China Floodwatch 2020-21 - Wuhan, Hubei/Henan Province is sinking and I dunno how to swim.

Is the Three Gorges Dam kill?

  • Yes

    Votes: 310 78.7%
  • No

    Votes: 84 21.3%

  • Total voters
    394
  • Poll closed .
how would I like the world to end? quickly I guess, and preferably a few billion years from now.
Zombie Apocalypse..caused by zombies I raised from the dead myself.

I promise the survivors will have a better life under the rule of my undead army than they did under The Chinease.
 
Some reports have suggested bad blood between the CCP and the PLA following the Galwan Valley skirmish with India. Specifically regarding Beijing's refusal to honor, or even acknowledge, the deaths of the Chinese soldiers in the battle. Don't know if it's related, but I'd guess that would have some negative effects on morale.

If somewhere through the years China inadvertently established a professional military, I think we'll ALL be surprised. Just CCP the most.

That's absolutely awesome if PLA leadership are standing up for their men. American Generals don't even do that any more.
 
Okay I found this really interesting PDF about problems with the plans to construct the 3 Gorges Dam. Here's the link: http://probeinternational.org/libra...at-the-dam-builders-dont-want-you-to-know.pdf

I'll copy/paste some specific segments. There's a lot in these specific sections, so I'll bold what I think is most critical. There's also a lot more in the document. It was published in the 90s after the Canadian analysis team kinda fudged their reports for the CCP, so some of it could be out of date. But there's a lot of interesting stuff here about the plans to build it at the time it was approved.

On Design and Safety:
The dam builders claim they have completed an adequate design and safety analysis.
Our experts have found:
1. The dam builders provide an inadequate analysis of a reservoir-induced earthquake.
2. The dam builders provide an inadequate analysis of structural stability.
3. The dam builders underestimate the risks of a catastrophic landslide.
4. The dam builders underestimate the risk of spillway failure.

5. The dam builders fail to consider the downstream effects of cofferdam failure.
6. The dam builders fail to consider the potential dangers of increased sedimentation in the reservoir which would reduce the dam’s ability to hold back large floods.

On Sedimentation:
The dam builders claim that the Three Gorges reservoir storage capacity can be “preserved indefinitely.”
Our experts have found:
1. CYJV arrived at this conclusion without verifying YVPO’s original sedimentation data, even though CYJV acknowledged that “the quality and quantity of basic field data is of crucial importance to the sediment load investigation.”
2. CYJV admits elsewhere in its study that, after 100 years, 50 percent of the reservoir will be filled. Even after 100 years, sediment build-up in the reservoir will continue.
3. CYJV accepted YVPO’s estimate that the bed load (sediment larger than 1 mm) conveyed by the Yangtze is 0.05 percent of the total sediment, an amount so small CYJV decided to count it as 0 in its analysis. This estimate is grossly at odds with the Yichang Hydrological Gauging Station’s statistics, which indicate bed load is 1.6 percent of total sediment.
4. If CYJV’s calculations are wrong, as the evidence suggests, CYJV’s prediction of the amount of reservoir storage that can be preserved by flushing sediment through the dam is greatly exaggerated. This means that the dam would silt up and have to be decommissioned much sooner than planned.


The dam builders claim to have developed a dam design and operation methodology to deal completely and effectively with the sedimentation problem.
Our experts have found:
1. The operation and design proposed by CYJV to minimize sedimentation problems is unproven. The only attempt to control a river with sediment discharges of this magnitude – at the Sanmenxia Dam on China’s Yellow River – is widely recognized as a costly failure.
2. CYJV’s dam design and operation methodology is based on untenable, unsubstantiated, and flawed assumptions.
3. In particular, CYJV’s prediction that 90-95% of the sediment entering the reservoir will be flushed through, and CYJV’s recommended method for doing so, exceed the confidence limits of the science of sediment hydraulics and fluvial geomorphology, and defy characteristics of the Yangtze River for the following reasons:
• Because the flow, sediment transport, and channel characteristics of the Yangtze River and Three Gorges reservoir would be complex, highly variable, and three-dimensional, CYJV’s prediction that sediment would deposit in the reservoir at an equilibrium slope – allowing the same quantity of sediment entering the reservoir to be flushed out – is highly unreliable.
• By underestimating bed load, CYJV has underestimated the effect that coarser bed load material has on making the equilibrium slope steeper over time. A steeper slope would cause increased flooding upstream, and shoaling of the navigation channel impeding ship traffic to Chongqing.
4. The “reservoir trap efficiency method” CYJV used to calculate reservoir sedimentation is unable to estimate sedimentation in the active flood storage zone, and underestimates sedimentation in the dead storage zone of the reservoir.
5. CYJV underestimated total sedimentation rates by ignoring the effect of landslides which could fill several cubic kilometres of the reservoir, further impeding the flushing of sediments through the dam.

