Greer v. Moon, No. 20-cv-00647 (D. Utah Sep. 16, 2020)

[Fabio Socialist]

Everyone claiming they have a right to travel thinks they'll get a judge like Greer's.

 

[Star Platinum]

Utah courts tend to routinely agree with your view, but the appellate courts seem to routinely disagree. See Quigley v. Rosenthal, 427 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2005) (untimely motions to be considered under excusable neglect standard), Livingston v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., No. 20-3075 (10th Cir. Feb. 11, 2021) ("By the time she requested the extension, her deadline had already expired. So she needed to show excusable neglect."), Lopez v. Cantex Health Care Ctrs. II, No. 23-2044 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 2023) (motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B) to be considered under excusable neglect standard), Hamilton v. Water Whole Intern. Corp., 302 F. App'x 789 (10th Cir. 200 (same), Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 2016) ("Because the motion was timely, he needed only to show good cause for the extension request.), Babakr v. Fowles, No. 23-3026 (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 2024) ("Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1)(B), a district court has discretion to accept a party's late filing if the party files a motion showing that the delay was the result of "excusable neglect.", "under Rule 6(b), a post-deadline extension . . . is permissible only where the failure to meet the deadline was the result of excusable neglect"

Your interpretation of the case law is misguided. For example, Quigley v. Rosenthal, when describing the standard for an extension under Rule 6(b), notes that a district court "for cause shown" may extend a deadline "where the failure ... was the result of excusable neglect." Quigley, 427 F.3d at 1237. (For that quote, note that Quigley is a 2005 case, before FRCP 6's language was modified in 2007 from "for cause shown" to "good cause," though it was intended only as a stylistic change per the Rules Committee notes.) Again, like in the Supreme Court case you cited, the specific issue on appeal was excusable neglect; at no point in Quigley is the cause (now "good cause") requirement deemed unnecessary.

And in Lopez, the court quotes Rule 6(b) directly, and does not omit the "good cause" language: " Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B) provides: When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect." Like in Quigley, good cause simply wasn't the issue on appeal.

Same for Hamilton. "A district court may, however, 'for good cause, extend the time . . . on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.'" Hamilton, 302 F. App'x at 798.

Rachel v. Troutt actually proves my point. "In district court, the governing rule allows an extension of time 'for good cause.' Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1)." Rachel, 820 F.3d at 394. What the court means by then saying "Because the motion was timely, he needed only to show good cause" under Rule 6(b)(1) is that excusable neglect is an additional requirement for untimely extensions under Rule(b)(1)(B), and that because this motion was timely, only the fundamental requirement of good cause is necessary.

Ignoring linguism, consider this? What point is there to have good cause and excusable neglect for post-deadline motion, when one of them is much stricter than the other? Even if your linguistic view is accurate, that still doesn't change the fact that one of the standards would be a non-factor. If memory serves, courts routinely frown on such interpretations.

Neither is necessarily stricter than the other, though one may be harder to prove than the other in a specific case. Different facts can support either requirement.

To the extent you imply that both standards would also apply to pre-deadline extensions, that is completely and totally incorrect.

"Good cause" is necessary whether the requested extension is pre-deadline (Rule 6(b)(1)(A)) or post-deadline (Rule 6(b)(1)(B)). The "good cause" language is in the "(b)(1)" part of "Rule 6(b)(1)(A)" and "Rule 6(b)(1)(B)".

In other words, that's what the 10th Circuit was explaining in Rachel v. Troutt, as I described above.

I agree with you, however, that "excusable neglect," on the other hand, is only an explicit requirement for a post-deadline extension (not a pre-deadline extension) per the rule.

(In reality, a judge may deny your pre-deadline motion for an extension by saying you waited too long to seek it. (For example, some judges have standing rules that require you to seek an extension at least seven days before the deadline or it will be summarily denied absent a show cause hearing or the like.)

 

[Sexy Senior Citizen]

TL;DR: law autism.

Sadly, we're not dealing with facts, logic, or even the law. We're dealing with one butthurt little man and a judge that seems keen to act as his lawyer/tard wrangler.

Very informative post, though.

 

[mindlessobserver]

Sadly, we're not dealing with facts, logic, or even the law. We're dealing with one butthurt little man and a judge that seems keen to act as his lawyer/tard wrangler.

Very informative post, though.

Yeah, which is why it's not worth even guessing what is going to happen at this point. The only certainty is that it's going to be very fucking retarded. All that earlier discussion about rules, procedure and precedent we've had over the course of this thread looks very gay and optimistic today.

