Greer v. Moon, No. 20-cv-00647 (D. Utah Sep. 16, 2020)

[DragoonSierra]

Having learned that public records requests are not discovery, he will fill out a FOIA form and send it to Null and then demand sanctions when Hardin says Null's records aren't public.

Stop helping Russ! REEEEE!

 

[Bloodthirsty Nosenigger]

You have to realize that according to the broad public, whose understanding of this forum comes entirely from the Wikipedia page on it, this site is adjacent to Stormfront forum.

I was hoping that judges would be able to perform their sworn duty objectively, in accordance with the law. Not according to some dickless faggot's scribbling on Wikipedia.
Optimistic, I know.

For the sake of argument, let's take a look at the applicable statute and case law.
First off, courts can generally award attorney's fees under their inherent power.
Then there's 17 US Code (copyright law), §505:

In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.

Also very straightforward. There's a SCOTUS decision adding clarification to this, under Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley& Sons.
Accordingly, courts are to place "substantial weight" on the reasonableness of either litigant's position. Also noted are "several nonexclusive factors" to consider, such as "frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness[,] and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence".

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-375

This article provides further applicable statutes for fee shifting in frivolous copyright claims.

Now, let's apply the law to the facts of the case. Was the defendants position reasonable?
A reasonable person would expect not to be held liable for copyrighted material that was uploaded to google by an unidentified third party.
On the only remaining claim, the defendant has a reasonable expectation to prevail, in accordance with fair use doctrine.

Now, Crusty Rusty will cling to "muh 10th Circuit" to claim that his position was reasonable, but that's not how that works.
They merely determined that he successfully stated a cause of action, and made the factual allegations to support it. Barely.

Factual allegations were good enough to get him this far, but he hasn't raised any evidence to support them.
On the contrary, as per Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37:

(c) Failure to Disclose, to Supplement an Earlier Response, or to Admit.
(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.

ECF No. 127-1: "There are not any documents in Plaintiff’s possession that would need to be provided to Defendants’ counsel."
ECF No. 201: "To the best of each party’s knowledge, Nathan Greer and Scott Greer have no information relevant to the Plaintiff’s claims or the Defendants’ defenses."
"No other witness has been disclosed by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff does not intend to call any other witness at trial as part of his case in chief."

Now, Greee may not understand the law, or what he's done there, but Hardin made him concede that he has neither evidence, nor witnesses to support his claim.
As per ECF No 210: "WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully submit that this Court should exclude non-disclosed evidence and witnesses, and summarily dismiss this case because there is no possible means for the Plaintiff to present any evidence upon which the Court could enter a judgment in his favor."

The reason I believe his conduct to be warrant fee-shifting is the same reason the case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Expecting to prevail on his claim, without providing any evidence or witnesses to support it, is objectively unreasonable.

"Bad faith" should be obvious. He lied to opposing counsel, as well as the court, about his dead witness being "eager to testify". He lied about having a restraining order against Moon. He openly admitted his intention to bury the defendant in costly litigation, and has dragged out the case over 4+ years to that end.

He's failed to get the desired outcome with his meritless police reports and request for a restraining order. Now he seeks to impose a gag-order upon defendant, trying to relitigate the long-dismissed harassment and defamation claims under the guise of a copyright lawsuit:
ECF 154-8: "Remove me from kiwi farms, not just my copyrights, install a code on his site to ensure I’m automatically erased every time my name and likeness is used."
This is but the most recent act in plaintiff's lengthy history of frivolous litigation. I'd say deterrence is absolutely warranted.

And they have utterly failed to do so until now whenever there's been even a bit of discretion involved.

Well, the court may use and abuse its discretion on this matter to say "fuck you, Null", but that's appealable.
As you stated, there's already reversible error with regard to awarding fees on the record, something that'd bolster Hardin's position in a potential appeal.
And Greee can't hope to receive pro-bono lawyers tardguarding him again, they already got everything they wanted out of him, and dumped him like a used-up whore.

 

[Supplemental Authority]

Here are my updated notes on issues before the Court. I have likely "goofed up" some of the details. Please correct any mistakes you find. However, please note that I am trying to objectively summarize the contents of the court documents, not adjudicate whether their claims are true or false. Thank you.