As for construction of the project, China has a tradition of changing plans as construction proceeds, despite efforts to curtail the practice. Major dams have been built using the traditional system of san bian (three sides); simultaneously surveying, designing, and building.25 As examples, the Danjiangkou and Gezhouba dams were both built using this system: both projects had to be halted for two years during construction due to inadequate planning,26 and their designs were frequently changed throughout the entire construction period. In the case of the Three Gorges Project, if implementation were to proceed on the recommended scheme of NPL 160 metres, it would be quite a normal practice for plans to evolve toward the more grandiose “draft” proposals for a higher normal pool level or a larger dam. These draft plans would displace more people (especially in Chongqing) and cause even more disruption to local economies and the environment.

Secrecy results in important factors being overlooked in the various planning and decision-making stages, and also prevents correction of omissions or distortions before the project becomes “irreversible.” In fact, the presentation of development plans as “irreversible” is often a deliberate strategy to avert more rigorous discussions of projects which, in cases such as the Three Gorges Project, would likely be rejected if the true costs and benefits were brought to light.* The CYJV feasibility study’s language indicates that the authors accept as a foregone conclusion that the Three Gorges Dam will be built along with other grandiose megaprojects affecting the Yangtze River, such as China’s interbasin water transfer schemes. Specifically referring to these developments, CYJV states flatly that “the Yangtze watershed will be [author’s emphasis] subjected to many human interventions over the next several decades.”55

Sun and Fang17 believe that the city of Chongqing would face an increased flood risk because backwater sedimentation would raise the elevation of the river channel. CYJV recognizes that significant sedimentation would occur, thereby increasing the level of flooding near Chongqing, although it appears it did not quantify the amount and cost of dredging required to reduce the flood risk.

CYJV implicitly claims that the Three Gorges Project would prevent major loss of life in an extreme flood such as the one-in-1000-years category. There is repeated emphasis that failure of the Jinjiang Dyke would have catastrophic consequences. So, the flood control operation of the reservoir is directed towards managing water levels to prevent failure in the downstream channel, even though the probability of flood damage is much larger in other areas – for example, in the beach areas and diversion areas.

A systematic impact analysis of the project would probably indicate that the benefits of preventing loss of life are likely to be negated because the dam itself would increase the potential for loss of life as follows:

• Increased risk of failure of downstream dykes

CYJV acknowledges that there would probably be an increased incidence of dyke failure due to a downcutting of the river channel which would undermine the river’s banks. This vitally important impact has been dismissed without substantiation by CYJV, with their statement that “channel morphology should not change significantly because the dykes that presently border the river are in many cases protected by rip-rap.”11* As well, undercutting and erosion would be significantly aggravated by the wide, daily fluctuations in flow because of power generation demands. Equally important as the physical impact of the project would be the institutional impact, which could increase the risk of dyke failure. Construction of the dam would draw on funds allocated for upgrading and maintaining dykes. As experience with other large flood control dams has shown, the mistaken perception of improved flood protection due to the dam could lead to reduced maintenance and deterioration of downstream dykes and other flood management infrastructure.

• Potential failure of the dam

As is discussed in the later chapter on dam safety, the risk of catastrophic failure at the Three Gorges Project is probably of the same order of magnitude as the probability of a 1000-year flood. CYJV failed to prepare a map of the area which would be flooded if the dam were to fail, even though the potential loss of life would number in the millions. Property damage would be so extensive that even if the probability of failure were 1 in 10,000 years, any flood benefits claimed for the dam would be negated, according to CYJV’s own figures.


• Large increases in population induced to settle in flood-prone areas

Although CYJV recognizes that the presence of dykes can create a false sense of security leading to more fatalities when they fail, it has not applied this same relationship to the presence of the dam itself. CYJV’s analysis of flood benefits is clearly based on the assumption that an additional population would settle in flood-prone areas. What CYJV does not discuss is that the flood risk in these areas would increase as a result of any of the operational problems described earlier. Furthermore, CYJV does not discuss how risks would increase over time as the reservoir becomes clogged with sediment and its capacity to store flood waters is reduced.

It is reasonable to assume that, as sedimentation increases, the dam would be operated to maximize protection against smaller floods. This would lead to a scenario where cities and towns have been built up in what were thought to be protected areas and ring dykes and refuge centres have long been neglected. In the event of a large flood, the dam would no longer be able to control flood waters as originally intended, and, inevitably, the loss of life in such circumstances would be greater than if the dam had never been built.

