqi military
effectiveness. For example, the general staff and their corps headquarters
got very good at reacting to Iranian assaults, quickly beginning the
laborious effort of shifting strategic reserves from elsewhere along the
front. However, Iraq's tactical leadership reacted frustratingly slowly. Iraqi
junior officers showed little initiative in moving tactical reserves to block or
counterattack Iranian assaults, and it invariably required the intervention of
higher authority to get the reserves moving. Even then, these units generally
executed their tasks sluggishly. This tardiness led to numerous Iraqi
positions being overrun before help could arrive and Iraqi counterattacks
that came well after a battle had been decided.
Similarly, no matter how hard Iraqi training stressed the integration of the
various combat arms, Iraqi tactical formations simply could not fight as
combined-arms teams.

Spoiler: Air force and general maintenance

Air support of ground forces was similarly poor. The Iraqi Air Force
performed close air support (CAS) missions infrequently, basically just
contributing to the massive-fire plans laid down on particularly well
defended
Iranian positions. In these cases, the airstrikes had to be requested
well in advance and generally could only be called in on large targets such
as towns because the Iraqi pilots lacked the accuracy to hit anything
smaller. For the most part, only senior field officers could request air
support; all missions had to be approved by Baghdad; and the entire process
was conducted through an elaborate command-and-control system. Thus,
air support was unresponsive to the needs of commanders on the ground.
Although the air force provided sporadic and ineffective GAS, it performed
virtually no battlefield air interdiction (BAI) missions, hardly ever trying to
disrupt Iranian units regrouping in the rear or to prevent reinforcements and
supplies from reaching the front lines.


By about 1983, Iraq had won air superiority almost by default. Spare parts shortages had crippled the IRIAF to the point where it could only generate about io15 sorties per day
on a sustained basis, and though it could probably surge to 70-90 sorties if
necessary, doing so invariably hurt the IRIAE's ability to sustain a modest
sortie rate thereafter. In addition, Iraq's ground-based air defenses took a
heavy toll of Iranian strike aircraft. In late 1981 the IRIAF was forced to
shift to high-altitude bombing simply to avoid further losses.
The declining numbers of operational Iranian planes ultimately proved
decisive in the battle for air superiority because the Iraqis could not make
their numerical advantage count in the air-to-air war. Iraqi pilots were
extremely timid and frequently aborted their missions when they detected

Iraqi pilots were very poor by Western standards. The French washed out
8o percent of all Iraqi pilots sent to France for training on the Mirage F-1.
Likewise, the Soviets estimated that less than half of the Iraqi pilots they
trained would have been accepted for duty in Soviet line-fighter regiments.


The difficulties of the Iraqi Air Force point to the larger problem Iraq had
in effectively handling the modern weaponry it received during the war. The
Iraqis failed to take full advantage of the weapons they employed and
typically never approached their maximum capabilities. Iraqi personnel
took an inordinately long time to learn to use new weapons systems. For
example, four years after their initial delivery, none of Iraq's Su-24 attack
aircraft were fully operational. By 1983, of the approximately aircraft
Iraq had lost, many, and possibly most, of these casualties were due to
accidents and maintenance problems. Iraqi forces were rarely able to
employ the more sophisticated aspects of the weapons in their inventory.
More often than not, Iraq employed highly sophisticated weapons systems
in highly unsophisticated manners. For example, Iraqi tank crews rarely
ever used the night vision equipment or lead computing sights on their later
model Soviet tanks because they did not understand them.

Similarly, because Iraqi antiaircraft gunners could not work the Gun Dish radars on
their ZSU-23-4s, they instead employed a barrage fire system, thereby
relieving them of the need to track enemy aircraft.

Iraq's maintenance and repair practices were poor throughout the war.
Iraqi combat units paid little attention to day-to-day maintenance, which
generally had to be performed by a small group of technicians assigned to
every unit of battalion strength and greater. More serious maintenance and
virtually all repair work could only be performed at a small number of depots concentrated around Baghdad and al-Basrah. Moreover, many of the
technicians employed in these depots were foreigners, mainly Russians and
other Soviet-bloc nationals familiar with Soviet weaponry.