Russell Greer v. Joshua Moon, et al.
Case No. 2:24-cv-00421-DBB
U.S. District Court of Utah

https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/68847149/greer-v-moon/

Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

• ECF 209. Plaintiff seeks leave to file a First Amended complaint.
• ECF 242. Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended complaint upon stipulation with Defendants that Plaintiff may not call new witnesses.
• ECF 245. Defendants’ motion to stay discovery until new defendants are served and dispositive motions resolved.
• ECR 247. Plaintiff amends complaint with two anonymous KF users.
• ECF 254. Defendants argue Plaintiff hasn’t filed a timely opposition to the motion to stay.
• ECF 255. Defendants’ move for time extension due to new defendants.
• ECF 264. Plaintiff move for time extension without specifying the specific motion.
• ECF 266. Defendants partially oppose Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time.
• ECF 273. The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time as untimely.
• ECF 274. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amendment complaint under FRPC 12.
• ECF 275. Defendants file supplemental authority for their motion to stay discovery.
• ECF 283. The Court grants Defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending ruling on the MTD.
• ECF 288. Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion to dismiss as untimely and not meritorious.
• ECF 289. Defendants move for a time extension to file their reply memorandum of law to support their motion to dismiss. They hope the extension will allow pending rulings to render the motion moot, requesting an extension until June 30.
• ECF 290. Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion for an extension of time, citing the Court’s previous denial to him. He claims Defense counsel is abusing the litigation process by publishing his family’s information and submitting open records requests.
• ECF 291. Defendants provide a point-by-point rebuttal to Plaintiff’s opposition to their motion.
• ECF 292. Court grants Defendants’ motion for an extension of time to June 30.

Sanctions for Nondisclosure of Discovery

• ECF 210. Defendants move to exclude undisclosed evidence and witnesses during discovery and seek case-ending sanctions against the Plaintiff.
• ECF 217. Plaintiff claims he “did the bare minimum required by FRCP 26, by providing an evidence list.” He says that “the evidence is substantial and Plaintiff is extremely busy.”
• ECF 218. Magistrate Bennett sanctions the Plaintiff for the amount of Defense’s attorney’s fees.
• ECF 221. Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Bennett’s order for sanctions.
• ECF 229. Defendants proffer to the Court Plaintiff’s statement that “I’m not paying you a dime,” “There is no reason why I am being forced to pay this,” and “You violated the SPO.”
• ECF 230. District Judge Barlow reduces Plaintiff’s sanctions from about $5,000 to $1,000.
• ECF 251. Plaintiff motions for a bonded stay pending appeal to the 10th Circuit.
• ECF 256. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion for a bonded stay.
• ECF 283. The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for a bonded stay.
• ECF 304. Plaintiff again motions for a 10% bonded stay pending appeal to the 10th Circuit.
• ECF 305. Defendants request an extension to respond to Plaintiff’s bonded stay request and notify the Court of a forthcoming motion for sanctions under FRCP 11(c) regarding Plaintiff’s financial statements. This can’t be filed until June 10.
• ECF 310. The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for a bonded stay under FRCP 62(b) because sanctions are not a “judgment” and the request lacks merit. The Court orders Plaintiff to pay $1,000 to the Defendants no later than June 9. “Failure to do so may result in additional sanctions.”

Settlement Extortion Scheme

• ECF 213. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Moon has committed “a felony” because KF allegedly facilitates stalking, and that he would provide a case number “after he meets with detectives.”
• ECF 216. Plaintiff threatens to go after Defense counsel’s pro has vice status, which allows him to represent Defendants despite being an out-of-state attorney, due to counsel's “dishonesty.”
• ECF 244. Plaintiff claims that KF users “stalk” him and that two users sent him “death threats.” “Greer has offered twice to settle this case simply (sic) being removed from kiwi farms.”
• ECF 262. Defendants claim that “the Plaintiff has no good faith basis” to claim Mr. Moon has committed a felony. It appears he has not met with detectives or provided a case number.
• ECF 287. Defendants claim that Plaintiff has again threatened to report Defense counsel to the Virginia State Bar for not acceding to his settlement demand. Plaintiff has accused counsel of being involved with “bomb threats and pedophilia.” Defendants claim this is a pattern of abuse.
• ECF 321. Defendants claim that Plaintiff is attempting to extort them into a “settlement” by threatening criminal complaints. Plaintiff marked the relevant email as “attorneys [sic] eyes only,” which they claim is improper. Defendants demand that Plaintiff de-designate the email.