The consequence of failure at the Three Gorges Dam would rank as history’s worst man-made disaster. More than 75 million people live downstream on an intensively cultivated floodplain that provides much of China’s food. It is therefore reasonable to expect that a key design criterion for the project is ensuring that the risk of failure is kept extremely low.
Because of the limited operating experience with large dam projects of this type, and the disquieting number of safety incidents that have threatened the integrity of large dams in the last two decades, it is reasonable to expect that CYJV would use the best state-of-the-art techniques to demonstrate that the design, construction, operation and decommissioning of the project would keep the risk of failure acceptably low.

Unfortunately, CYJV does not address the safety issue either systematically or coherently. It provides no acceptable risk criteria, no mapping of the area and population at risk, no comprehensive risk assessment which identifies all the potential failure modes, and no identification of fail-safe measures. Because safety is not analyzed as a discrete topic, major failure mechanisms and combinations of failure mechanisms are ignored. There are many such possibilities; for example, a reservoir-induced earthquake that initiates new landslides close to the dam; sabotage or military action that disables spillway gates immediately before the flood season; unanticipated delays in construction leading to the overtopping and washing out of one of the cofferdams.*

Although CYJV discusses some safety issues, it makes many major assumptions and gross underestimations about the dam’s design which effectively put the probable risk of dam failure greater than the risk of a 1000-year flood for which the project is designed. Examples of the flaws in CYJV’s analysis are as follows:

• Underestimation of earthquake ground accelerations
One of the most important structural design criteria for a dam is the estimation of ground acceleration in the event of what is termed the maximum credible earthquake (MCE). For the Three Gorges design, a 6.5 magnitude earthquake occurring on a fault 17 kilometres away is used for structural analysis. There are substantial uncertainties in the selection of the MCE and also in the prediction of ground accelerations at various distances from the fault. CYJV uses a ground acceleration factor only one third the value that would be used in a reasonably prudent design.1 CYJV’s use of these values effectively results in the most optimistic interpretation possible of likely ground accelerations due to earthquakes.

• Inadequate analysis of reservoir-induced seismicity
CYJV recognizes that the weight of the water in a large reservoir can initiate earthquakes. However, in developing ground acceleration design criteria, CYJV uses only historical records of earthquakes, which means that the design accelerations selected are likely to be too low and/or would occur more frequently than expected. In addition, there appears to be substantial uncertainty about the movement of the most important of these faults, since CYJV stresses the “need for careful assessment”2 – an assessment that presumably has not yet been undertaken. The treatment of reservoir-induced seismicity (RIS)3 is cursory and does not acknowledge the serious potential for structural damage, property damage and loss of life downstream that could occur. CYJV assumes that RIS occurs only on faults that are presently proven active, and implies that only short lengths of long faults close to the dam site would be activated. The length of faults passing under the dam itself and the displacement that would occur if these were activated are not identified. Therefore, it appears that the dam design is based on the optimistic assumption that no movement would occur on these faults, despite the experience with RIS elsewhere. For example, the Koyna Dam in India initiated an earthquake (approximately 6.0 in magnitude) that seriously damaged the dam and killed 200 people in an area that had not previously been seismically active.

• Inadequate analysis of structural stability
Apart from the optimistic estimates of ground acceleration during earthquakes and the fact that potential RIS is downplayed, it is clear that there are substantial unresolved problems related to the structural design of the dam which, if satisfactorily resolved, could add hundreds of millions of dollars to the project cost. For example, with higher, more realistic assumptions for ground acceleration, the upstream face of the dam would be subject to stresses which would almost certainly cause cracking. And while CYJV recognizes that this would occur, it did not conduct the necessary analysis of the dam to identify where cracking could occur and what design modifications are needed. Furthermore, CYJV failed to conduct a comprehensive assessment of project operation management to analyze possible failure modes such as rupture of the dam due to fault movement underneath it, and the performance of the dam during an earthquake with prior cracking.

Other examples of how CYJV has systematically downplayed the risk of dam failure are as follows:
Underestimation of the risks caused by catastrophic landslides.
In 1963, at the Vaiont Dam in Italy, a landslide in the reservoir generated a flood wave that killed 4000 people. In the Three Gorges region, major landslides occur every few years, disrupting navigation and causing property damage and loss of life. CYJV states that the Three Gorges Project would result in “no significant change in slope stability,”4 which is highly questionable considering that wide fluctuations in reservoir levels in the Three Gorges region are highly likely to have a destabilizing effect on potential slide areas.