Repairs that would routinely be handled by vehicle crews in Western armies had to be
performed at battalion or division level, while repairs that would routinely
be taken care of at battalion level in Western armies had to be performed at
depot level. Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, who served as a military
correspondent during the war, reported that in most Iraqi armored and
mechanized units, a 50 percent operational readiness rate was considered
good. Iraqi crews frequently abandoned tanks, ARV's, and other heavy
equipment on the battlefield because they required minor repairs, and
recovery of damaged vehicles could only be performed by corps-level
assets.

Spoiler: Golf war and in general Iraqis performance

The Persian Gulf War demonstrated just how modest Iraq's improvements
in military effectiveness really were. At the time of the Gulf War, Baghdad's
military remained largely depoliticized because Saddam had not felt a need
to reimpose draconian controls after the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Baghdad
retained most of the competent generals who had led its armies to victory
over Iran and in many cases promoted them to positions of greater
responsibility. Training continued to stress conventional military operations
against conventional military threats, and merit continued to be at least as
important as loyalty, if not more so, for promotions. Nevertheless, the
Iraqis were humiliated by the American-led multinational coalition during
the Gulf War. This change in fortunes can be attributed partly to the huge
advantages the Coalition enjoyed in numbers, technology, and air power.
However, this defeat also reflected just how little Iraqi tactical effectiveness
had improved over the years. Without the advantages in numbers and
firepower they had enjoyed over the Iranians, without the advantage of
chemical warfare, and without the ability to conduct operations the only
way they knew how, Iraq's combat formations proved virtually helpless
against the Coalition onslaught.

Spoiler: Iraqi officers

Iraqi tactical commanders were inflexible and incapable of adequately responding to the constant maneuvering, deception, and speed of their adversary. Time and again, the response of Iraqi units to being surprised or outflanked was either to do nothing, to keep doing what they were already doing, or to flee. Only rarely did Iraqi junior officers try
to devise quick responses to unforeseen developments. For example, the 52d Armored Brigade was deployed with the rest of the 52d Armored Division as the operational reserve of the Iraqi VII Corps and, therefore, its primary mission was to counterattack a Coalition attack against one of the VII Corps infantry divisions. Late on 24 February, the commander of the 52d Brigade received a frantic message from the headquarters of the 48th Infantry Division - directly in front of his unit - that they were being
overrun by American armored forces. Nevertheless, because he had not received orders from divisional command, the officer did nothing: he did not execute his primary mission by moving to support the embattled 48th Division; he did not ready his brigade to move or fight; he did not even contact divisional headquarters to report the message and ask if he should counterattack. As a result, the 48th Infantry Division was overwhelmed by
the U.S. ist Mechanized Division, and the 52d Brigade was later overrun by the British ist Armored Division without much of a fight. Combined arms at tactical levels was similarly poor.

While the initial deployment schemes of Iraqi units did a good job of weaving together infantry, armor, antitank units, artillery, and other supporting arms into a cohesive pattern, this was the product of the five months Iraqi division and corps commanders had to plan and inspect the dispositions of their subordinates. On every other occasion, Iraqi combined-arms cooperation was almost nonexistent. For example, the 5th Mechanized Division counterattack out of the Burqan oilfields featured large concentrations of armor, infantry, and artillery support -but none of them together. Most of their attacks consisted of armored charges without either infantry or artillery support. Likewise, when the Republican Guard's Madinah and Tawakalnah Divisions redeployed to the west to meet the U.S. VII Corps attack, their new defensive positions displayed only very haphazard integration of infantry and armor. The dispositions of the two divisions along their defensive lines showed little interspersing of tanks and infantry'. While both
the armor and the infantry of the Tawakalnah were active against the U.S. forces, it was generally the case that in any given sector, U.S. forces had to worry about T-72s or mechanized infantry, rarely both.

Spoiler: On the Republican Guard

The crucial difference here was that the army faced the more capable units of the
RGFC, who were more dedicated and (somewhat) more tactically
competent than the Iraqi army units facing the Marines. Thus, the better
equipped
VII Corps had a much tougher fight against the Tawakalnah than
the 1st Marine Division had against the Iraqi 3d Armored Division (which
was equipped almost identically to the Tawakalnah) because the RGFC
officers were slightly more willing to maneuver in battle, slightly more
aggressive, and had a slightly better understanding of armor tactics than
their Iraqi army counterparts.