Note: The SPO was revised following the start of this case in 2020. I believe that the original SPO is what applies to this case. However, I do not know if the Court has stated this explicitly. The revised SPO has different provisions concerning de-designation of AEO, which is why this detail is relevant here.

Steve Taylor Witness Scheme

• ECF 234. Defendants’ motion for sanctions against Defendants under FRCP 11. They claim that Plaintiff made materially false pleadings to the Court claiming that (1) he had a witness who is “eager” to testify despite him being dead; and (2) that Defense counsel violated the SPO.
• ECF 239. Defendants supplement their motion for sanctions, claiming a pattern of litigation abuse on the part of the Plaintiff (e.g., saying “there will be blood” to prior opposing counsel.)
• ECF 249. Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion for sanctions, claiming he never read the SPO and relied on a “blanket assumption” about its workings. He alleges Defendants published confidential information on KF in violation of the SPO, also asserting such a statement is an “opinion” that shouldn’t warrant sanctions.
• ECF 252. Defendants provide a reply memorandum in support of their motion for sanctions.
• ECF 283. The Court takes the motion under advisement.

Note: As I understand it, Mr. Greer's claim that he had Steve Taylor as a witness was a key reason the case was re-transferred back to Utah from Florida.

Compelled Discovery of Restraining Order Application

• ECF 243. Plaintiff motions for the Court to reconsider its motion to compel discovery.
• ECF 250. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider.
• ECF 283. The Court orders Plaintiff to provide the 2018 restraining order (RO) application against Mr. Moon.
• ECF 294. Plaintiff claims the RO application is costly to obtain and irrelevant. He requests Defendants pay for the document or extend the compliance time.
• ECF 295. Defendants agree to Plaintiff’s motion for an additional 14 days to provide the RO application, but oppose Plaintiff’s motion to be excused from complying.
• ECF 296. Court orders Plaintiff to provide a copy of the 2018 RO application to Defendants by June 3.
• ECF 326. Plaintiff asks for reconsideration of the Court's order (despite not having opposed Defendant's motion to compel discovery) because the RO application is irrelevant. Alternatively, Plaintiff asks that the Court require the Defendants to directly pay for the cost of obtaining the document.
• ECF 327. Defendants oppose the motion for reconsideration as unmeritorous, and request the Court consider sanctions for Mr. Greer's misconduct.

Note: Court documents generaly refer to the document in question as a "restraining order." However, it is understood by the parties that no restraining order was actually granted against Mr. Moon. Rather, Mr. Greer is being compelled to obtain the underlying application for a restraining order.

Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order to Show Cause

• ECF 298. Plaintiff requests an order requiring Defendants to show cause for not being sanctioned for their investigation into Plaintiff’s alleged misrepresentations to the Court.
• ECF 299. Plaintiff claims Defense counsel is sending him “threats” and that KF is sending him “death threats.” Plaintiff is now “considering criminal charges” against counsel for “stalking.”
• ECF 302. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion for an order to show cause. They claim Plaintiff hasn’t specified which pleading violated FRCP 11, hasn’t complied by allowing counsel 21 days to withdraw offensive pleadings, and Defense counsel is only defending his clients. They also allege Plaintiff has selectively edited exhibits.
• ECF 303. Plaintiff claims that Defense counsel’s open records requests amount to “criminal stalking,” and “has to go down to the Las Vegas” police to file a report against counsel.
• ECF 306. Defendants claim that Plaintiff sent Defense counsel emails referring to him as “Mr. Stalker” and telling him to “Fuck off. Kindly.” Counsel submits that ECF 299 should be denied.