Although CYJV discusses the risk of landslides in the reservoir, it did not investigate the effect of earthquakes, including those induced by the reservoir itself, on activating landslides in areas it has rated as stable. Nor did it evaluate the impact of landslide waves on spillway gates at the time of rapid drawdown* in the reservoir immediately prior to the flood season. Finally, CYJV did not conduct a systematic analysis of zones at risk from waves 20 to 50 metres high that could result from individual landslides and could conceivably kill tens of thousands of people living near the reservoir. Therefore, it appears that the threat to people living around the reservoir and downstream, and the threat to safe operation of the dam, have been greatly underestimated.

Apart from other optimistic assumptions, CYJV’s discussion of impacts due to landslide-generated flood waves assumes that all people living in the reservoir area would be relocated above the 182-metre elevation mark, contrary to the resettlement plans stating that only people living below the 162-metre elevation mark would be relocated.

• Underestimation of risk of spillway failure
As the world’s largest hydroelectric dam on the world’s third longest river, the Three Gorges Project incorporates many experimental technological innovations. One such experiment is the construction of the world’s largest submerged spillway bays. Each of the 27 spillway units has a capacity equivalent to the average flow of the Missouri River in the United States. CYJV confidently asserts “there is no reason to believe that these structures could not be successfully designed, constructed and operated,” even though the discharge per unit width is “well beyond proven world experience.” CYJV’s confidence in the spillways is further undercut in the same paragraph with the statement: “The feasibility of such a high unit discharge should be reviewed during final design.”5 In fact, operating experience with extremely large flows through such spillways has not been good. At the Tarbela Dam (Pakistan), and the Glen Canyon and Hoover Dams (U.S.), extremely high velocities and pressures caused cavitation* and erosion which threatened the structural integrity of the dam and necessitated serious and costly repairs. Similarly, at the Three Gorges Dam there would be a high possibility of failure. Another questionable assumption is that the “good and homogeneous quality” of the rock immediately downstream of the dam would minimize scouring (erosion of the channel caused by the river’s flow).6 Actual operating experience with this is very limited, but there is a significant possibility that scouring could threaten the structural integrity of the dam, as nearly occurred at the Tarbela Dam. Once scouring begins it is very difficult to correct and requires continual remedial measures which can add significantly to operating costs.

• No provision for decommissioning of the dam
The risk of dam failure increases with its age as construction materials deteriorate, mechanical systems such as spillway outlet gates fail, and the effects of a series of problems, such as corrosion, abrasion, sedimentation, and downstream scouring, become intractable. CYJV has calculated the costs and benefits of the project over a 50-year period (for comparison’s sake, Chinese culture has developed alongside the Yangtze River over some 4000 years). Regardless of the dam’s economic lifespan, CYJV should have made provision in the feasibility study for decommissioning the project in a way that would ensure the safety of those living downstream. The costs of decommissioning should have been included in the cost-benefit analsyis.

tl;dr: "As is discussed in the later chapter on dam safety, the risk of catastrophic failure at the Three Gorges Project is probably of the same order of magnitude as the probability of a 1000-year flood." What has been happening these past few weeks—and will continue to happen as China enters its official rainy season—might count as a "1000-year flood." This does not bode well, I'd argue.
 
The English Wikipedia now has a page on the disaster.
Interesting. That page says the damage is around $3.6 billion, but I had heard around $12 billion from other sources a couple days ago. Maybe they aren't counting the damage caused by levees and dikes the CCP destroyed to avoid flooding Wuhan?

Also, I theorized yesterday that we may be getting false numbers on TGD's water level because of a road leading out to an island being submerged. Well, the guys over on /pol/ managed to find some other photos where the water line is confirmed at 170 meters and 160 meters. The photo from yesterday at 164.5 meters was about halfway between the two, so it looks like the numbers are acurate for now.
 
Dumbasses are flooding anhui to save the dam. Literally the resevoir is so full its swallowing cities on its banks
That’s probably how this will pan out. The dam is significantly silted up and already holding a huge amount, so it’s no longer a significant buffer. They will have to sacrifice places both upstream and down. Upstream to stop inflow and downstream because they have to keep the outflow up or the dam will fill/ risk of failure. The CCP will protect the dam at all costs, so anywhere up or downstream that can be flooded probably will be.
I wonder what else 2020 has in store for us.
 
Actually, heres a fun little game to play while we wait for more information; how would YOU prefer the world to end? Honestly I'd rather it be the alien invasion; getting assfucked for all eternity by Ghur-Tuul the Endless does NOT sound like a good time, and atleast the aliens would turn me into food when I kicked the bucket.

