Opinion A Storm in the West: The Liberal Intellectual Paradigm Is Broken - The collapse of global liberalism’s intellectual paradigm – its delusions together with its associated technocratic structure of governance – transcends the red/blue schism in the West.

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Alastair Crooke • May 27, 2025

Hector is tricked into combat and killed beneath Troy’s city walls. Trump might well heed the moral to The Iliad story.

Presentation at the XXIII International Likhachev Scientific Readings, St Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, 22-23 May 2025 – Transforming the World: Problems and Prospects’, XXIII International Likhachev Scientific Readings, St Petersburg

Last year in St Petersburg, I asked the question: Will the West come out of its cultural war as a more amenable potential partner? Or will the West disaggregate, and resort to bellicosity in an effort to hold things together?

Well, that was then. The ‘counter-revolution’ is now underway in the form of the Trump ‘Storm’. And the West already has come apart: Project Trump is turning America upside down – and in Europe, there is crisis, desperation and a fury to overturn Trump and ‘all his works’.

Is this then ‘it’? The anticipated revolt against ‘Progressive’ cultural imposition?

No. This is not the extent of the creeping, thunderous changes underway in the U.S. Those are provoking far more complicated political shifts. It will not be some courteous red versus blue affair. For there is yet another ‘shoe’ to drop – beyond the MAGA revolution.

The real action in the U.S. is not happening in seminars at Brookings or in op-eds in the New York Times. It is happening backstage, out of sight; beyond the reach of polite society, and mostly off-script. America is undergoing a transformation more akin to what befell Rome in the age of Augustus.

Which is to say, the main happening is the collapse of a paralytic élite order and the consequent unfolding of new political projects.

The collapse of global liberalism’s intellectual paradigm – its delusions together with its associated technocratic structure of governance – transcends the red/blue schism in the West. The sheer dysfunctionality associated with western culture wars has underlined that the entire approach to economic governance must change.

For thirty years Wall Street sold a fantasy – and that illusion just shattered. The 2025 trade war has exposed the truth: Most major U.S. companies were duct-taped together by fragile supply chains, cheap energy, and foreign labour. And now? It’s all breaking.

Frankly put, liberal élites simply have demonstrated that they are not competent or professional in matters of governance. And they do not understand the gravity of the situation they face – which is that the financial architecture that used to produce easy solutions and effortless prosperity is well-past its ‘sell-by’ date.

The essayist and military strategist Aurelien has written in a paper entitled, The Strange Defeat (original in French), where ‘defeat’ consists in Europe’s ‘curious’ inability to understand world events:
“… i.e. the almost pathological dissociation from the real world that [Europe] displays in its words and actions. Yet, even as the situation deteriorates … there is no sign of the West becoming more reality-based in its understanding– and it is very likely that it will continue to live in its alternative construction of reality– until it is forcibly expelled”.

Yes, some understand that the western economic paradigm of debt-led, hyper-financialised consumerism has run its course and that change is inevitable; but so heavily invested are they in the Anglo economic model that they stay paralysed in the spider’s web. There is no alternative (TINA) is the watch phrase.

Thus, the West is continually out-pointed and disappointed when dealing with states who at least make an effort to look to the future in an organised fashion.

The West is in crisis, but not in the way Progressives or the bureaucratic Technocrats think. Its problem is not populism or polarisation or whatever is the chosen ‘current thing’ of the week on the MSM talk shows. The deeper affliction is structural: Power is so diffused and fractured that no meaningful reform is possible. Every actor has veto power, and no actor can impose coherence. The political scientist Francis Fukuyama gave us the term for this: “vetocracy” – a condition where everyone can block, but no one can build.

American commentator Matt Taibbi observes:
“Pulling back, in a broader sense, we do have a crisis of competency in this country. It has had a huge impact on American politics”.

In one sense, the lack of connection to reality – to competency – is ingrained in today’s global neo-liberalism. In part it may be attributed to Friedrich von Hayek’s Road to Serfdom’s acclaimed message that government interference and economic planning leads inevitably to serfdom. His message is regularly aired, whenever the need for change is mooted.

The second plank (whilst Hayek was fighting the ghosts of what he called ‘socialism’) was that of Americans sealing a ‘union’ with the Chicago School of Monetarism – the child of which was to be Milton Friedman who would pen the ‘American edition’ of The Road to Serfdom, which (ironically) came to be called Capitalism and Freedom.

Economist Philip Pilkington writes that Hayek’s delusion that markets equal ‘freedom’ has become widespread to the point of all discourse being completely saturated. In polite company, and in public, you can certainly be left-wing or right-wing, but you will always be, in some shape or form, neoliberal – otherwise you will simply not be allowed entry to discourse.

