Three days into the campaign between Israel and Iran, Tehran is nearing a juncture on continuing the fighting, its exit strategy and possible regulation. At this point, Iran continues to be focused on fighting management, but as the campaign continues and its damage accumulates, it will have to decide between continuing the campaign in its current form, ending the fighting in a political series or escalating measures, As a retirement example NPT. This decision will be derived from the assessment of the situation in Tehran regarding the preferred way to preserve the regime's survival, nuclear program and strategic systems. Another significant dilemma will be faced by the Iranian leadership at the end of the campaign: Whether to risk undermining the regime's short-term survival through the continuation of the campaign and the possibility of active American participation in it or the renunciation of uranium enrichment in its territory as a key component of the "insurance certificate" for the regime's survival. Israel, for its part, faces two key options: to continue to deepen the campaign to continue to establish its operational achievements but at a cost of loss and damage to the home front or a ceasefire from a stage where it will assess that it has exhausted its objectives, Especially regarding the nuclear program. In any case, Israel will be required to continue its campaign to maintain the achievements achieved and, in particular, to prevent an Iranian effort to restore its nuclear capabilities and, worse, to break into nuclear weapons based on the capabilities left in its hands.
Three days after the outbreak of the campaign between Iran and Israel, Iran is approaching a decisive junction against the background of the continuation of the significant Israeli attacks and the cumulative damage to Iranian strategic capabilities and assets. As of this stage, the situation from Iran's point of view is complex and mixed: on the one hand, it suffered a very severe opening blow, which hurt the senior military command level. This is not just a strategic surprise, a national humiliation and further proof of Israel's intelligence and operational penetration into critical power centers in the regime, But in damage –, even if temporary and partial, –, to the ability of the political and security leadership in Tehran to optimally manage the campaign in the absence of prominent commanders in the Iranian armed forces, led by the Chief of Staff, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, The heads of the intelligence and operations divisions and the commander of the air and space arm in the Revolutionary Guards.
In addition, in recent days, the Israeli Air Force has continued to establish significant operational achievements and bring incremental damage to the nuclear program ( to combat injury, although partial and not total destruction, The Bentenz enrichment facility and the elimination of more than ten scientists, probably related to the nuclear weapons program and constitute a significant bottleneck in the nuclear program ), to the Iranian security-military systems ( headquarters, missile systems and air defense, The Revolutionary Guards Intelligence System ) and certain strategic infrastructures in the energy field. Israel's ongoing damage can erode the command and control system of the Iranian armed forces and even weaken the regime's ability to successfully face domestic challenges to the point of posing a growing threat to its stability over time.
On the other hand, the Iranian leadership is currently facing a number of certain achievements: the nuclear program has been damaged, but the injury is not critical, especially as long as the Fordo enrichment facility has not been damaged. Second, for now, there is no real and immediate threat to the internal stability of the regime that continues to demonstrate cohesion, determination and vitality and even aligns with the external threat. The Iranian public, whose hostility towards the regime is undeniable, expresses dissatisfaction with the failure of the authorities to provide protection to civilians, but does not at this time object to the regime. The public's position appears to be largely influenced by the harsh images of destruction in residential neighborhoods affected by Israeli attacks, which contributes precisely to internal cohesion and the strengthening of the sense of national solidarity. Third, the regime managed to inflict some damage on the Israeli home front. Although the injury dimensions are relatively limited,The Iranian media and the authorities are leveraging the vulnerability record in Israel to highlight the conscious narrative of the ability of the Islamic Republic to successfully deal with Israel over time and cause significant damage to it.
In light of this reality, Iran is approaching critical decisions on how to run the campaign and its exit strategy. It can be estimated that the Iranian leadership also strives to preserve at the end of the campaign some key achievements: the regime's survival, which the desire to secure it from domestic and external threats and the first target of the Islamic Republic; The remains of the nuclear program, Perceived as an "insurance certificate" for preserving the regime's existence; And the survival of critical strategic systems, including missile systems, intelligence and command and control, in a way that will enable it to face future security challenges. Iran's decisions on how to run the campaign, its end date, its exit strategy and then a possible series and the future of the nuclear strategy will be derived in the coming weeks based on its assessment of its ability to maintain these key achievements.
At this stage, Iran continues to be focused on managing the fighting while trying to reduce as much as possible the consequences of the Israeli attacks and inflict maximum damage on Israel. However, as the campaign continues and its damages accumulate, the leadership in Tehran will be required to decide between several key options: to continue the campaign in its current form in an attempt to drag Israel into a continuous war of attrition, Try and end the campaign within a political settlement or take escalating steps, such as withdrawing from the NPT or trying to break forward with nuclear weapons ( possibly in a secret facility) to encourage international intervention to stop the war.
Continued fighting may allow Iran to continue to damage the Israeli home front, but on the other hand it will require it to absorb severe prices that may be even worse, jeopardizing strategic assets, critical infrastructure and even other nuclear capabilities. Over time, these damages may undermine its ability to preserve the key achievements it strives to preserve at the end of the campaign. Furthermore, there is no certainty as to the length of time it can continue to launch missile barges on current scale. If it is required to adopt an armament economy, especially in view of its continued detracting from Israel's capabilities, it could reach a situation where it could not pose a significant challenge to Israel's air defense systems through individual launches a day.
