Polinsky also produced evidence that, using the blog’s Twitter account, Bolton had sent her a Twitter “@mention” a total of eight times. An expert witness testified that the “@mentions” would result in notifications on her phone and that the primary purpose of sending an “@mention” on Twitter “is to get somebody’s attention . . . to send them a notification and let them know about [a] tweet.” At some point, Polinsky blocked Bolton from her Twitter account.
[...]
Specifically, the district court found that Bolton’s “@mentions” of Polinsky on Twitter, as well as his sending the package to the hotel, constituted harassing acts.
[...]
[2] Because the HRO statute does not include a standard of proof, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to the decision to grant an HRO. SeeMinn. Stat. § 609.748 (not identifying a standard of proof for HROs); State by Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 500 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn. 1993) (stating that statutory silence regarding a standard of proof “is regarded as a signal that the legislature intended the preponderance of the evidence standard” to apply). A preponderance of the evidence means a greater weight of the evidence, or that a claim is more likely true than not. State v. Maley, 714 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Minn. App. 2006).
[...]
The district court found that the use of the “@mentions” was deliberate contact with Polinsky that was unwanted and had a substantial adverse effect on her security. We agree with this reasoning and conclude that Bolton’s Twitter “@mentions” of Polinsky satisfy the statutory definition of harassment. See Minn. Stat. §649.748, subd. 1(a)(1).
[...]
The district court here, however, did not base its HRO findings on Bolton’s “following” Polinsky on Twitter, but rather on his conduct of making “@mentions” of her on Twitter, which directly contacted her on her phone.