“Each country may have its own peculiarities, but on broad principles they follow a similar pattern: debt-led neoliberalism is first and foremost a theory of how to reengineer the state in order to guarantee the success of the market– and that of its most important participants: modern corporations”.

Yet the whole (neo)-liberal paradigm rests on this notion of utility-maximisation as its central pillar (as if human motivations are reductively defined in purely material terms). It postulates that motivation is utilitarian – and only utilitarian – as its foundational delusion. As philosophers of science like Hans Albert have pointed out, the theory of utility-maximisation rules out real world mapping, a priori, thus rendering the theory untestable.

Its delusion lies in making man and community well-being subservient to markets and presumes that excess ‘consumption’ is sufficient recompensation for the inherent vassalage. This was taken to an extreme with Tony Blair who said that there was, in his day, no such thing as politics. As Prime Minister, he presided over a cabinet of technical experts, oligarchs and bankers, whose competence allowed them to steer the state accurately. Politics was over; leave it to the technocrats.

“The British Conservative government elected in 1979 thus decided– rather than to imitate Britain’s successful competitors to do the opposite of what they did– and essentially to rely on magic. “Thus, all the government had to do was to create the right magical environment (low taxes, few regulations) and that the “animal spirits” of entrepreneurs would spontaneously do the rest, through the “magic” (interesting choice of words, that) of the “market.” The magician, however, having summoned up these powers, should make sure to stay well away from its workings”, as Aurelien has written.

The ideas were taken from the American Left, but cosmopolitanism spread them across Europe.
“The Anglo-Saxon (now more broadly western) fixation with archetypal heroic entrepreneurs and university dropouts has obscured the historical fact that no significant industry, and no key technology, has ever been developed without some level of planning and government encouragement”.

Clearly such globalist liberal systems of ideas are ideological (if not magical), rather than scientific. And one ideology, when no longer effective, will in future be replaced by another.

The lesson here – when a state becomes incompetent, someone eventually arises to govern it. Not by consensus, but by coercion. One historical cure for such political sclerosis is not dialogue or compromise; it is what the Romans called proscription – a formalized purge. Sulla knew this. Caesar perfected it. Augustus institutionalized it. Take the élite interests, deny them resources, strip them of property, and compel obedience … or else!

As U.S. political and cultural critic Walter Kirn has predicted:
“So, looking forward, it’s what are people going to want? What are people going to value? What are they going to prize? Are their priorities going to shift? I think they will shift big time …”.

“[Americans] They’re going to want less concern for the philosophical and/or even long-term political questions of equity and so on, I predict; and they’re going to want to lay in a minimum expectation of competence. In other words, this is a time when the priorities shift and I think that big change is coming: big, big change, because we look like we’ve been dealing with luxury problems, and we’ve certainly been dealing with other countries’ problems, Ukraine or whoever it might be, with massive funding”.

What does Brussels make of all this? Absolutely nothing. The EU technocracy is still entranced by the America of the Obama years – a land of soft power, identity politics, and cosmopolitan neoliberal capitalism. They hope (and expect) that Trump’s influence will be expunged at next year’s Mid-Term Congressional elections. The Brussels ruling strata still mistake the cultural power of the American left as being synonymous with political power.

American conservatism then, it seems, is being rebuilt as something rougher, meaner, and far less sentimental. It aspires to emerge too, as also something more centralized, coercive, and radical. With many families in the U.S. and Europe skirting bankruptcy and possible dispossession as the real economy implodes, this segment of the population – now including an increasing proportion of the Middle Classes – despises both the oligarchs and the Establishment and is moving ever closer to a possibly violent response. Then the culture war will move from the public arena to the street ‘battleground’.

Today’s U.S. Administration is, above all, attached to the ancient notion of greatness – to individual greatness and the contributions that greatness makes to all of civilization.

The individual transgressive, for example, plays a significant role in Ayn Rand’s theories of the industrialist and the genius (in her novels, there is always a strong element of the outsider being this kind of criminal transgressor who bring a new measure of energy, which insiders cannot provide), political scientist Corey Robin writes.

There is, in short, a not-so-secret affinity between today’s populist conservatism and radicalism. However, as Emily Wilson in her book, The Iliad, sets out, loss of ‘greatness seldom’ is easily recouped.

One cannot escape The Iliad’s analogy for today – in which Trump seeks to recover his country’s ‘greatness’ (and in the process achieve undying personal kleos (reputation). Today, we might refer to it as one’s ‘legacy’. In The Iliad, it is definitional and gives mortal leaders the metaphorical ability to surpass death through honour and glory.

