Russian Special Military Operation in the Ukraine - Mark IV: The Partitioning of Discussion

Weeb Union on Youtube did some interesting analysis yesterday. He asserted that the recent Russian strategy has been to launch offensive operations along the line wherever Ukraine is weak, draw Ukrainian reserves to that point in the line and then stop offensive operations in that area until the Ukrainian reserves move away to another location.

The numerical superiority of the Russians along the whole line allows them to start and stop offensive operations without having to move forces around. The tendency of the Ukrainians, when committing reserves, to order them into counter-offensive actions also plays into this strategy with the Ukrainians ending up taking disproportionate losses. Even moving around reserves from one area of the front to another exposes them to more fire than they would experience if they were defending in the same position.

Examples of this strategy in action are said to be the Robotyne area and at Berdychi near Avdiivka among others.

The observations and theory presented were interesting. But there is no definitive way to know if the theory reflects actual Russian intentions.
 
Interleaved wheels have been around for a long, long time. They allow you to get more traction without lengthening a chassis.
Yeah, but this isn’t a 50t tiger tank that NEEDS a schelltalls whatever they’re called.

Four big wheels should be plenty here.

Since this is Ukraine, I reckon they originally wanted four double wheels on, but a bunch of the tires got stolen and sold off, so they made some drunk Mikola improvise.
 
Weeb Union on Youtube did some interesting analysis yesterday. He asserted that the recent Russian strategy has been to launch offensive operations along the line wherever Ukraine is weak, draw Ukrainian reserves to that point in the line and then stop offensive operations in that area until the Ukrainian reserves move away to another location.

The numerical superiority of the Russians along the whole line allows them to start and stop offensive operations without having to move forces around. The tendency of the Ukrainians, when committing reserves, to order them into counter-offensive actions also plays into this strategy with the Ukrainians ending up taking disproportionate losses. Even moving around reserves from one area of the front to another exposes them to more fire than they would experience if they were defending in the same position.

Examples of this strategy in action are said to be the Robotyne area and at Berdychi near Avdiivka among others.

The observations and theory presented were interesting. But there is no definitive way to know if the theory reflects actual Russian intentions.
He's a LARPing cretin though. He's useful for daily updates on where there have been movement, but he always pads out his videos with bullshit to hit the 10 min mark for sweet Youtube bucks
 
GIGEX5QWcAAumY6.jpg
 
Yeah, but this isn’t a 50t tiger tank that NEEDS a schelltalls whatever they’re called.

Four big wheels should be plenty here.

Since this is Ukraine, I reckon they originally wanted four double wheels on, but a bunch of the tires got stolen and sold off, so they made some drunk Mikola improvise.
Wonder if its a clearance thing. My first thought when I saw it was that if its flat and low to the ground, the extra midwheel like that means you're not gonna have a gap where you can get the damned thing stuck on a branch/ledge/etc. But I know almost nothing about wheeled UGV's, all the ones I do know of just went tracked to solve that problem.
 
The New York Times did an article on the last days of Avdiivka today.

It was predictably bad. Not as bad as the Washington Post's recent story on the same subject, but still misinformed and bad.

The constant message in the article is that everything happened due to lack of artillery shells. If they just had more artillery shells to fire, everything would have been fine. This though is completely wrong in that the Ukrainian artillery had generally pulled back from the city long before the final fights there. The Ukrainian Artillery could not provide fire support inside the city because the Russians were on three sides of the city. Any artillery deployed close in would have been rather quickly taken out.

Its claimed that the Russians made six attempts to take the final road out of the city and were pushed back each time by artillery. And then it fell on the seventh when there were no more shells. Its doubtful that it happened that way. But 155mm shells are the magic solution to all Ukraine's military problems.

He could send four to eight men as reinforcements, but he said the Russians fielded groups of 30 people at a time. “To stop a group 30 people, you would need 50 shells,” he said. “You need five shells to correct the fire and we can only use 10 shells.”

A potentially useful observation in the article was that the glide bombs have become an increasingly effective offensive weapon in urban areas. In particular against the large concrete buildings that tended to very difficult targets earlier in the conflict. The targeting and accuracy of the glide bombs seems to be dramatically increasing as time passes.

As to casualties, a guy from a company that had been deployed to the chemical plant in February reported a strength of 86 on arrival and 28 when they started the retreat. The article later concludes that "perhaps hundreds" of Ukrainians were lost in the city as a whole. Probably an underestimate.
 
Russian aesthetics sometimes give me an existential crisis, as the impression I get is that I'd live and die with things unchanged and my grandmother's toaster outliving me.

Like, here everything moves in trends with each generation having their own chosen house colors and aesthetics and refusing to live in a home with older aesthetics or have appliances or furniture that's old fashioned. So seeing stuff like that immediately strikes me as outdated and old and overdue for replacement, while I'm simultaneously aware that these are timeless aesthetics that will continue to last and are a sign of a healthy and lasting frugal society - unlike the one I live in.
 
Last edited:
Interleaved wheels have been around for a long, long time. They allow you to get more traction without lengthening a chassis.

If seen them on tracked vehicles. But on non tracked. That's new. And frankly looks like a stone, piece of wood or whatever could get between the tires and that drone is immobilized.
 
Russian aesthetics sometimes give me an existential crisis, as the impression I get is that I'd live and die with things unchanged and my grandmother's toaster outliving me.

Like, here everything moves in trends with each generation having their own chosen house colors and aesthetics and refusing to live in a home with older aesthetics or have appliances or furniture that's old fashioned. So seeing stuff like that immediately strikes me as outdated and old and overdue for replacement, while I'm simultaneously aware that these are timeless aesthetics that will continue to last and are a sign of a healthy and lasting frugal society - unlike the one I live in.
Barely anybody lives like that in real life tho.
 
Interleaved wheels have been around for a long, long time. They allow you to get more traction without lengthening a chassis.
C'mon, look at that thing. The crossmembers on the middle axle look super nigger-rigged. I'm guessing they were originally 4wheelers, then the extra two wheels crammed in were their attempt to fix them getting stuck too often
 
Back