Spoiler: Conclusion

The performance of Iraq's junior officers - and the skill of their American
and British adversaries -was the most important cause of Baghdad's defeat,
not Iraqi generalship. As military analyst Murray Hammick observed, "
[Iraqi] tactical incompetence would almost certainly have put paid to the
best laid strategic plans. A close second was the severe imbalance in
the weapons wielded by each side and the inability of the Iraqis to take full
advantage of many of the more sophisticated weapons they possessed. For
instance, many U.S. fighter pilots reported that their fear of Iraq's advanced
MiG-29 fighters abated considerably when they realized that most of Iraq's
MiG-29 pilots barely knew how to fly the plane, let alone employ its
avionics. Nevertheless, as veterans of the Gulf War unanimously aver, Iraqi
tactical incompetence was ultimately more important than the technological
balance between the two sides.

Spoiler: Overall

Iraqi military effectiveness between 1948 and 1991 closely parallels the
Egyptian experience. Both countries enjoyed mixed success at the strategic
level but were constantly plagued by extremely poor tactical capabilities. In
most cases Iraqi generals were prevented from obtaining all that they might
have with the resources at their disposal because of the limitations of Iraqi
field units. In addition, Iraqi and Egyptian forces shared almost identical
patterns of strength and weakness among their tactical units, demonstrating
a reasonably good ability to perform set-piece offensives and static
defensive operations but almost entirely incapable of fighting fluid,
maneuver battles.
With regard to Iraqi generalship, no clear pattern emerges. In some cases
Iraqi strategic leadership was quite good, such as in the latter half of the
Iran-Iraq War. Likewise, during the latter half of the First Kurdish War, the
entire Second Kurdish War, and the Gulf War, Iraqi generals performed
adequately, if not well. Of greatest importance, in each of these conflicts
Iraq's generals came up with what was probably the best strategy available
to them. At other times, its leadership was miserable.

By contrast, Iraqi tactical performance remained constant. Regardless of
the opponent or the situation, Baghdad's junior officers performed very
poorly. Iraqi commanders from platoon to brigade (and often division) level
repeatedly showed little aggressive initiative, little willingness to innovate
or improvise, little ability to adapt to unforeseen circumstances, and little
ability to act independently. Iraqi forces were virtually oblivious to tactical
maneuver and reacted poorly to enemy maneuvers, often failing to do
anything at all in response. Intelligence gathering and information flows
throughout the chain of command were perverse, and most Iraqi units
fought their battles in a haze of misinformation. Iraqi forces used their tanks
like moveable artillery; their artillery was incapable of anything but
preplanned, preregistered bombardment missions; and combined arms
usually could only be engineered by the direct intervention of the general
staff.

Iraqi forces consistently had problems because of a dearth of technical
skills and a limited exposure to machinery. As a result, Iraqi troops were
never able to realize the full capabilities of the sophisticated equipment they
fielded. Maintenance and repair was almost nonexistent; Iraqi forces took
extremely long periods of time to learn to handle new weaponry (even
simple Soviet weapons); and, with the exception of a few high-priority
projects that received lavish resources and Iraq's best scientific minds, the
Iraqi arms industry was a sham.
Nevertheless, like the Egyptians, there were also areas of real Iraqi
strength and other important areas where the results were consistently
mixed. Two strong categories for the Iraqis were logistics and combat
engineering

Funny enough under the Americans Iraqis showed even worse performances. As they go butt fucked by ISIS.

And here are few more on other sand niggers

Spoiler: Egyptian Military

The Gulf War revealed what U.S. military personnel had privately admitted for years: that despite fifteen years of American aid, advice, and training, Egyptian military effectiveness had improved little, if any, since the Arab-Israeli wars. While numerous Westerners who have had contact with the Egyptian military claim that most of Cairo's generals are as competent as their U.S., Russian, or Israeli counterparts, tactical performance remains extremely limited.

Spoiler: Saudi Arabs in general

Little can be said about Saudi performance at the strategic level because all of their military operations were essentially planned by the Americans. Once the U.S. Central Command began deploying to Saudi Arabia on about 7 August 199o, defense of the country effectively fell to the Americans. cans. The hasty Saudi deployment before Central Command's arrival was awful, showing little real understanding of how to conduct a proper defense against a large armored force. Thereafter, the Saudi high command demonstrated little that would suggest they could have planned and executed large-scale combat operations, but they were never asked to do so. In short, the available evidence points to a poor performance by Saudi strategic leadership, but one that had little or no effect on the actual course of the war. At the tactical level, Saudi forces were mostly terrible. Although the SANG troops were generally very brave and determined fighters, they showed little military acumen despite their long tutelage under the Americans. The Saudis did not patrol and made no effort to conduct reconnaissance before an assault; unless their American advisers provided them with intelligence, they went in blind. Saudi attacks were poorly planned frontal assaults that showed no ability to employ fire and maneuver synergistically.

