One fundamental element of Biden’s engagement policy is U.S. “strategic ambiguity” on cross-strait affairs. In a 2001 op-ed on
The Washington Post titled “
Not So Deft On Taiwan,” Biden questioned then-President George W. Bush’s self-imposed “obligation” to defend Taiwan as a “policy of ambiguous strategic ambiguity.” “Strategic ambiguity,” as Biden defines it in the article, refers to a policy where “we reserved the right to use force to defend Taiwan but kept mum about the circumstances in which we might, or might not, intervene in a war across the Taiwan Strait.” The implication in this strategic mindset is that the United States should not cede its decision-making ability automatically to Taiwan, which would risk being drawn into a war should Taiwan act “provocatively” toward China, regardless of how legitimate the action may be.
Over the years, Biden has been consistent in his strong preference for the cross-strait status quo, especially when it comes to the normalization of Taiwan’s status and U.S.-Taiwan relations. When Taiwan’s former President Lee Teng-hui contended that cross-strait affairs were a form of “special state-to-state” relations in 1999,
Biden said the statement had “rattled Beijing and injected a measure of uncertainty about Taiwan’s future into the cross-strait dynamic.” When explaining the nature of the U.S. “One China Policy,” Biden noted that the two pieces of the equation are providing military means, in terms of materiel, to prevent forceful unification, and stopping Taiwan from declaring independence. In a
2001 warning to Taiwan, Biden said it clearly: “we are not willing to go to war over your unilateral declaration of independence.”