Suspected IFP Fraud

• ECF 253. Defendants motion to review Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis (IFP) status.
• ECF 267. Defendants proffer a CAD Report, showing that Defendant represented to the Nye County Sheriff’s Department “that he had significant financial resources” on Nov. 22, 2024.
• ECF 268. Defendants proffer the Plaintiff's statement, “Yes, I have an LLC and have been working with investors.” They state that Plaintiff likely did not provide his “controlling interest in any LLC capable of purchasing millions of dollars worth of property” when seeking IFP status.
• ECF 283. Based on statements by the Plaintiff to the Court, the Court finds that the Plaintiff can pay the filing fee while still supporting himself. Failure to pay the fee will mean dismissal. The Court denies Defendants’ motion to review the Plaintiff’s IFP status as moot.
• ECF 286. Defendants provide a record that Plaintiff paid a filing fee in Nevada State Court, indicating he could previously afford filing fees.
• ECF 311. Plaintiff pays the full filing fee of $405.00 by the required deadline.
• ECF 313. Defendants request leave to view Plaintiff’s IFP application, which is currently under seal. Defendants wish to investigate whether Plaintiff misled the Court, noting the Plaintiff’s admission in a prior case that he was wealthy enough to spend “$14,000 at brothels,” pay the filing fees for his other cases in state court, and found his own real estate development firm.
• ECF 315. Plaintiff claims that Defense counsel has lied to the Court about Plaintiff’s inability to pay the $1,000 sanction. He claims that his $5,000 savings is “money reserved for business.” He claims that challenging his IFP status is untimely, and also moot because he paid the filing fee.
• ECF 317. Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s recent filings establish that he was wealthier in 2020 than today and therefore, that his initial IFP filing may have contained misrepresentations.
• ECF 318. Plaintiff claims that he made $16/hr in Sep 2020 and now makes $14/hr. He claims that his 2020 expenses include a Los Vegas security deposit and rent, Utah rent, utility bills, car expenses, etc. He claims that he used his 2020 stimulus check to pay for his AGT audition.
• ECF 319. Plaintiff claims that he filed suit in Sep 2020 because of a three-year statute of limitations on copyright infringement. He claims the book was published in Oct 2017.
• ECF 320. Plaintiff claims that he cannot produce a receipt of his U-Haul rental expenses because of their data retention policy, but that his social media post corroborates his rental.
• ECF 323. Plaintiff claims that he did not commit IFP fraud, that his financial situation changed due to (e.g.) an auto loan and relocation expenses, and that Defendants are harassing him.

Winnemucca Prostitution Scheme

• ECF 276. Plaintiff files an “EMERGENCY REQUEST for a continuance” claiming that he has a “business meeting in rural Nevada."
• ECF 277. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion as without good cause and prejudicial.
• ECF 278. The Court denies Plaintiff’s continuance. “Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of any emergency that warrants a continuance.”
• ECF 293. Defendants claim that the Plaintiff’s “emergency” requiring a rescheduling of the Court’s May 6 hearing was a “complete fabrication.”
• ECF 314. Plaintiff claims that he “accidentally scheduled” the Winnemucca city counsel meeting on the same day as the Court hearing. Plaintiff motions for a protective order against Defense counsel and the Defendants under FRPC 26(c) “before he goes to the Las Vegas Police.”
• ECF 316. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion for an “emergency” protective order because FRCP 26(c) applies to discovery, but discovery has been stayed. Defendants claim they are not seeking discovery, with one immaterial exception allowed by ECF 283 (i.e., the restraining order application).
• ECF 322. Plaintiff claims that he “has got the Las Vegas police involved” because people are emailing the “Winnemucca realtor.” He requests a protective order against Defense counsel.
• ECF 324. Plaintiff claims that Defendants are violating the Court’s discovery stay by submitting open records requests stay, and that the city council’s refusal to change its agenda constituted an “emergency.” Plaintiff renews his request for a protective order.

Motion for Sanctions for Violation of Discovery Stay

• ECF 328. Defendants note that Plaintiff has tried to subpoena Mr. Moon in violation of the discovery stay ordered by ECF 283.
• ECF 329. Per the Clerk of the Court, "The subpoenas [...] were issued in error and in violation of the court's stay of discovery. As such, the subpoenas are invalid and void."
• ECF 330. Defendants move for sanctions against Mr. Greer for violating the discovery stay and allegedly false statements made to the Clerk.
• ECF 331. Plaintiff moves for "clarification" regarding the discovery stay. He claims that he needs Mr. Moon to provide user information so he can serve the two new (pseduanonymous) defendants. Claims that the stay did not apply to information required to serve the new defendants. Alternatively, he requests that the order be modified so that he can use discovery to obtain information to locate and serve the new defendants.
• ECF 332. Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion for clarification and/or modification. Defendants claim that Plaintiff's motion contains "materially false statements" about the Court's order, and a request an order to show cause for why Plaintiff should not be sanctioned for those false claims.