At this rate,i fully expect a gamma ray burst to fry the fuck out the planet around 11pm the day of the 2020 US elections to prevent trump winning again,as long as i get to laugh at screenies of kev kevs 'am hole' by then i could live with that outcome tbh :optimistic:
 
Who doesn't?

I dont.

I had a blast in fuzhou on a trip to a factory. That makes EVA shoes Most chinese are cool people who dont like the government

The women are awesome. Every chinese business meeting is the same. They take you out for drinks...have you eat wierd food...sign the deal and then they bring in a bunch of fucking holy shit beautiful women barely of age and you are expected to take one or two of them back to the hotel...even if you are married. My business partner and translator said they would be offended otherwise. So i did

They are pretty based tbh. Im pretty sure the girls are spies but who gives a shit. Didnt turn down double dipping both of em
 
I dont.

I had a blast in fuzhou on a trip to a factory. Most chinese are cool people who dont like the government

The women are awesome. Every chinese business meeting is the same. They take you out for drinks...have you eat wierd food...sign the deal and then they bring in a bunch of fucking holy shit beautiful women barely of age and you are expected to take one or two of them back to the hotel...even if you are married. My business partner and translator said they would be offended otherwise. So i did

They are pretty based tbh. Im pretty sure the girls are spies but who gives a shit. Didnt turn down double dipping both of em

And that Godlessness and lack of moral integrity is what brought us here. Good job.
 
Its crazy to think 5% of the world population will have died off just this year. Has there ever been another time when that happened after 1400?

Imagine being the ccp now, at minimum 10% of the population is dead even if they manage to stem the flooding. Do you know how much chaos that causes? From supply chain on up. They cant really convince people to work more theyre already near the max.

Imagine the dam breaks and 25% of their population is dead. It would be impossible to bounce back until the 2100s, especially when most of their under 50 population is already struggling to have kids.

And then all the shit made in china would become obsolete overnight, you cant get your cheap shit because the corporation that owned the factories and the labor working there dont exist anymore.
 
Found a decent-to-good source on china related news.
Apart from some american posturing it seem pretty accurate so far.
While watching keep in mind that this video is 2 days old.

Apparently there was a sign of rebellion against CCP in Wuhan, with some woman breaking a sign with an ax before going on a one way trip to a chinese prison. Also sighting of some support for her actions from chinks on the internet. Its not substantial but its something.
 
Its crazy to think 5% of the world population will have died off just this year. Has there ever been another time when that happened after 1400?

Imagine being the ccp now, at minimum 10% of the population is dead even if they manage to stem the flooding. Do you know how much chaos that causes? From supply chain on up. They cant really convince people to work more theyre already near the max.

Imagine the dam breaks and 25% of their population is dead. It would be impossible to bounce back until the 2100s, especially when most of their under 50 population is already struggling to have kids.

And then all the shit made in china would become obsolete overnight, you cant get your cheap shit because the corporation that owned the factories and the labor working there dont exist anymore.

This is pretty doomy
 
I dont.

I had a blast in fuzhou on a trip to a factory. That makes EVA shoes Most chinese are cool people who dont like the government

The women are awesome. Every chinese business meeting is the same. They take you out for drinks...have you eat wierd food...sign the deal and then they bring in a bunch of fucking holy shit beautiful women barely of age and you are expected to take one or two of them back to the hotel...even if you are married. My business partner and translator said they would be offended otherwise. So i did

They are pretty based tbh. Im pretty sure the girls are spies but who gives a shit. Didnt turn down double dipping both of em
What you described is one of the oldest hustles in human history.

Keep a close eye on your manufacturing tolerances or whatever quality control standards/measures your business deal entails. Chinese suppliers are known to cut corners on materials and when pressed, will offer to increase this or that to bring your product back up to the standard you expect. For a fee. And without informing you that they've been cutting material out of the process in drips and drabs over the last two years. You'll be paying them to hopefully bring them back to the initial terms of the agreement.
 
What you described is one of the oldest hustles in human history.

Keep a close eye on your manufacturing tolerances or whatever quality control standards/measures your business deal entails. Chinese suppliers are known to cut corners on materials and when pressed, will offer to increase this or that to bring your product back up to the standard you expect. For a fee. And without informing you that they've been cutting material out of the process in drips and drabs over the last two years. You'll be paying them to hopefully bring them back to the initial terms of the agreement.

This.

Knowing what i now know; i would have myself put down , like a cancer riddled dog , if i realised i had been dumb enough to do business with people who knew all it would take is a crap load of booze and some unimpressive minutes with 2 girls (who didnt have the choice but get jiggy with a pissed westerner).
 
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