Greer v. Moon, No. 20-cv-00647 (D. Utah Sep. 16, 2020)

[Himedall All-seeing Waifu]

The 6th amendment is absolutely in play. @Null right to a speedy trial, as required by the Federal Constitution has been manifestly denied by the Federal Courts, in defiance of their own rules of procedure and precedent. In favor of the plaintiff whose own stated goal is to prolong litigation in order to bankrupt the defense. Sure. it say's "Criminal" cases, but Greers own fillings allege criminality, and the courts own rulings affirm the plaintiffs allegations of criminality to justify their incessant use of process as punishment.

Is not the 6th Amendment for criminal cases where the government are prosecuting you?

 

[mindlessobserver]

Is not the 6th Amendment for criminal cases where the government are prosecuting you?

Yes. The thrust of my argument however was that Greer has dropped all civil actions and his case is proceeding solely under Statutory Copyright Law, which by definition seeks not to address his own personal grievance but the statutory grievance of the State.

Statutory Copyright law is however still considered civil, so yes, its a schizo theory that is out there.

 

[AnOminous]

Statutory Copyright law is however still considered civil, so yes, its a schizo theory that is out there.

There's criminal copyright law, too, but it's fairly unusual to see it applied. It has been, though, even in cases where it wasn't commercial in nature. The DMCA also has some fairly little-used criminal provisions. None of them apply here.

 

[mindlessobserver]

There's criminal copyright law, too, but it's fairly unusual to see it applied. It has been, though, even in cases where it wasn't commercial in nature. The DMCA also has some fairly little-used criminal provisions. None of them apply here.

Really though my rage came from the fact that Greer by some retard magic can get things he should not get by a strict reading of the law.

Imo turnabout is fair play. If the plaintiffs retarded petitions and whining are worth the courts time, then the defense can waste the courts time with an equally retarded petition. Like a 6th amendment objection to how fucking retarded it is this case has gone 4 years and still hasn't had a scheduling conference. done in good faith of course, and citing perfectly reasonable arguments.

 

[Debbie Macomber]

As far as the DJF goes, I think he's trying to wrangle them in, and then get payment from Null to pay them off. It works like this: they work pro bono, he wins, he gets money, he pays the ambulance chasers the fees they're demanding. In other words, I think he's offering them money he doesn't have, because Hardin is beating him like a rented mule in the filings.

That's the weird thing, he specifically says APPELATE legal fees, so it isn't even asking Null to pay later for them representing him now, it's to pay them for work they've already done for free

 

[AnOminous]

That's the weird thing, he specifically says APPELATE legal fees, so it isn't even asking Null to pay later for them representing him now, it's to pay them for work they've already done for free

They did it for free.

 

[Sneedfully and Peacefully]

this case has gone 4 years and still hasn't had a scheduling conference

This is what's infuriating to me as well. I know the courts can be slow and you're expecting anywhere from some months to a year down the line to hear your case depending on the nature of it and how backed up they are(IANAL but this is my assessment) but this case has already been seen and this is appeal and motions have been made and it's been stuck in limbo because of this retard. He's treating it like a woman he didn't pay to give him attention; by some insanity he made it past step one and now he's stalling because he fears rejection (dismissal/losing).

Shoot your shot shit lips! You don't know until you try! Walk up to that case, compliment her on her 100+ docket filings, and say "chchhhey you wanna hahve a schchchchhcheduling KHonherenschhhh?"

 

[reptile baht spaniard rid]

I think retard thinks he can lose the case at a scheduling conference.

Normally I'd say that's batshit insane, but I think he might be right ....

 

[Bill Evans 45]

Stop rushing the scheduling conference! He needs to at least take it out for shake at Wahlburgers for the full GF experience.

 

[DavidS877]

Stop rushing the scheduling conference! He needs to at least take it out for shake at Wahlburgers for the full GF experience.

I thought we decided it was going to be a Buc-ee's

 

[Mankirk]

Is it too soon for a poll speculating the docket number we will reach before the scheduling conference commences? I feel Florida retransferring to Utah counts as a response by the court.