Note: Mr. Greer had 90 days from the date of the First Amended Complaint to serve the two new defendants. FRCP 4(m). This deadline has passed.

Past Deadlines

• May 29. Plaintiff must serve the two new defendants with the First Amended Complaint, or the Court may dismiss the complaint against them.
• June 3. Plaintiff must produce a copy of the restraining order to Defendants, who will update the Court within seven days.
• June 4. “Attorney’s Eyes Only” email will be de-designated if Plaintiff does not provide an explanation of why the designation is appropriate.

Upcoming Deadlines

• June 9. Plaintiff must pay Defendants their awarded sanctions (a net amount of $774.75).
• June 10. Defendants must update the Court about whether plaintiff has produced the restraining order application.
• June 10. Defendants can file their motion for additional sanctions for IFP misrepresentations.
• June 30. Defendants must file their memorandum of law in support of the motion of dismissal.

"[Greer v. Moon] drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least, but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises."

 

[The Un-Clit]

I don't want to veer into assisting Mr. Greeeee but my experience with capital contributions to an LLC is that once you put it into the business checking account you can't really move it back without being taxed. It becomes income. If Mr. Greeee uses funds from the prostitution business for his vendetta lawsuits the government needs their pound of flesh.

i would make a bet that the account with funds earmarked for "business" are simply Greee's personal savings account as opposed to his personal chequeing account.

The chances that Strokey the Snowflake made an actual business bank account for his LLC are extremely low.

 

[Napoleon III]

i would make a bet that the account with funds earmarked for "business" are simply Greee's personal savings account as opposed to his personal chequeing account.

The chances that Strokey the Snowflake made an actual business bank account for his LLC are extremely low.

It takes a lot of legal maneuvering to be able to hide funds in a lawsuit and most importantly you have to do it years before the lawsuit even starts.

There are a lot of rich people who have lawyers just for lawsuits and taxes whose sole job is finding ways to hide money in ways courts can't reach. Without that no way Russ can hide that money.

 

[break these cuffs]

Russell Greer v. Joshua Moon, et al.
Case No. 2:24-cv-00421-DBB
U.S. District Court of Utah
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/68847149/greer-v-moon/

snip

Upcoming Deadlines
June 9. Plaintiff must pay Defendants their awarded sanctions (a net amount of $774.75).
June 10. Defendants must update the Court about whether plaintiff has produced the restraining order application.
June 10. Defendants can file their motion for additional sanctions for IFP misrepresentations.
June 30. Defendants must file their memorandum of law in support of the motion of dismissal.

"I ain't reading all that. I'm happy for u tho. Or sorry that happened."

- Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett

 

[Friend of Dorothy Parker]

Stop helping Russ! REEEEE!

Well, he either already had it set up or didn't. Moving now/ recently to shuffle money to a business account would be...disfavored, aka it would look like what it would be, which is fraudulent.

 

[Gorton Colu]

Well, he either already had it set up or didn't. Moving now/ recently to shuffle money to a business account would be...disfavored, aka it would look like what it would be, which is fraudulent.

Even of he had done it a while ago would that even matter? I don't see how moving personal income into a business llc really shields them.

It'd make sense if it was earned business income, but as far as any of us is aware, Russ could only be moving personal money to a single member llc that he is in sole control of.

Please correct me if im mistaken.

 

[reptile baht spaniard rid]

It'd make sense if it was earned business income, but as far as any of us is aware, Russ could only be moving personal money to a single member llc that he is in sole control of.

One LLC is dead and the other is just bornêd. Either way they could claw it back, you can't just yell "BUSINESS" and transfer all your money into an LLC to avoid judgement.

 

[Gorton Colu]

One LLC is dead and the other is just bornêd. Either way they could claw it back, you can't just yell "BUSINESS" and transfer all your money into an LLC to avoid judgement.

