One thing that actually makes watching this war of attrition interesting to me is the knife's edge that Russia is holding the war at. I've said before, but the question isn't how much of Ukraine they'll get, but when, and for how much. Russia has chosen, seemingly as its timetable, "after NATO is pushed past its breaking point" and as far as cost goes, "for as little cash and as few soldiers as possible." To that end, you see rear echelons with T-55s. Missile strikes to harass and cripple but not completely disable civilian life. You see mobilizations at less than half of what is speculated might be necessary to decisively break the UAF. You see no attempt to move to a wartime economy, to starve their enemies of either food or energy, both of which are received at Russia's mercy. You see no attempt to purge military leadership of the people who produced multiple, humiliating disasters that have damaged the basic credibility of Russia's advantages in attrition warfare, artillery and air superiority, standoff weapons superiority, and logistics. They're taking slow and cheap, which has certain risks that aren't communicated well by pro-Russian milbloggers on telegram, and which get exaggerated by ukie tards high on the idiotic idea that an extra tank battalion will somehow convince the current iteration of Russia's government to just submit to Nuremberg-esque show trials and give up wealth, power, and long-term security.
