on why I think #Iran will eventually return to the negotiating table and wave the flag of compromise
overview:
1. Iran can resist the US and Israel but not deter them
2. Iran's best option is compromise
3. Follies of the nuclear option
4. Regime change is unlikely 1/ <i></i>
1. Iran can resist the US and Israel but not deter them
My contention since soon after 07 October 2023 has been that Iran's best chance to end the conflict in its favor was the coordination application of overwhelming force to attempt a halt in the war and negotiations. 2/ <i></i>
Otherwise, Israel would have the time and space to dismantle the Axis of Resistance, front by front, and eventually reach Iran itself to degrade its strategic capabilities and economy [for example see post from April 2024]. Which is what has unfolded. 3/
A key issue revealed by Iran's strikes on Israel in April and October 2024 and again yesterday is that its medium-range ballistic missiles and drones (the main weapons capable of reaching Israel) are a good strategic tool when applied on a large-scale for saturation...4/ <i></i>
...but (as I've been repeating since last year) not good tactical weapons to destroy small, hardened, military/key targets covered by Israel's air defenses.
Translation: Iran can't meaningfully degrade Israel's offensive and defensive capabilities. 5/
In stark contrast Israel CAN meaningfully degrade Iran's offensive and defensive capabilities, and has been consistently doing so since 07 October, and as we saw again yesterday in the worst day in the Islamic Republic's military history since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. 6/ <i></i>
Iran should have struck a resounding blow in response. Instead, it's not clear if yesterday's retaliation, Operation True Promise 3, exceeded the benchmark set by Operation True Promise 2 in October 2024, although military censorship will prevent a full accounting for now. 7/ <i></i>
Perhaps a much more powerful attack is forthcoming, as some sources claim, and has only been delayed by the shock of yesterday's Israeli strike and degradation of the Iranian military command and control.
But even if Iran can conduct a few more devastating attacks...8/ <i></i>
...it's ability to conduct such attacks will likely only degrade over time as its air defenses have been pulverized, its missile and drone launch capacity disrupted, production capacity targeted, and options for resupply limited. 9/ <i></i>
Israel's leadership and people have the resolve to absorb these blows, and can largely maintain its operational tempo, striking Iran's nuclear, military, leadership, and economic targets at will, with strong US military and financial backing and Western diplomatic support. 10/ <i></i>
Iran's options to halt the conflict through other means will also be suboptimal.
Iran retains a capacity, through its short-range and anti-ship missiles, drones, mines, frogmen, Houthis etc, to disrupt the energy trade through the Strait of Hormuz and production in the GCC. 11/ <i></i>
As I will return to, Iran can leverage this threat and its effects on global energy prices (an issue which resonates with President Trump) to pressure the US to negotiate.
But actually acting on it with major attacks has a high chance of backfiring: 12/ <i></i>
(a) This will disrupt Iran's own ability to export oil/conduct trade at a time when it's economy is faltering
(b) It's will result in blowback, leading to military action against it by the US and others
(c) It will alienate key allies/partners - oil exporters and importers 13/ <i></i>
As Israel continues its campaign, Iran will suffer greater nuclear and military (and even leadership and economic) losses, damaging the ability of the system to respond, its credibility at home and abroad, and its negotiating leverage with the US. 14/ <i></i>
That's not to say Iran is on the verge of military defeat.
This is not the worst crisis the Islamic Republic's leaders have faced, they retain a solid level of resolve, and even if they can't deter Israel and the US, they can continue to resist.
But to what end? 15/ <i></i>
2. Follies of the nuclear option
Of course, Iran retains the option to attempt a nuclear test.
The chances of this have increased dramatically and we may even see some signaling in this direction.
It could use a nuclear test to halt the conflict and increase its leverage. 16/ <i></i>
Given the Islamic Republic's level of intelligence penetration, the "sneak out" to a bomb option is likely off the table, meaning it will have to "break out", likely in view of Israeli and Western intelligence. 17/ <i></i>
But its ability to break out to a bomb is being degraded through the murders of its nuclear-scientific leadership, as well as degrading of its nuclear capacity and infrastructure.
While Israel can't completely remove Iran's ability to break out, it can make it much harder. 18/ <i></i>
And any decision to break out is likely to trigger President Trump's red line that Iran cannot possess nuclear weapons, likely leading to a more punishing US-Israeli campaign against Iranian nuclear and other targets, further degrading its break out capacity. 19/ <i></i>
I should also note that I'm not confident that one or two nuclear tests would fully deter Israel (although it would likely deter most other actors).
