Debate user @BlueArmedDevil on the validity of Plato's theory of forms

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Ok, but... how does that differ from Plato's position, let alone undermine it? My (admittedly limited) understanding is that Plato didn't believe that forms had instantiations "in the real world", either (except for things like squares, which I maintain do have real world instantiations). Plato thought the forms existed as metaphysical constructs, ones we presumably experienced on a spiritual level. The fact that many forms do not have real world instantiations is not, in and of itself, sufficient to refute Plato. In fact, it sounds to me like you're agreeing with Plato, except for...
My disagreement with Platonic forms is that forms are an imitation/approximation of the real world, which is the reverse what Plato believed. This approximation contains some data that we regard as useful, but doesn't contain the infinite depth that everything has.

I disagree. While I'd happily concede that it's possible for people to have different definitions of mathematical concepts, it does not follow that everyone's definition is equally valid, or that everyone has their own versions of the forms. It simply means that some people might be wrong! Or, at the very least, it means some people might be using the same word to describe very different concepts - which doesn't the mean the concepts are the same (but different, and subjective!), it just means people happen to be using the same word to describe different things. Confusingly.
People are allowed to be wrong so it is perfectly plausible that someone might consider a square to be a circle. When asked what is love, some people might answer "oh baby, don't hurt me". Some might have more refined answer. We could set up some performance metrics for forms (e.g. universability and transferability), but while they are not equally good they are all forms despite some being bad.
 
Simultaneously the worst and best debate user thread. Good job?
 
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