3) Because motion is quashed in part due to reason below, he may not be considered under indictment and hence the speedy trial portion is not applicable per a court of criminal appeals ruling (seems like a big loophole here).
It looks like there are two things that need to be done by the prosecution. The first is to use "conjunctive or dysjunctive" language between two parts of the indictment, generally "and" or "or." This should be trivial to fix.
The second is the prosecution has alleged "recklessness" without identifying any specific acts alleged to be "reckless." Since I'm not sure where they're going with that, I don't know the precise definition of "recklessness" that applies to the statute, so I don't know whether that will be trivial to fix or even possible. I think it also may simply be a matter of bad drafting.
This seems to be a fairly concise explanation of the
Barker v. Wingo standard Texas has adopted:
Under the Barker balancing test, there are four factors that the court assesses:
- Whether the length of the delay was uncommonly long;
- Whether the reason for the delay was justified;
- Whether the accused asserted his right; and
- Whether the delay resulted in prejudice to the accused.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
Of the four factors, the state bears the burden with regards to the first two factors and the defendant bears the burden of proving the other two factors. The court will evaluate the factors, separately and together, to determine whether they weigh in favor of the state or the defendant. If a majority of the factors weigh in favor of the defendant, the court may find that his right has been violated and his charges may be dismissed.
This is what's called a "balancing test," because generally not just one factor applies, and sometimes not all factors come down in the same direction, so they have to be balanced against each other with regard to the specific case.
There's also the factor of a "presumptive" prejudice for certain amounts of delay, in excess of the "deadlines" you cited. A presumption can be conclusive or rebuttable, and this is rebuttable. It, however, shifts the burden to the state to argue why the delay was actually not prejudicial, despite it being presumptively so.
Something your friend would be in a lot better position to answer would be what are the applicable deadlines, that is, exactly how long does the state have to bring these charges in a proper format, and would the deadline be calculated from the initial arrest to the filing of the initial (now quashed) information (since it is a class B dismeanor it does not require indictment), or whether the same deadline applies and puts the prosecution under time pressure.
I'll note that generally, to assert the right to a speedy trial requires actually requesting it. Considering he did that just now, right before the holidays, it probably doesn't necessarily trigger the obligation to reply to it instantly, nor would prejudice necessarily accrue unless, having notice of the assertion of the right, they dawdle around on it.
I think it will really all come down to the meaning of the word "reckless" in this context and it will either be trivial to fix (just identify the facts of record that support it) or there aren't such facts in the record and they have to abandon it. If I had to guess, I'd guess the former and that they will in a speedy fashion submit a superseding document fixing the problems and it may very well go to trial by the current date on the schedule, since the parties seem to be agreed on moving forward.
Again, I'd assume if anything I've said contradicts something your friend said, he's probably the correct one.
I'll note some important dates:
9/26/2023 Riley does a harassment, allegedly. An arrest warrant is issued although he claims to have been unaware of it at the time.
6/8/2024 Riley does another harassment, allegedly. They notice the original arrest warrant and arrest him on that.
9/9/2024 Texas files an information formally charging Riley.
[Note: B) Misdemeanor more than 6 mo: 90 days
C) Misdemeanor less than 6 mo: 60 days]
This appears to be late unless the sentence for a class B misdemeanor (unless the sentence being "up to 180 days" puts it in the "more than six months" category somehow even though it is less than six months). Not sure if that issue was waived by not raising it in a timely fashion earlier. It's also apparently three days late even by the 90 day deadline, which would have been 9/6/2024 at least if Texas uses the most common deadline calculation.
I don't think that's important, at least not now, or it would have already been the subject of a motion to dismiss.
