NL: How close do you believe we got to reaching peace between Syria and Israel?
FCH: Although I believe a genuine opportunity was missed, it’s impossible to say. Bashar had explicitly acknowledged that peace with Israel would have two essential elements: Syria’s strategic reorientation away from Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas; and Syria’s full recovery of all land lost to Israel in June 1967. Netanyahu acknowledged the territorial price Israel would have to pay and had authorized his team to work with me to define exactly the line of June 4, 1967. Both sides protected the confidentiality of the effort, and both sides gave every indication of seriousness.
...
Israel would have had to return to Syrian sovereignty, over time — perhaps three to five years — all territory it took from Syria during the 1967 June War. Syria would have had to liquidate all threats to the security of Israel arising from its territory and from its relationships with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Both sides were fully aware of what was required. Neither side tried to redefine or scale back its side of the commitment ledger. Netanyahu was acutely aware of the risks inherent in returning territory to Syria. He knew he would pay a domestic political price and planned to submit any agreement with Syria to a referendum. He wanted Syria’s strategic reorientation to be genuine and measured carefully during Israel’s phased withdrawal. He wanted strong U.S. support, including a large military assistance package. Bashar downplayed the risks inherent in breaking militarily with Iran and requiring Lebanon to make peace with Israel, a step that would have ended Hezbollah’s armed status as the “Lebanese Resistance.