However, it does not always end well: Hector, the protagonist, also seeking kleos, is tricked into combat and killed beneath Troy’s city walls. Trump might well heed the moral to The Iliad story.

 
Well, let's see here... bottom of the article says the author is associated with something called the Strategic Culture Foundation.


.su domain. Interesting.


"The Strategic Culture Foundation (SCF) is a Russian website founded in 2005 that publishes an online magazine of the same name. The SCF is regarded as an arm of Russian state interests by the United States government, and has been characterized as a conservative, pro-Russian propaganda website by U.S. media and others. It is based in Moscow."

Ah, there we go. How I can rate this both "obvious commie propaganda" and "agree" at the same time?
 
I'm going to have to read this again with a bit of sleep, (and for good reason.. see post above ^) but i will say one thing. Always quote "intellectual" in the modern context. It's not so much a rebellion against the intellectual as it is against the abuse of the concept.. by those who have co-opted the term and concept. Especially those of a political and ideological nature, seeking to use it to enforce and create narrative or support agendas.

Boy do they love to use pushback to dream up all sorts of anti-science labels for people who call them out.
 
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The insanity of the left calling themselves intellectuals is insane

Even more insane when these are the same people that say we monkeys became humans somehow and that humans can change sex and the atmosphere is a "greenhouse"
Cutting taxes and slashing regulations to simulate the economy is "magic thinking" , but letting a man in a dress play women's sports with other women is just common sense.
 
It's an interesting outsiders perspective. But I think it's missing a key point. Trump and his administration don't see themselves as outside Western Civilizations ruling elites. They see the current ruling Liberal elites as being outside western civilization and actively working to destroy it.

America under Trump is more then happy to work with Europe. Just not the Europe of the Brussels technocrats. Ironically, the Catholic church clearly picked up on this, which is why the selection of an American Pope was so inspired. You had the Vice President and the Secretary of State in Rome the next week starry eyed. They then also had by all accounts a productive sit down with the Italian government.

Russia is being overly optimistic in thinking Trump will somehow bring an end to Anglo economic dominance or the Trans Atlantic consensus. At least insofar as it would allow Russia to do some Empire building and building a new power block of it own.
 
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I just want to point out that a large part of the story of the original Shrek is that he's not the stereotypical ogre.

I cannot believe these people are so out of touch that they use Trump in a Shrek suit as an insult.
They don't know classical literature ('Hector was tricked') and they don't even know modern, current day entertainment.

Is it any wonder they keep stepping on rakes?
 
They don't know classical literature ('Hector was tricked') and they don't even know modern, current day entertainment.
Did you read the Illiad?
The Illiad said:
...while Minerva left him and went after Hector in the form and with the voice of Deiphobus. She came close up to him and said, "Dear brother, I see you are hard pressed by Achilles who is chasing you at full speed round the city of Priam, let us await his onset and stand on our defence.

And Hector answered, "Deiphobus, you have always been dearest to me of all my brothers, children of Hecuba and Priam, but henceforth I shall rate you yet more highly, inasmuch as you have ventured outside the wall for my sake when all the others remain inside."...

...Thus did Minerva inveigle him by her cunning, and when the two were now close to one another great Hector was first to speak. "I will-no longer fly you, son of Peleus,"...

...With a loud cry he called Diphobus and asked him for one, but there was no man; then he saw the truth and said to himself, "Alas! the gods have lured me on to my destruction. I deemed that the hero Deiphobus was by my side, but he is within the wall, and Minerva has inveigled me; death is now indeed exceedingly near at hand and there is no way out of it- for so Jove and his son Apollo the far-darter have willed it, though heretofore they have been ever ready to protect me. My doom has come upon me; let me not then die ingloriously and without a struggle, but let me first do some great thing that shall be told among men hereafter."
 
I had to keep doubling back to read this. I think the author has a good point or two, but then goes off in way too many directions.

Which is to say, the main happening is the collapse of a paralytic élite order and the consequent unfolding of new political projects.
This is a good framing of the liberal vs progressive, and MAGA vs GOPe, fights in the USA. But I'm not sure how applicable that is in UK/EU. Their radical wings seem pretty established, and they're mostly only "radical" on the issue of immigration.