I may be retarded and wrong as I'm not anything close to an attorney but I remember having a client who wanted to set up a revocable living trust with himself as grantor, trustee, and beneficiary. I asked him if he was doing estate planning and he said that his intent was to shield his assets from personal liability. As far as I am aware, that would not work well for him.

This seems like the same thing with Rusty.

 

[reptile baht spaniard rid]

I may be retarded and wrong as I'm not anything close to an attorney but I remember having a client who wanted to set up a revocable living trust with himself as grantor, trustee, and beneficiary. I asked him if he was doing estate planning and he said that his intent was to shield his assets from personal liability. As far as I am aware, that would not work well for him.

Here's the whole of the law, basically - "if you can have your cake and eat it, too, it ain't gonna fly."

 

[jerkstore]

to add some info to the questions about paralegal/legal assistant questions. i am a former certified legal assistant. when i thought i wanted to become a legal assistant/paralegal (to eventually become a lawyer), i already had my bachelor’s degree. in order to qualify to take the licensure exam with the association i chose, because i already had a BA, i had to take a full year of legal courses at a university, which i did. while i took the exam and passed, the job i had only taken to make money while i was doing those courses turned into a career, and i never ultimately practiced. while it does vary some what it takes/what it means to be “certified,” i do not think russell ever pursued certification, and just graduated with an associates in law. the test i took for certification was not easy and took two sessions to complete (long-ass test), which is why you have to have some legal education, whether you have a bachelor’s or not.

on the flipside, i have known lawyers who hire their wives to be their paralegals with zero legal education.

 

[Watching Rekieta]

Having learned that public records requests are not discovery, he will fill out a FOIA form and send it to Null and then demand sanctions when Hardin says Null's records aren't public.

Did he learn this? Damnit!!

I wanted him to ask the court to sanction Hardin for brothel FOIA requests while discovery is paused since he just learned discovery is paused. I want him to learn in the funniest way possible.

 

[reptile baht spaniard rid]

You know, Discovery™ is paused® - but every day, people are clicking the thread and discovering that Greee is a fucking retard.

That's obviously in violation of the Stay on Discovery™.

 

[Supplemental Authority]

I may be retarded and wrong as I'm not anything close to an attorney but I remember having a client who wanted to set up a revocable living trust with himself as grantor, trustee, and beneficiary. I asked him if he was doing estate planning and he said that his intent was to shield his assets from personal liability. As far as I am aware, that would not work well for him.

This seems like the same thing with Rusty.

You can structure your business as a separate legal entity to protect your business assets from personal judgments, and your personal assets from business judgments. This is true even for a business owned by a single person (e.g., a single-member LLC). Of course, there are various rules/exceptions.

 

[lolwatagain]

Who that second one? That doesn't sound like Acerthorn

It's Acerthorn.

It's some funny shit too.

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.wawd.177986/gov.uscourts.wawd.177986.2.0.pdf

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-txnd-3_11-cv-02227/pdf/USCOURTS-txnd-3_11-cv-02227-0.pdf

 

[obsdj]

You can structure your business as a separate legal entity to protect your business assets from personal judgments, and your personal assets from business judgments. This is true even for a business owned by a single person (e.g., a single-member LLC). Of course, there are various rules/exceptions.

One might wonder if that's what the intention was in adding "Chris Wilson" and "W.H." to the new LLC that was just registered less than a month ago. Are we still looking for someone to get copies of those filing documents from SilverFlume? They might not show anything juicy, but then again they might.

 

[Friend of Dorothy Parker]

Even of he had done it a while ago would that even matter? I don't see how moving personal income into a business llc really shields them.

It'd make sense if it was earned business income, but as far as any of us is aware, Russ could only be moving personal money to a single member llc that he is in sole control of.

Please correct me if im mistaken.

Generally, transfers after a known actual or potential liability (such as legal claims) (and in some places before after that) with intent to defraud or without reasonably equivalent value are considered fraudulent transfers/ conveyances and subject to voiding. That's a common-law concept, though codified in many places. Utah has the Uniform Voidable Transfers Act. Primer. For Nevada:

NRS 112.180  Transfer made or obligation incurred with intent to defraud or without receiving reasonably equivalent value; determination of intent.