In the absence of a robust nuclear deterrence force, I think it could risk a demonstrative nuclear strike on Iran by Israel. 20/ <i></i>
So, on balance, while I think Iran retains a nuclear break out capacity and could eventually move to a test, this option is becoming harder, more costly because of its other consequences, and leading up or after a test, risks a nuclear strike on Iran. 21/ <i></i>
3. Iran's best option is compromise
Iran can resist Israel for the foreseeable future, but lacks good options to deter/restrain it, meanwhile its nuclear capacity (and thus negotiating leverage with the US), military capabilities, leadership, and economy are being degraded. 22/ <i></i>
My macro contention for a while has been that Iran's best option is to go for a big deal, conceding on losing issues (e.g. Axis of Resistance and conflict with Israel) for getting/keeping essential ones (e.g. sanctions-relief, enrichment, missiles). 23/
Such a deal is now unlikely now, as Israel (and its Western backers) are likely to push their advantage while they think Iran is weak.
So in the short-to-medium term, it's best (but still not great) option is likely to resist and fight until it regains its footing. 24/ <i></i>
In the meantime, a key obstacles for #Iran to make the kind of concessions necessary to end this conflict and reach a deal with the US that stabilizes the country's position has been the resistance of the hardline elites and social base of the Islamic Republic system. 25/ <i></i>
As I heard from a conversation of well-connected system insiders in the foreign policy arena recently, there is a concern about backlash from this important group, and that any leader making such a deal would face "the fate of [Yitzhak] Rabin." 26/ <i></i>
Furthermore, given the advanced age of Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and a leadership transition on the horizon, alienating this core group could be dangerous and destabilizing for the system at this sensitive moment. 27/ <i></i>
Spectacular military losses, especially if pressure continues and intensifies, rising insecurity when the ruling system has partly based its legitimacy on providing security, and a worsening economy, could force hardliners to change their minds in a few months or year. 28/ <i></i>
I believe this group (hardliners) is a key factor preventing Khamenei and the Islamic Republic's elites making the decisions necessary to take the country off the disastrous and unsustainable path it's been on, and changing their mind will open up new possibilities. 29/ <i></i>
What's more complicated, and difficult to see in the fog of war today, is how these new possibilities are translated into a package that the United States (and Israel) can accept. 30/ <i></i>
In my view there are some key elements:
- Iran needs sanctions relief
- It must end the futile conflict against Israel by ceasing incitement and military support to groups fighting Israel
- Its nuclear program must also be strictly aligned with its peaceful needs. 31/ <i></i>
BUT: I believe it would be detrimental to the long-term security of Iran to surrender on the right to enrich, and possession of the fuel cycle, as well as conventional military capabilities like missiles. 32/ <i></i>
4. Regime change is unlikely
I believe in the course of this war Israel could very well attempt leadership decapitation and to foment regime change.
But I have yet to see a theory of the case on how regime-change actually happens or at least succeeds. 33/ <i></i>
Israel lacks the capacity to militarily defeat Iran, even if it can devastate the country like it has done to Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and the US lacks the resolve and will to carry out regime change through invasion and occupation. 34/ <i></i>
There is also no strong, unified, organized, and disciplined political opposition able to do the work of revolution on the ground: There have been three rounds of massive anti-system protests since 2018 and the opposition has yet to demonstrate its efficacy to bring change. 35/ <i></i>
This leaves the option of a military coup (for example if there is leadership de-capitation) or elite defection.
Israel and the US have killed many of the key military figures who have the power and authority to conduct system transformation in a leadership vacuum. 36/ <i></i>
We tend to view senior IRGC leaders as ideological caricatures, but at the end of the day, most are ambitious men with a will to power, and history shows us that under the right circumstances some could have be effective players as part of a process of change. 37/ <i></i>
This will get me some backlash, but under the right circumstances, men like Ghasem Soleimani, Mohammad Bagheri, or Amir-Ali Hajizadeh could have played such a role.
People who worked with Hossein Salami told me about his ambition and intelligence, although I never saw it. 38/ <i></i>
Such figures may still exist (I have my eye on one in the Army and one in politics), but in a system like the Islamic Republic which has placed safeguards against coups, this becomes more difficult as authority decreases further down the chain of command. 39/ <i></i>
Elite defection is possible, and in revolutionary regimes like the Islamic Republic, younger generations can be more careerist/opportunist, and have lower levels of commitment and resolve to fight to the death.
Although the system is rotting, it's not quite there. 40/ <i></i>
I can see a scenario in which a military coup attempt and/or elite defection lead to civil war, but I believe Iranian society (beyond the politically inconsequential peripheries) lacks the appetite for a bloody and protracted conflict with an uncertain outcome like Syria. 41/ <i></i>
Un-/lightly armed civilians or isolated military units, even with support, would do poorly against the IRGC with its mosaic doctrine (giving lower level units and commanders freedom of action), decades of experience (incl. in Syria), and cooperation with actors like Russia. 42/ <i></i>
That's not to say that I don't think what's happening now - what's been happening for some time - doesn't play into regime transformation on the horizon, and perhaps some form of long-term "change", even if that change is more Weimar Germany 1918 than Imperial Japan 1945. 43/43 <i></i>