Frankly put, liberal élites simply have demonstrated that they are not competent or professional in matters of governance. And they do not understand the gravity of the situation they face – which is that the financial architecture that used to produce easy solutions and effortless prosperity is well-past its ‘sell-by’ date.
True.
The West is in crisis, but not in the way Progressives or the bureaucratic Technocrats think. Its problem is not populism or polarisation or whatever is the chosen ‘current thing’ of the week on the MSM talk shows. The deeper affliction is structural: Power is so diffused and fractured that no meaningful reform is possible. Every actor has veto power, and no actor can impose coherence. The political scientist Francis Fukuyama gave us the term for this: “vetocracy” – a condition where everyone can block, but no one can build.
Probably the best insight here. The uncomfortable debate is whether this is a failure, a limit, or a feature of democracy itself. I think the real problem is scale: 1 vote in a group of 10 is powerful; 1 vote in a group of 10 million is meaningless. 1 million votes in 10 million is meaningful, but not dispositive. However the structures required to govern 10 people vs 10 million are radically different. Governance at scale becomes federated, or rigidly hierarchical, or even decentralized; all of which makes power either subject to bottlenecks (vetos), or to diffusion (of responsibility).

If the author took this idea to its logical extreme, he might suggest that a strongman who ignores the various levels of government to ram change through is the only solution to the impasse. But it's a fatal blow to an ostensibly democratic, egalitarian system to admit such a thing.

The lesson here – when a state becomes incompetent, someone eventually arises to govern it. Not by consensus, but by coercion... what the Romans called proscription – a formalized purge. Sulla knew this. Caesar perfected it. Augustus institutionalized it. Take the élite interests, deny them resources, strip them of property, and compel obedience … or else!
He's so close, but won't take the plunge. (And he's careful to ignore any 20th century cases.) He really wants to keep the class warfare aspect going, but as mentioned above, it might not even be a problem of class or elitism; it might just be a function of scale.

The latter bits about Trump are besides the point, and meander over well-worn ground. I'll just note that this entire essay focuses on the elite, the strongmen, some economic theory, and other high level national or macro forces. But he doesn't think there's any power, for change or for impasse-breaking, that comes from The People. The challenges to the elite aren't coming from better governors, it's coming from populism and reactionary forces. Trump is not Sulla, he's the popular head of a mob.

One last thing: the author thinks governing elites and financial structures are due for splitting up; why not countries themselves? For all his criticism of liberal economics, the author never critiques the liberal conception of citizens themselves, as interchangeable units somehow bonded together in common belief in a list of political ideas.

The existence of a vetocracy implies a fractured population who can't agree enough to push through change. The willingness to veto shows the strength of belief strong enough to form unhealable divisions. In a group of 10, that might be ignored due to greater interests of keeping the group, any group, together. But in In a group of hundreds of millions, you can split off entire countries' worth of dissidents. When they're already organized into an intermediate level entity--a state or province--they have a real chance of thriving better separate than alone. Change will come very fast at the moment of fracture.

I don't know what the author's politics are, but he's committing a similar error to the liberal elite he criticizes. Yes, he identified their static belief in ancient structures with glaring cracks. But he doesn't step back far enough to consider whether the real crack lies through the nations themselves, not just the elite they produced.
 
The deeper affliction is structural: Power is so diffused and fractured that no meaningful reform is possible. Every actor has veto power, and no actor can impose coherence.
Despite how annoyingly this article is written, this is the single greatest weakness of the west.

It just can’t deviate from the path it set in the 1990s.
 
Same and then I realized this had to be some ChatGPT bullshit. I noticed some of the same things you quoted and you can see where the article shits all over globalhomo but than later loves it.
I don't think it's ChatGPT, some of the points aren't exactly common links that a generative article would put together. It reads like an intellectual piecing together some dinner party speech from random other intellectuals he read over the last month.

Again, I don't know the author's politics, but I get the impression he was never shitting on globohomo, he's just shitting on the current faction running it. He doesn't have an alternative in mind. He thinks the current elite clung to bad economics for too many decades, and it opened cracks for non-Western elites to slip out from under their money-driven influence. Which is true, but that's the end of his real criticism. He thinks the end game of the elite losing their grip is their eventual replacement with another, rougher elite.

He doesn't like the anti-globohomo faction, Trump and MAGA, he's just noting that Europeans don't take their challenge seriously. He doesn't even recognize the challenge as being nationalism vs post-nationalism. The ending bit about Trump is the closest to a ChatGPT analysis in the article, maybe it's just him trying to have something to say to wrap up his critique.
 
this is the single greatest weakness of the west.

It just can’t deviate from the path it set in the 1990s.

I'd put it more around the later 1960s for a lot of things actually. A lot of the root cause is based in the incompatibility of other systems and ideals put in place as far back as then. (esp on economics and social ideology, via education and media) So many of the social ills (and life blood) flow from that open wound.

One should probably take a lot of the article with a grain of salt given the source, but it does have a few points.
 
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