I can understand why certain users have gotten black pilled and are talking about doing alinsky tier malicious compliance and/or alog the court. But that's not going to work either. It's counter intuitive but the best option at this point is to just roll with the punches and hope Greer or the Court finally fucks ups decisively in a way that cannot be hand waved away.

 

[Friend of Dorothy Parker]

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B)

Couple comments on good cause/excusable neglect:

1. The analysis of whether to permit an extension after the deadline has passed is as much equity* as law, so it essentially boils down to is it fair and would ruling against be severely prejudicial to the fuck-up who missed the deadline.

2. Russ didn't mention excusable neglect standard at all, iirc, and he didn't run through the Pioneer factors. I'd have expected the Court to articulate those in the Order, for documentary purposes, if nothing else. But that might be a step too far for what boils down to an equitable analysis. On balance, the Court found the circumstances satisfied both standards, and it's not clearly wrong.

*

With regard to determining whether a party's neglect of a deadline is excusable, we are in substantial agreement with the factors identified by the Court of Appeals. Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for determining what sorts of neglect will be considered "excusable," we conclude that the determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission. [n.13] These include, as the Court of Appeals found, the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith. See 943 F. 2d, at 677. [n.14]

- from Pioneer (n.b., Pioneer was a bankruptcy case, but its articulated factors have been adopted more broadly).

Hardin's citations re the "stringency" of the "excusable neglect" standard were as good as you could get, but most decisions note the equitable, flexible, and contextual aspects of the analysis. And even in one of his cited cases, Stout v Seitz, the Court stated a few things that could be considered excusable neglect, and by analogy they're not too too far off from Russell's assertions:

Circumstances giving rise to excusable neglect include failure to learn of the entry of judgment, unpredictable events affecting the delivery of notice of appeal to the clerk, uncontrollable delays in mail delivery, illness of counsel, and unpredictable events affecting the feasibility of appeal.

Stout went on to note that pro se status and ignorance of the law as a pro se litigant are not ipso facto "excusable neglect" (""a party's pro se status may be considered in determining whether excusable neglect has been demonstrated, it does not in and of itself constitute an excuse for the litigant's non-compliance with procedural rules." Goldwyn v. Donahoe, No. 12-4099-JTM, 2013 WL 3778919, at *2 (D. Kan. July 18, 2013) aff'd, 562 F. App'x 655 (10th Cir. 2014) (denying relief under Rule 4(a)(5) grounded on nothing other than plaintiff's pro se status; citing numerous cases in support); see also Cordell v. Pacific Indem., 335 Fed. Appx. 956, 960 (11th Cir.2009) (no showing of excusable neglect by pro se appellants, as "even pro se pleadings must adhere to time requirements")."). However, that isn't what Greer argued, but rather that "it's all so confusing." And complicated or confusing case status does feed in to whether neglect is excusable. That was somewhat at play in Pioneer, and also in this:

Interesting review of a case in Idaho finding excusable neglect in a civil case where there had been "confusing" litigation and the relevant litigant was pro se. Court was basically like, "this has been confusing litigation with criss-crossing decisions, and even though this guy is belligerent and disrespectful [literal words used] in court, it doesn't seem to be a tactical play (i.e., missing the deadline on purpose for some long game), so we'll conclude the neglect was excusable." So apparently Russ isn't unique, after all.

All that said, none of Hardin's citations [that I looked at, and I didn't shephardize shit] were binding or seemed to be clearly indicating that granting an extension would be manifestly wrong.

I also note that in Rachel v Troutt, the Court's own fuckery in deciding motions not-very-timely, or criss-crossing deadlines that left ambiguity around what impacted what, were a major part of the underlying context for reversing the denial of a motion for extension.

In the instant case, it's not totally unreasonable that a Court could say, ok, yeah, so much happening and crossing motions and some left open for long periods of time, fine, here's your extension, bygones, let's get back on track. It's more an equitable assessment and rewind than anything else.

Tl; dr: the objection was as supported as it could be, but the Order is supportable, particularly given the equitable aspect of the analysis (of either good cause or excusable neglect, or overall). As to whether good cause is distinct from excusable neglect, good cause boils down to impact, which is not far off the prejudice factor in Pioneer, so potentially redundant, but it's in the Rule where it is bc it applies both to subsecs. A and B. Russ neglected to articulate the excusable neglect standard, and the Court could have identified how the standard is met, but the Order isn't crazy, even if the motion is standard Greer whining.