An Iranian decision to end the campaign and return to negotiations depends on Israeli agreement to a ceasefire and it may also be the willingness of the United States to agree to its demands before a ceasefire. In any case, it is highly doubtful whether Iran is already ready at this stage to demonstrate flexibility and willingness to return to the negotiating table. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi has expressed a principled willingness to cease fire, but the Foreign Ministry spokesman has already made it clear that resuming talks with the United States has become meaningless, Because Tehran does not think that Israel has acted without coordination, cooperation, or at the very least a green light from the US government.
Retirement from the SNPT, which has already been raised as a proposal by some Iranian Majles members, and increasingly an attempt to break forward into nuclear weapons, may indeed serve as a means of pressure for international intervention to end the war. However, it is doubtful that Iran's ability at the present time, especially in view of the proven intelligence penetration into the nuclear program and the continued intense IDF activity in the Iranian sky, is carrying out a secret weapons breach. Moreover, such moves carry a significant risk, as they could lead to American intervention in the campaign, which Iran wants to avoid, as well as weaken Iran's international legitimacy, which was allegedly strengthened by the attack on the Israeli engine.
Even in the event of a ceasefire, the Iranian leadership will face a deep dilemma about its future policy. On the one hand, a determination to continue to enrich uranium in its territory could lead not only to the resumption of the campaign but also to the United States joining the war, which could pose an existential challenge to the regime's survival. On the other hand, consent to the negotiations will require her to return to the enrichment capabilities in her territory. The leader will face a particularly difficult dilemma in this situation: whether to risk undermining the regime's short-term survival through the continuation of the campaign and the possibility of dragging the United States into conflict, Or jeopardize the long-term regime's survival by giving up uranium enrichment that is seen by the Tehran leadership as a key component of the regime's insurance certificate. In this respect, the dilemma will be even more difficult than that of his predecessor Khomini, who was ready to "drink the cup of poisoning" in 1988, when he had to agree to a ceasefire with Iraq. The choice faced by the current leader will be even more severe than that of the Islamic Revolution,Because the question may not be whether to drink the "cup of poisoning" but whether to choose an option that may be in his view to collapse his regime in the short term, Or one that could jeopardize his perception of the remains of his regime even in the longer term.
If the leader concludes that continuing the fighting is actually endangering his survival and unable to realize a breach of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable range ( for technical considerations or in view of the enormous risk involved ), He may agree to negotiations and possibly even significant concessions, including in the field of uranium enrichment in Iran. It may come to terms with far-reaching negotiations and compromise on the assumption that in the future it may be able to exploit its residual nuclear capabilities to break into nuclear weapons under more favorable circumstances and under negotiation, As she did at North Korea. Negotiations may require Tehran to join other player talks, such as Russia or China, in the face of deep distrust of the United States.
For Israel, there are two main options. First, continue the campaign while establishing and expanding achievement, including deepening the nuclear program damage, damaging strategic military and security assets and weakening the regime. The advantage of this approach is to further undermine Iranian capabilities and further undermine the regime's institutions. Israel's ability to destroy or completely prevent Iran's nuclear program from preserving significant nuclear capabilities is questionable without active US involvement, But the continuation of the campaign may strengthen the prospect of forcing Iran to make further significant concessions. Its disadvantage, on the other hand, includes further significant uptake in the home front, loss and damage to infrastructure in Israel. The lengthening of the war may also erode the sense of achievement over time and lure the expansion of the campaign in directions that do not serve the central strategic purpose: blocking Iran's path to nuclear weapons.
A second option is to strive for a ceasefire. It can be assumed that if a ceasefire is reached at this stage, Israel will not be able to realize the full achievement required, especially in the nuclear field. Moreover, A ceasefire and negotiations (am Iran will also agree to ) probably not to cause Iran to agree on further significant concessions at the present time because it is doubtful that Tehran has a significant fear of losing its strategic capabilities. Therefore, Israel should strive for a ceasefire ( in the absence of a political series on the nuclear issue between Iran and the West ) so as not to be drawn into a war of attrition, which does not serve the strategic purpose, Only after you have come to the conclusion that you have exhausted the maximum achievements that can be realized to promote this purpose. In any case, Israel's position will be largely derived from the United States' position on both the continuation of the campaign and on a possible future arrangement with Iran.
In any case, Israel should prepare for the possibility that whether the campaign ends with a political settlement or a ceasefire without the series, it will be required to continue an ongoing campaign with Iran: Whether through military kinetic measures or through clandestine thwarting operations ( in coordination and possibly cooperation with the United States ) to maintain achievement, preventing Iranian experience from rehabilitating nuclear infrastructure, And in particular, the braking of any Iranian effort to exploit the capabilities it will have in its hands to break into nuclear weapon