Saudi ground forces were virtually paralyzed by over centralization and passivity. U.S. military personnel reported that operations were delayed sometimes for days by the necessity of referring all decisions up to the highest levels of command. Because the Saudis generally made little effort to prioritize issues and could only make decisions by communal debate rather than staff work, the process of decision making itself was extremely slow and further delayed operations.

Saudi maintenance practices were abysmal but never became a significant problem because they relied heavily on foreign technicians to perform even the most minor services on their equipment. Saudi forces did not know the first thing about keeping their vehicles running. For example, tank crews did not even know to replace the air filters in their tanks. In one battalion, better than two-thirds of its M-60 tanks were inoperable because of clogged air filters only weeks after deploying from garrison to a defensive position in the desert. Rather than properly care for their personal weapons and gear, Saudi soldiers were issued completely new "kits" every six months." RSAF attrition rates, even among the elite F-15 squadrons, were "significantly higher" than for U.S. squadrons with the same aircraft.

Despite their radically different circumstances, military history, and political context, Saudi forces evinced many of the same patterns of behavior as other Arab armies. Saudi oil wealth and the kingdom's close cooperation with the United States did not prevent its military from developing the same problems as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Syria. Indeed, in some ways, the Saudis' advantages made these problems more prevalent and more debilitating. Their oil wealth allowed them to indulge certain tendencies, cies, such as their unwillingness to accept jobs they considered menial labor or to acquire technical skills in school. As a result, Saudi personnel often displayed even less familiarity with machinery than their poorer brethren elsewhere in the Arab world.

...In the end, they had little to show for their billions of dollars spent on defense since the first oil boom. Saudi troops suffered from all of the same problems as other Arab armies, only worse.

There is a goddamn reason why it's generally thought that all the big four in WWII could have steamrolled Iraq in the 1990's.


Also, it's hilarious that some there suggested Gulf war was a poor showing of the Soviet doctrine. As if trained by Soviets means you where trained in their doctrine.

One needs to practice complex fast paced combined maneuvers on regular bases at scale most Arab countries (or hell most countries ) couldn't or didn't want to pay for,
nor have the space for to do so.

With officer corps educated in military theory and practice along with battlefield analysis, calculation and all arms co-operation and co-ordinate to the Soviet Standard and a institution that made the Soviet military into what it was.


Then of course equally important tactical reconnaissance. Which apparently is not in Arab vocabulary.
And General Arab rank and file that doesn't suffer from numerous crippling issues like low intelligence, education, lack of actual national identity, or see it as a job for social status sign, etc, etc.

Their has been only on nation that could have done the Soviet doctrine of "OMG" (operational maneuvering group) which the Soviets came up with post WWII and evolved through decades. That where the Americans.

 

[Zman]

UKfaggotry now complicit with the genocide of ethnic Russians in the eastern portion of the temporarily Ukranian-occupied territories by supplying terrorist forces with depleted uranium ammunition which is known to cause deformities in children and irradiate land. The NATO goal has always been to leave historical Russian lands an irradiated depopulated wasteland and do as much damage to the land and people as possible. It was never about making the fake terrorist "Ukrainian state" win a unwinnable war. Hopefully the Russian government will respond accordingly to this nuclear escalation.

 

[Mav52ri]

View attachment 4877618View attachment 4877626
UKfaggotry now complicit with the genocide of ethnic Russians in the eastern portion of the temporarily Ukranian-occupied territories by supplying terrorist forces with depleted uranium ammunition which is known to cause deformities in children and irradiate land. The NATO goal has always been to leave historical Russian lands an irradiated depopulated wasteland and do as much damage to the land and people as possible. It was never about making the fake terrorist "Ukrainian state" win a unwinnable war. Hopefully the Russian government will respond accordingly to this nuclear escalation.