 

[AnOminous]

Ignoring linguism, consider this? What point is there to have good cause and excusable neglect for post-deadline motion, when one of them is much stricter than the other?

This is one of those rules where, despite appearing clear to me, there are apparently circuit differences. The full text:

(b) Extending Time.

(1) In General. When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time:

(A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; or

(B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.

The fact that both clauses are after the colon ending (1), by any normal canons of statutory canon, would apply "for good cause" to both the following clauses. So according to a plain reading, it's "good cause" for both (A) and (B), with (B) requiring "excusable neglect" in addition to "good cause." It makes no sense to decide "excusable neglect" means the court can extend a deadline without any "good cause" for doing so, unless "excusable neglect" is a standard that includes every aspect of "good cause" but is somehow more strict as well.

That said, this is in the Tenth Circuit and Hardin has to go with that, sensible or not.

I don't see how it makes any practical difference since the discretion is so broad it's unlikely to be appealed successfully in any event, and it distracts from the argument, which is brief for a reason, to get into a law journal level nitpicking session about the minutiae of the weird way some Circuit Courts of Appeal have looked at the issue.

So apparently Russ isn't unique, after all.

Whatever his "plights," he's routinely been engaging in obvious gamesmanship, blatantly lying and asserting a nonexistent address as a real one, etc.

Everyone claiming they have a right to travel thinks they'll get a judge like Greer's.

You do have the right to interstate travel and it's one of the few recognized "privileges and immunities" under the Fourteenth Amendment. You also have the right not to be discriminated against for being from out of state upon arrival under the "privileges and immunities" clause in Art. IV § 2 cl. 1. You don't have the right to a car to do it in or even a license to drive a car if you're incompetent to do so.

 

[Useful_Mistake]

Spoiler: responses spoilered to not clog up the view

It makes no sense to decide "excusable neglect" means the court can extend a deadline without any "good cause" for doing so, unless "excusable neglect" is a standard that includes every aspect of "good cause" but is somehow more strict as well.

It similarly makes no sense to apply two standards when that would induce duplicity. For example, there is a lot of 90's caselaw suggesting "Good cause" could include the "lesser" "excusable neglect". If that is true, then the entirety of section b is superfluous. If that is not true, they are still two different standards, which creates a problem that one must be supreme to another (like actual malice v negligence in defamation cases), which again raises the problem of superfluity.

Your interpretation of the case law is misguided.

You keep mentioning the part about "good cause", but neither of the cases evaluated the validity on good cause, but rather on excusable neglect, unless your point is that the finding of latter creates the former, which, again, makes the section superfluous.

Rachel v. Troutt actually proves my point. "In district court, the governing rule allows an extension of time 'for good cause.' Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1)." Rachel, 820 F.3d at 394. What the court means by then saying "Because the motion was timely, he needed only to show good cause" under Rule 6(b)(1) is that excusable neglect is an additional requirement for untimely extensions under Rule(b)(1)(B), and that because this motion was timely, only the fundamental requirement of good cause is necessary.

I respectfully disagree. The court simply realized two different standards for two scenarios.

Neither is necessarily stricter than the other, though one may be harder to prove than the other in a specific case.

They are necessarily stricter than one another as far as the rule is concerned. "Good cause requires a greater showing than excusable neglect. The two standards, although interrelated, are not identical." Utah Republican Party v. Herbert, No. 16-4058 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 2017)

For the sake of completely fairness, this case DOES stand for the your overall proposition, but it appears to be the only one in the 10th.

I will again conceed that Utah courts overwhelmingly support your view.

(In reality, a judge may deny your pre-deadline motion for an extension by saying you waited too long to seek it. (For example, some judges have standing rules that require you to seek an extension at least seven days before the deadline or it will be summarily denied absent a show cause hearing or the like.)

Well, yes, but that part is not really a topic of an interesting debate.

My overall point, I guess, is one of duplicity and superfluity. Accepting the Utah point would render consideration of section b pointless. If the moving party had good cause, then nothing else matters as it is a stricter standard as far as motions for extension of time are concerned. Accepting differening standard interpretation, the one I and Mr. Hardin (or so I read his objection) spout, would instead provide power and value to all sections of the rule.

In any case, thank you for your posts. They were interesting and informative

 

[BULLY HUNTER_78]

dude that is every filing. He could mail in a piece of notebook paper he used to wipe his ass and the judge would find his true meaning between the lines.

