There can be aggravating and mitigating factors in determining an appropriate sanction (I'm cribbing from the quickest source so can't give citations atm; it's also a list oriented to Rule 11, but the general considerations are about the same; good enough for internet work/ trust me bro):
I don't think reasoning pertaining to Rule 11 is really apposite. Rule 11 is a "may impose." Rule 37 pretty clearly says "must."
(5) Payment of Expenses; Protective Orders.
(A) If the Motion Is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery Is Provided After Filing). If the motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if:
(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;
(ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or
(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
It provides a pretty big catch-all in (iii), but generally, broadly worded catch-alls like that (another example would be FRE 807 the so-called "residual exception" which allows admission of evidence falling under no other rule) are disfavored and require some reasoning as to why they're being applied.
And the metric for the award is not calculated based on deterrence. Even though the purpose of the rule itself is deterrence, the size of the award must be related to the "reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees."
The discretion is largely in what the judge believed were "reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney fees." Meanwhile, the ruling is completely bereft of any reasoning related to the reasonableness of the expenses (including fees). In fact, the judge even openly admitted in a footnote not even to have read the relevant filing by Hardin, so it's essentially an admission he just pulled the number out of his ass.
This is despite the fact that the rule governing objections to magistrate findings specifically requires de novo review.
In any event, the language of the rule itself is what Goodyear is based on, and the mechanism (only fees and expenses reasonably related to the motion) is clearly compensatory, the same textual reason the Court applied in finding it compensatory and not allowing deviation upwards.
It's just a sloppy ruling in about every way it could be.
Not saying I wouldn't argue it's an unreasonable amount, especially given how much Hardin already trims his bills and what he submitted, but the Rule doesn't require that the sanction amount equal attorney's fees.
It doesn't require that the sanction equal them, but it does require it be based on costs and fees, not whatever the judge pulls out of his ass. Here, the amount awarded is completely untethered from any consideration of the reasonableness of the costs and fees.