And this whole thing could've been over last year if it wasn't for our retarded former Prime Minister sticking his shabby dick into affairs where it didn't belong and prolonging the suffering of these nations.

The hatred of Westminster is mutual.

 

[Male Idiot]

I've lost more than one friend by pointing out that it's a war and collateral damage is unavoidable, especially when the Ukrainians are doing the same shit as the Palestinians and hiding military assets in civilian buildings.
The misguided idea my fellow Burgermutts have that war can somehow be separated from the civilians is infuriating. As is the "if the Russians want peace, they can just go home!", like it's a fucking video game.

Collateral is mostly unavoidable. It is silly to designate lets say US, French, Nazis, Soviets, Russians now as evil just a few bombings. I just take issue when people say "Well the others were baddies." All sides are baddies in a war that get civilians killed.

And if we look beyond the 20th century, the US, the Nazis, the Soviets, aren't even that fucking bad. What do people think, the mongols didn't rape, enslave, and burn any village they could find? Where is Carthago? In fact, most 20th century wars were fought by rather nicer people than the ones before it.

What Russia is doing in the Ukraine is -kiddy gloves-. Even what the US did was mostly lighter stuff. For thousands of years, an opposing army in your territory meant villages raped to death and burned to the ground, and most people seem to have forgotten this.

 

[Dvsilverwing]

The misguided idea my fellow Burgermutts have that war can somehow be separated from the civilians is infuriating. As is the "if the Russians want peace, they can just go home!", like it's a fucking video game.

This comes almost exclusively from the rules of engagement the US imposed on the soldiers during Enduring Freedom and in Afghanistan I think, they're too used to the past two decades of US troops exclusively fighting irregular militants rather than a conventional force. And I'm gonna go out on a limb and say guys probably bent those rules a little more than the media reported on anyway.

And we bombed doctors without borders and a shitload of weddings lol.

 

[Falcos_Commisar]

Arabs at war is not a good source and it's "sequel" Armies of Sand is more shit.

The author can't actually read or speak Arabic and has sources that are mostly non-Arabic.

It would be like reading a history of the US civil war where the sources are all 2nd hand Russian.

A military historian/author named "Tom Cooper" has ripped Arabs at War a new asshole multiple times.

Here's a snippet

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-iran-iraq-war-interview-with-author.html?m=1

And another

The Myth of Soviet Arms and Tactics in the Middle East, Part Five: why Soviet arms perform so poorly in Arab service - The Aviation Geek Club

The Myth of Soviet Arms and Tactics in the Middle East, Part Four: here's why Soviet arms perform so poorly in Arab service

www.google.com

 

[Some Dumb Faggot]

This was a post I made awhile ago the politics thread and I feel it fits with the discussion of the decay within the US army.

I think that's why the Democrats are so bad for America right now. They fail to realize that the other G7 nations tow the line because they are afraid of what America can do to them.

The Democrats let themselves become an anti-military party failing to grasp that America is an empire and empires NEED a strong army to project their power.

Democrat leadership comes across as very weak, like they are afraid of foreigners. It's infuriating because they can act tough with fellow Americans but then shit and piss themselves in fear when dealing with foreign nations.

The problem is that Democrats and to some lesser extent Republicans have bought their own propaganda and think the world bends the knee to America because they love America so much. In reality America is probably one of the most hated nations on the planet and relies on fear to stay on top.

This is why American leadership has to come across as strong and intimidating. Otherwise you have places like Russia and China who start to act against the status quo because they, like everyone else, is sick of it.

 

[Cold Root Beer]

This comes almost exclusively from the rules of engagement the US imposed on the soldiers during Enduring Freedom and in Afghanistan I think, they're too used to the past two decades of US troops exclusively fighting irregular militants rather than a conventional force. And I'm gonna go out on a limb and say guys probably bent those rules a little more than the media reported on anyway.

And we bombed doctors without borders and a shitload of weddings lol.

I think the idea comes from the reverse direction. It's the common cope excuse whenever America fails in a conflict ("we would have won Vietnam/Afghanistan if not for those stupid rules of engagement!").

Meanwhile, the Afghanistan conflict with the Soviets, Nazi Germany in WW2, and countless other examples demonstrate that being able to kill indiscriminately, use collective punishment, and have no rules of engagement aren't exactly "cheat codes" to win a conflict, and oftentimes have knock-on negative effects to balance.