What you need to do is hire your own pet retard and pay them in bitcoin to intervene in on this case on your behalf. That way, the judge has two people wiping their ass with notebook paper that the judge is forced to find the true meaning of.

Maybe find one of the hookers Greer has sexually harassed and ask her to write the court about how he’s a sex pest and her coworkers rely on the Kiwi Farms to protect themselves from Greer.

 

[Star Platinum]

In any case, thank you for your posts. They were interesting and informative

Thank you. I appreciate your posts (both here and across the forum). Many of my favorite lolsuit, lawcow, and lawcow adjacent threads would be dead without you.

 

[AnOminous]

I will again conceed that Utah courts overwhelmingly support your view.

I'm more used to things Utah federal courts do being some Mormon bullshit the Tenth Circuit slaps down, but in this case, it appears Utah courts have taken the more reasonable view, looking at what the rule ACTUALLY SAYS, and applying standard rules of statutory construction to it, than the Tenth Circuit, which repeatedly says things about the rule that make no sense to me at all.

Spoiler: contains utterly blinding autism

If the drafters of the rule had actually intended to create two entire domains of the rule for extensions, with one half (before the deadline) being "for good cause" and the other half (after the deadline) being "excusable neglect," there shouldn't have even been the phrase "good cause" before the bifurcating language. The language "good cause" appearing before the colon where the difference between the rule pre and post expiration of the deadline sought to be extended clearly means "good cause" applies to both before and after.

The language in (A) adds no further requirements. Shouldn't the "good cause" language be there instead of in the main clause?

The language in (B) clearly adds another requirement, "excusable neglect."

If that language means nothing, because it already encapsulates "good cause," then why even include it? It violates the rule against superfluity (I'm not just making shit shit up to anyone dumb enough to click spoiler on this look it up).

 

[UncleTusky]

Greer responded to Hardin's objection. Nothing funny, just Russ whining about Hardin standing up for his client and claiming this time he'll make the deadline for real:



Full PDF in attachment

 

[mindlessobserver]

Greer responded to Hardin's objection. Nothing funny, just Russ whining about Hardin standing up for his client and claiming this time he'll make the deadline for real:
View attachment 6253733


Full PDF in attachment

Greer still doesn't realize Josh refusing to settle or engage in mediation is not frivolous. He's the defendant. He's not required to help the plaintiff end the case on the plaintiffs terms.

 

[Useful_Mistake]

and claiming this time he'll make the deadline for real:

It'd be funny if after his expression on how grateful he is for the extension, that the district judge reversed the Magistrate's order. Come on, Josh is due for funnies.

 

[The Dude]

Shit-Lips is going to fuck this up somehow. The question is, will the court let him get away with fucking it up, or are they going to finally hold him accountable and stop cutting him slack?

 

[ForTheHoard]

Greer responded to Hardin's objection. Nothing funny, just Russ whining about Hardin standing up for his client and claiming this time he'll make the deadline for real:
View attachment 6253733


Full PDF in attachment

Blames the delay on Josh not capitulating to his demands from 2 years ago. Please, Josh. Stop making him do this.

 

[306h4Ge5eJUJ]

Greer responded to Hardin's objection. Nothing funny, just Russ whining about Hardin standing up for his client and claiming this time he'll make the deadline for real:
View attachment 6253733


Full PDF in attachment

Half the docket has been consumed by one of the two parties? Say it ain't so!

 

[Dizzyuntildeath]

Half the docket has been consumed by one of the two parties? Say it ain't so!

And the other half is filled with a man in his thirties treating the court system like his angst filled diary, because they are legally obligated to listen.

 

[Jotch]

And the other half is filled with a man in his thirties treating the court system like his angst filled diary, because they are legally obligated to listen.

Dude you just have to let him explain

 

[BoobWhiskers]

On the upside, having now filed something just to petulantly proclaim "I will too have my homework done on time", he'll manage to look extra bad and disrespectful of the couet if he misses the deadline... he's actually acknowledged that it exists for once.

Probably massively optimistic and it'll turn into more demanding extensions upon extensions, but it would be exciting to actually see some forward movement on the 5th.

 

[DSP's Tax Lawyer]

Greer responded to Hardin's objection. Nothing funny, just Russ whining about Hardin standing up for his client and claiming this time he'll make the deadline for real:
View attachment 6253733


Full PDF in attachment

Counter to point 3

Defense has offered multiple times to have Plaintiff kill himself to end the case, yet Plaintiff refuses to do so