A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person; and
(a) Either:
(i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision
34 of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of
the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and
the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended
victim was a police officer; or
(ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a
of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or
sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the
criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the
course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such a
uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee
of the division for youth; or
(ii-a) the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical
technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse
involved in a first response team, or any other individual who, in the
course of official duties, performs emergency response activities and
was engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such
firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic,
physician or registered nurse; or
(iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as
defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who
was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his
official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or a local correctional facility; or
(iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant was
confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody
upon a sentence for the term of his natural life, or upon a sentence
commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an indeterminate
term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of
which was natural life, or at the time of the commission of the killing,
the defendant had escaped from such confinement or custody while serving
such a sentence and had not yet been returned to such confinement or
custody; or
(v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior
occasion and the death was caused for the purpose of preventing the
intended victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether
or not such action or proceeding had been commenced, or the intended
victim had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and
the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for
such prior testimony, or the intended victim was an immediate family
member of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the
killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the
testimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate
family member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal
action or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of
exacting retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony. As used
in this subparagraph "immediate family member" means a husband, wife,
father, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent,
stepchild or grandchild; or
(vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the
killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than the intended
victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expectation of the
receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or
from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of
a party to such agreement; or
(vii) the victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of
committing or attempting to commit and in furtherance of robbery,
burglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in the first
degree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape in the first
degree, a crime formerly defined in section 130.50 of this title, sexual
abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree
or escape in the first degree, or in the course of and furtherance of
immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime
or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting
to commit the crime of murder in the second degree; provided however,
the victim is not a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes and,
provided further that, unless the defendant's criminal liability under
this subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another
person to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to
section 20.00 of this chapter, this subparagraph shall not apply where
the defendant's criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another
pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or
(viii) as part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with
intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional
person or persons, causes the death of an additional person or persons;
provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal
transaction; or
(ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted
of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this article,
or had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if
committed in this state, would constitute a violation of either of such
sections; or
(x) the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner
pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting
torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death. As used in this
subparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of
extreme physical pain; "depraved" means the defendant relished the
infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing
debasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of
pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or
(xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more
additional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions
within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar
fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or
(xii) the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision
twenty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the
defendant killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the
killing, a judge; or
(xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as
defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 490.05 of this
chapter; and
(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime.
2. In any prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative
defense that:
(a) (i) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the
second degree. (ii) It shall not be a "reasonable explanation or excuse"
pursuant to subparagraph (i) of this paragraph when the defendant's
conduct resulted from the discovery, knowledge or disclosure of the
victim's sexual orientation, sex, gender, gender identity, gender
expression or sex assigned at birth; or
(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without
the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.
Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second
degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.
Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
