Now if you go back and look at the media then, the neocons claimed that not only would Russia be forced to negotiate, Putins whole regime would likely collapse. How did that go? They were wrong then, and they’re wrong now. And they’re just sperging about tariffs because they don’t know what else to do, and are rich enough not to be affected by higher inflation.
I remember 2022 differently. The Russians miscalculated, failed badly at negotiation and at warfare, lost most of their grounds gained, and have, after 2 additional years of bloody attrition warfare, slowly clawed back to a still-losing position. A ceasefire today is a defeat and none of Russia's war aims have really been achieved. This has been a disaster for Russia by any reasonable standard, and it has exposed structural weaknesses in their society and how they organized their armed forces and industries. The Wagner Mutiny was shocking, strange, and exposed to my view the fundamental hollowness of the regime. Unable to thrive in war or in peace, and unable to even muster the forces to destroy their puny neighbor. Russia had to turn to North Korea for civil defense and shells, and Iran for drone technology, and is now China's bitch for consumer goods. They've hamstrung their development and pushed themselves into a corner. It will take years of diplomacy for them to ever appear as something more than a hostile and bellicose rival for their most natural and wealthy trading partners. Any vision of a US-Russian-German partnership for a balanced, secure, and prosperous Europe is lost. They have lost allies and been forced to ignore some due to their single-minded focus on this war. Iran was defenseless, Armenia did not fare well in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Assad's regime fell. I don't know if it was the sanctions on Russian exports or if it was the trillions of dollars printed for fighting covid under Biden and Trump that caused inflationary pressures, but it's safe to say the sanctions on Russia were not the whole story.
Pariah state among who? Europe? Who cares. Europe is broke anyways. The rest of the world doesn’t really care all that much
(Shit, at a recent G20 summit, they couldn’t even agree on a statement that went beyond: “War is bad, mkay?”)
and Europe’s share of the world trade and GDP has been steadily shrinking.
Who can they trade with and sell their shit to besides poor countries that offer nothing strategically, or slightly more despised states like Iran and North Korea? Their many friends in Africa and SEA are broker than their enemies in Europe, the (mostly white) Commonwealth and America. China hasn't exactly helped them. They can't even fly their flag at the fucking Olympics, which isn't so meaningful, but it shows that no one who matters likes them right now. And yeah, being a pariah state amongst the richest and most powerful countries sucks. The military stockpiles and the wealth of these pathetic little EU states, when given to retarded hohols, was enough to significantly stymie their ambitions. The EU didn't face the energy crisis and grim winters foretold when they lost Russian gas. Germany was able to build LNG terminal ports and absorb the costs and people minded the ensuing recession less than capitulating to their hated enemies. Centrist parties and left coalitions remained in power and AfD remains popular mostly in East Germany. Europe is gay, dumb, self-undermining, and weak, but Russia is not stronger for it.
Russia had NATO on the borders for years. Norway. That wasn’t an issue. It was Ukraine as a NATO member that was a problem.
Now they’ll get a NATO on their borders with mostly empty arsenals. And without the money to replace it. (For example: Entire countries, such as Netherlands or Denmark doesn’t even have artillery any more since they sent it to Ukraine to get blown up. The same can be said about tanks and air defenses in many cases.
Ukraine (what will be left of it) will be a bankrupt, and depopulated place that won’t be a threat.
That would probably count as a solid W for many Russians.
Being at risk of losing Kaliningrad isn't exactly the risk missiles too close to intercept being aimed at Moscow. I believe you are not considering properly the long-term costs of the course they are on. The strategic problem with Ukraine as a NATO member was continually stated by most sources I read at the time to be about putting Moscow in range of missiles they would not have time to intercept or respond to, essentially putting the knife to their throat and necessitating immediate and massive intervention in a low-intensity civil war on their borders. Now the knife is really at their throat, and Europe will continue to rearm and buy US arms and manufacture its own with renewed zeal, partly thanks to Trump. Russia's strategic aims with their gambit in Ukraine I would say have backfired, and their losses while much lower than Ukraine's are not something to be excited about. Their situation is worse now than in 21. Ukraine will not be the threat after the war--aside from the constant domestic terror attacks from their barely distinguishable coethnics all along their porous border to be fought by their barely competent security services. Transnistria will certainly be in the crosshairs and Putin's history lecture to Tucker about the eternal Polack makes me think perhaps Poland will be the next bit of problem they want to fix. The course they're on is destructive and probably not wise, or particularly viable. The war has destroyed the constituency for peace in Russia, and peace is more badly needed by them than by their actual rival, the US. They've lost a lot of men in a country where social suicide is the order of the day, their birthrates are in the toilet, I've never met a Russian confident in the present state or the future of Russia, and sacrificing their men and materiel by the thousands for a strategy that ultimately has a very low chance of working is not a good way for Russia to thrive.
They’re winning the war, and hurting the American or European economy to try and drag it out is top dollar retarded.
It seems to me that it is a pyrrhic victory they're aiming for now. They have lost more than they wanted to even wager. Nationalist sources in Russia by necessity and the strict media controls there are going to say things are doing well, but it's as hard to believe a Russian statistic as it is a Chinese one. Their position in the world is lower, the esteem for their military strength is lower, and their ability to earn money and participate in consequential institutions is lowered. Their citizens are more isolated for travel than they were in the past, though certainly they still do travel, Turkey, Thailand, Vietnam, and China still have love for Russian tourists. But they've forced Europe and America to rearm and consider the necessity of eliminating actors like Russia instead of trying to tolerate and work with them. And frankly I don't think the American economy has really been harmed by the war all that much. Prices have risen--but shelves are full, most economic indicators are good, and yes that's in part because some essential trade with Russia did continue. But most halted. Their traditional customers are interesting throwing good money in the direction of anyone els.e But the defense orders keep piling up, our companies keep making breakthrough products, we have massive qualitative leads in a lot of domains, and our markets are doing pretty well all things considered.
I think that a strategy that more directly attacks Russia's primary source of state revenue by placing penalties via tariffs on their energy customers is a fairly well-considered policy, and better strategically than allowing Russia to march up to Poland and Moldova and start making its demands. It is more likely to have the desired effects than the secondary sanctions and sanctions regime as well as the price cap efforts. I think the costs to the US are likely to be ephemeral and probably not significant vis a vis inflation.
I do believe that you and I agree about a lot of the short term prospects for the war, and probably don't have super different positions in many ways. Ukraine is losing, and never had a chance, and the US does not have much leverage on Russia, though it is finding some new avenues that are worth exploring from the American perspective. The war is racing toward the tragic end and Moscow would not negotiate if it does not face any headwinds to its progress, and it will not temper its ambitions without efforts like Trump's. I think Moscow's course is simply not a wise or sustainable one if you project out past the conclusion of the war, and especially when you take into account the conduct of the war to date. The end of the conflict in Ukraine will not be the end of the conflict between Europe, America, and Russia, nor will it be the end of Ukrainian nationalism and revanchism in the new Russian territories.