 

[Pee Cola]

Is it too soon for a poll speculating the docket number we will reach before the scheduling conference commences?

Over-under on docket number 1488?

 

[The Dude]

Over-under on docket number 1488?

It'll include evidence number HH-420.

 

[.iota.]

would it not at this point make some measure of sense to offer russtard $10k out of the legal fund to settle out of court?

I think Null would rather kill himself than consider settling with Russel, despite all the stupid shit that has happened.

There's not a chance in Hell Null will offer to settle with Russ, it would be with money he was gifted to fight for the farms with, not to give away to gimpy faced retards.

Not to mention the other reasons already noted: every single cow on the Farms would Pro-Se up and sue Josh for any and all bullshit reasons just hoping for another sympathetic judge or that Null will settle with them or remove their thread.

null clearly stated in the synopsis of this case on the litigation fund website that he would never settle:

The one benefit of the case being in Utah again is that judge seemed to at least move it along every so often. Nothing got done in Florida whatsoever as they were clearly cooking up as much justification as possible to not hear the case there.

I'm jealous of how quickly the Rekieta legal thread is moving along

that's not entirely true; the court did schedule a status conference, for which they mistakenly posted the link.
then, when they realized the depth and breadth of the austism that doing so inspired ...

 

[waffle]

The primary concern in a custody case is the best interests of the child, which the result of a combat is completely irrelevant to. The parents can't just say fuck the welfare of the child and sign away the rights of the child to a fair resolution.

If we're carrying forward the logic of trial by combat it was that God would not allow the wrongdoer to prvail, so I'd say it's equally logical to say He would not let the unfit parent prevail.

 

[Useful_Mistake]

Can someone tell me because I was wondering and I have no clear answer. What's the proper procedure here? Utah can't consider Russ objections as both they and the motion to reconsider were denied, which means it would have to raise the issue Sua Sponte which it may or may not be able to do (it may reconsider it's final mandate re: habeas petitions (non applicable), but it may not for evidentiary rullings. All other questions on this were dismissed for lack of preservation for appeal, or are otherwise matters within BIA or likewise agencies). So, if it is on Utah to act, and assuming arguendo, that it can act, is it even procedurally proper for them to act on the same motion twice (effectively considering motion for reconsideration twice)?

On the other hand, Russ might be required to file another motion. But I don't think he can refile it, so are we waiting on him to file for leave to file his objections again? And if so, is it even a thing the district court can grant?

Or does it go back to Mr. Hardin, requiring him to refile his motion to transfer venue so Florida's order could be then procedurally carried out?

 

[Your Starter for 10]

In all honesty, Hardin should do absolutely nothing, no matter how much he or Null want to (if, indeed, they do). Every day that goes by, regardless of which court is causing the delay or actually has (or does not have) jurisdiction, contributes to the weight of the failure to prosecute MTD when/if a court ever decides to pick it up. As it stands now, Null can never win, nor can he lose, so it's just stuck in limbo, but with the big ol' stinky shitbomb the 10th left out there waiting on someone to throw it around.

 

[Thomas Talus]

What's the proper procedure here?

In a functional sense, to hire the biggest Fed Civ Pro name you can find to tell you what the answer is, if there even is one. This is way beyond the bounds of normal practice, and a) I ain't doing that kind of research and analysis for free, and b) if I were getting paid for that it might be UPL since I'm not licensed in the district.

It might end up being whatever the judge wants it to be, falling under the catch-all of the inherent powers of the court to manage their docket. See USCA ArtIII.S1.1.1.2.1.1 Inherent Powers of Federal Courts: Procedural Rules:

Article III, Section 1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Among the incidental powers of courts is that of making all necessary rules governing their process and practice and for the orderly conduct of their business.1 However, this power too is derived from the statutes and cannot go beyond them. The landmark case is Wayman v. Southard,2 which sustained the validity of the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792 as a valid exercise of authority under the necessary and proper clause. Although Chief Justice Marshall regarded the rule-making power as essentially legislative in nature, he ruled that Congress could delegate to the courts the power to vary minor regulations in the outlines marked out by the statute. Fifty-seven years later, in Fink v. O’Neil,3 in which the United States sought to enforce by summary process the payment of a debt, the Supreme Court ruled that under the process acts the law of Wisconsin was the law of the United States, and hence the government was required to bring a suit, obtain a judgment, and cause execution to issue. Justice Matthews for a unanimous Court declared that the courts have “no inherent authority to take any one of these steps, except as it may have been conferred by the legislative department; for they can exercise no jurisdiction, except as the law confers and limits it.” 4 Conceding, in 1934, the limited competence of legislative bodies to establish a comprehensive system of court procedure, and acknowledging the inherent power of courts to regulate the conduct of their business, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the lower federal courts not inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes.5 , Congress, in authorizing promulgation of rules of civil procedure, reserved the power to examine and override or amend rules proposed pursuant to the act which it found to be contrary to its legislative policy. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1941). Congress also has authorized promulgation of rules of criminal procedure, habeas, evidence, admiralty, bankruptcy, and appellate procedure. See Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supraat 533-543 (discussing development of rules and citing secondary authority). Congress in the 1970s disagreed with the direction of proposed rules of evidence and of habeas practice, and, first postponing their effectiveness, enacted revised rules. Pub. L. No. 93-505, 88 Stat. 1926 (1974); Pub. L. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334 (1976). On this and other actions, see Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra. Their operation being restricted, in conformity with the proviso attached to the congressional authorization, to matters of pleading and practice, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus judicially promulgated neither affect the substantive rights of litigants6 nor alter the jurisdiction7 of federal courts and the venue of actions therein8 and, thus circumscribed, have been upheld as valid.

Limitations to the Rule Making Power​

The principal function of court rules is that of regulating the practice of courts as regards forms, the operation and effect of process, and the mode and time of proceedings. However, rules are sometimes employed to state in convenient form principles of substantive law previously established by statutes or decisions. But no such rule “can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law.” This rule is applicable equally to courts of law, equity, and admiralty, to rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for the guidance of lower courts, and to rules “which lower courts make for their own guidance under authority conferred.” 9 As incident to the judicial power, courts of the United States possess inherent authority to supervise the conduct of their officers, parties, witnesses, counsel, and jurors by self-preserving rules for the protection of the rights of litigants and the orderly administration of justice.10

The courts of the United States possess inherent equitable powers over their process to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice, and to protect their jurisdiction and officers in the protection of property in the custody of law.11 Such powers are said to be essential to and inherent in the organization of courts of justice.12 While the Court has not “precisely delineated the outer boundaries” of a federal court’s inherent powers to manage its own internal affairs, the Court has recognized two limits on the exercise of such authority.13 First, a court, in exercising its inherent powers over its own processes, must act reasonably in response to a specific problem or issue “confronting the court’s fair administration of justice.” 14 Second, any exercise of an inherent power cannot conflict with any express grant of or limitation on the district court’s power as contained in a statute or rule, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 In applying these two standards, the Court has recognized that a district court, as an exercise of its inherent powers, can in limited circumstances rescind an order to discharge a jury and recall that jury in a civil case.16 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that federal courts possess the inherent power to control other aspects of regulating internal court proceedings, including having the inherent power to (1) hear a motion in limine;17 (2) dismiss a case for the convenience of the parties or witnesses because of the availability of an alternative forum;18 and (3) stay proceedings pending the resolution of parallel actions in other courts.19 The courts of the United States also possess inherent power to amend their records, correct the errors of the clerk or other court officers, and to rectify defects or omissions in their records even after the lapse of a term, subject, however, to the qualification that the power to amend records conveys no power to create a record or re-create one of which no evidence exists.20 Nonetheless, while the exercise of an inherent power can, at times, allow for departures from even long-established, judicially crafted common law rules,21 courts are not “generally free to discover new inherent powers that are contrary to civil practice as recognized in the common laws.” 22