1.  A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:

(a) With actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or

(b) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:

(1) Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or

(2) Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became due.

2.  In determining actual intent under paragraph (a) of subsection 1, consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:

(a) The transfer or obligation was to an insider;

(b) The debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;

(c) The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;

(d) Before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;

(e) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets;

(f) The debtor absconded;

(g) The debtor removed or concealed assets;

(h) The value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;

(i) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;

(j) The transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and

(k) The debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.

(Added to NRS by 1987, 11)

(An analogy is bankruptcy law, which specifically has clawbacks for certain asset transfers (generalizing, 90 days pre-filing in general to creditors if the transfer puts them in a better position than in the bankruptcy ("preferences") and 1 year for transfers to insiders (which would certainly include one's own business)). But outside of bankruptcy, it's still a problem.)

Russ doesn't have an operating business and the value of any LLC he might have is $0. He has an idea (a bad one) of what he wants to do, at most, so earmarking money, wherever he put it, shouldn't shield that money from claims.

Now, of course, we're not even talking about asset-shielding. He's saying, "hey, I have money, but I want it to go for X, so I don't want to pay the $87 required for me to meet the obligations I 100% created." He's just full of it.

I may be retarded and wrong as I'm not anything close to an attorney but I remember having a client who wanted to set up a revocable living trust with himself as grantor, trustee, and beneficiary. I asked him if he was doing estate planning and he said that his intent was to shield his assets from personal liability. As far as I am aware, that would not work well for him.

This seems like the same thing with Rusty.

That is a very sus set-up, yes. And while the person us alive, a revocable living trust of any type wouldn't shield their assets from creditors, courts, or 3rd parties, bc the person controls the assets, so the assets would be deemed their property.

You can structure your business as a separate legal entity to protect your business assets from personal judgments, and your personal assets from business judgments. This is true even for a business owned by a single person (e.g., a single-member LLC). Of course, there are various rules/exceptions.

Yeah, but if you don't have an ongoing business and/ or you do it when knowing of a potential claim, and/ or it leaves you insolvent, the reasonable inference isn't going to go in your favor.

 

[Supplemental Authority]

Are we still looking for someone to get copies of those filing documents from SilverFlume? They might not show anything juicy, but then again they might.

So far as I know, those docs have not been posted to KF. I believe they can be ordered here. (Beware phonebooking yourself.)

This might already be known, but I found that Greer had an LLC formed in April 2022. It has a similar name with a presumably similar purpose (i.e., prostitution). Gives further lie to the idea that Greer could not afford filing fees.

Entity Name:    INTIMATE DEALINGS LLC
Entity Number:  E22627342022-2
Entity Type:    Domestic Limited-Liability Company (86)
Entity Status:  Revoked
Formation Date: 04/20/2022
NV Business ID: NV20222429675

Interestingly, "Christopher Wilson" is an officer on this LLC, as well.

For anyone keeping score, the current LLC is...

Entity Name:    ID NV LLC
Entity Number:  E48962662025-8
Entity Type:    Domestic Limited-Liability Company (86)
Entity Status:  Active
Formation Date: 05/14/2025
NV Business ID: NV20253353842

Edit:

Yeah, but if you don't have an ongoing business and/ or you do it when knowing of a potential claim, and/ or it leaves you insolvent, the reasonable inference isn't going to go in your favor.

I entirely agree. I was just explaining the point that even single-member LLCs have limited liability. It's not like the revokable trust example. Obviously, Greer's scheme will fall flat on its face. ("This money is reserved for business!")

 

[Watching Rekieta]

Entity Name: INTIMATE DEALINGS LLC Entity Number: E22627342022-2 Entity Type: Domestic Limited-Liability Company (86) Entity Status: Revoked Formation Date: 04/20/2022 NV Business ID: NV20222429675

The domain intimatedealings.com is apparently maintained even if the LLC is revoked. Not sure who is paying for it. WHOIS returns the domain to the NV LLC. The "about" page on the site references a "disabled" run company.

https://www.whois.com/whois/intimatedealings.com

Updated on 3/31/2025.

Anyone think Russtard let the llc go but pays the domain registration costs out of personal funds so he doesn't lose that choice domain?