Footnotes

1Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & P.S.B.C. Co., 263 U.S. 629 (1924). 223 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). 3106 U.S. 272, 280 (1882). 4See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960), holding that a federal district court, sitting in admiralty, has no inherent power, independent of any statute or the Supreme Court's Admiralty Rules, to order the taking of deposition for the purpose of discovery. See also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969), in which the Court found statutory authority in the “All Writs Statute” for a habeas corpus court to propound interrogatories. 5In the Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, and contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2072, Congress, in authorizing promulgation of rules of civil procedure, reserved the power to examine and override or amend rules proposed pursuant to the act which it found to be contrary to its legislative policy. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1941). Congress also has authorized promulgation of rules of criminal procedure, habeas, evidence, admiralty, bankruptcy, and appellate procedure. See Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supraat 533-543 (discussing development of rules and citing secondary authority). Congress in the 1970s disagreed with the direction of proposed rules of evidence and of habeas practice, and, first postponing their effectiveness, enacted revised rules. Pub. L. No. 93-505, 88 Stat. 1926 (1974); Pub. L. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334 (1976). On this and other actions, see Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra. 6However, the abolition of old rights and the creation of new ones in the course of litigation conducted in conformance with these judicially prescribed federal rules has been sustained as against the contention of a violation of substantive rights. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 7Cf. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589–590 (1941). 8Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). 9Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & P.S.B.C. Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635, 636 (1924). It is not for the Supreme Court to prescribe how the discretion vested in a Court of Appeals should be exercised. As long as the latter court keeps within the bounds of judicial discretion, its action is not reviewable. In re Burwell, 350 U.S. 521 (1956). 10McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915); Griffin v. Thompson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 244, 257 (1844). See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (court of appeal rule conditioning appeal on having filed with the district court timely objections to a master's report). In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956), the Court, citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), asserted that this supervisory power extends to policing the requirements of the Court's rules with respect to the law enforcement practices of federal agents. But compare United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 11Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131 (188; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176 (1884); Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1866). 12Eberly v. Moore, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 147 (1861); Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 134 (1919). 13See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. ___, No. 15-458, slip op. at 4 (2016). 14Id. at 4–5. 15Id. at 4. 16Id. at 5–7 (acknowledging that while it is “reasonable” to allow a jury to reconvene after a formal discharge to correct an error and while such an exercise of authority does not conflict with a rule or statute, the exercise of the inherent power to rescind a discharge order needs to be “carefully circumscribed” to guarantee the existence of an impartial jury); see also id. at 9–10 (holding that a court, in exercising an inherent power to rescind a discharge order, must consider, among other factors, (1) the length of delay between discharge and recall; (2) whether jurors have spoken to anyone after discharge; (3) any reaction to the verdict in the courtroom; and (4) any access jurors may have had to outside materials after discharge). The rule provided in Dietz extends only to civil cases, as additional constitutional concerns—namely, the attachment of the double jeopardy bar—may arise if a court were to recall a jury after discharge in a criminal case. See id. at 10. 17See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). A motion in limine is a preliminary motion resolved by a court prior to trial and generally regards the admissibility of evidence. See Black's Law Dictionary 1171 (10th ed. 2014). 18See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1947). This doctrine is called forum non conveniens. See Black's Law Dictionary 770 (10th ed. 2014) (defining forum non conveniens as the “doctrine that an appropriate forum — even though competent under the law — may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might also have been properly brought in the first place.” ). 19See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). 20Gagnon v. United States, 193 U.S. 451, 458 (1904). 21See Dietz, slip op. at 11 (assuming that, even if courts at common law lacked the inherent power to rescind a jury discharge order, a court’s exercise of its inherent powers can depart from the common law). The term “common law” refers to the body of English law that was “adopted as the law of the American colonies and supplemented with local enactments and judgments.” See Black's Law Dictionary 334 (10th ed. 2014). 22See Dietz, slip op. at 12.

 

[teriyakiburns]

In a functional sense, to hire the biggest Fed Civ Pro name you can find to tell you what the answer is

So, Randaza?

 

[reptile baht spaniard rid]

You start filing briefs with the Supremes, using all the articles and amendments of the constitution, and then go to the articles of confederation.

Might as well at least amuse Thomas.