The Role of Strategic Planning
Decision outcomes are not always determined by the quality of the decision-making procedures that precede them. Factors such as luck, chance, and the consequences of strategic interaction may also influence results. Nonetheless, over the long term, a correlation exists between failures in the substantive quality of decisions and the processes through which they are made. Deficiencies within decision-making processes significantly contribute to such failures.
Security policy decisions involve political-ideological factors. However, they should also be grounded in a strategic operational framework supported by a comprehensive infrastructure of detailed knowledge and experience. This includes setting a clear strategic vision, formulating goals and objectives, analyzing the relationship between goals and the means to achieve them, effectively integrating various approaches to attain objectives, and considering relevant end-states, including an estimated timetable.
For all these aspects, it is essential that political leaders rely on specialized professional bodies. This is a continuous rather than one-time process of developing thinking and analytical skills, ultimately resulting in the creation of an appropriate cognitive infrastructure that enables the formulation of the most suitable decision given the circumstances. These institutional decision-making procedures are designed to provide decision-makers with tools intended to structure and regulate judgment, thereby reducing the risks associated with excessive dependence on emotion, intuition, impulsiveness, or personal and political considerations that could lead to undesirable outcomes.
A Problematic Baseline
Israel has never truly excelled in strategy formulation. Constant and persistent security threats and crises have promoted a short-term, responsive outlook at the expense of long-term grand strategic planning. This outlook, however, does not stem just from “shadow of the present” threats outweighing “shadow of the future” ones, but also from a strategic-cultural predisposition for an inductive logical-analytical cognitive style that prioritizes praxis over strategic thinking. This orientation aligns with an anti-intellectual perspective that undermines the value of vision preceding action.
The politicization of Israel’s national security decision-making process — a consequence of its coalition government system — reinforces the predominance of short-term, reactive planning. Ideological considerations, with a bias toward the Palestinian issue, prevent any professional discussion of a whole range of specific strategic avenues from even getting off the ground.
The Second Lebanon War of 2006, for example, is indicative of the deficiencies in this decision-making system. In its wake, a five-person commission of inquiry, led by retired Judge Eliyahu Winograd, faulted both the government and the Israel Defense Forces, concluding their decision-making and performance during the war and in preceding years led to Israel’s failures. The commission then recommended improving Israel’s strategic decision-making processes by enhancing staff work, political-military exchange, and the cabinet’s standard operating procedures. Afterwards, the Ministry of Defense and the Prime Minister’s Office enhanced their administrative capabilities to support strategic planning.
Still, these administrative fixes have been repeatedly undermined and circumvented. For example, according to the interim report of a State Commission of Inquiry probing decision-making surrounding some $2 billion worth of deals with German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp that have been under scrutiny for possible corruption and bribery, Netanyahu and his staff worked repeatedly from 2009 to 2017 to undermine strategic staff work rather than enhance it. According to the Sept. 2025 interim report, the prime minister and his staff, led by the National Security Council, undermined the security decision-making process by bypassing the normal approval processes of the security establishment and the government, thereby neutralizing their ability to influence issues central to Israel’s national security.
Prime ministers in the Israeli governmental system are supreme in strategic and security decision-making. However, they typically convene small groups of loyal and trusted advisers who are privy to their preferences and help them navigate the decision-making process. In Hebrew, this group is referred to as a “kitchenette” because Prime Minister Golda Meir used to convene her trusted advisors in her kitchen. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it functioned as a war cabinet.
While this type of closed discussion is accommodating for the prime minister, it discourages debate and contestation and inevitably culminates in a self-sustained dynamic of groupthink. This feature of Israeli strategic decision-making has intensified during Netanyahu’s present government, with him relying on a small number of aides and three or four loyal officials, including the recently sacked head of the National Security Council, Tzachi Hanegbi, and the retired Minister of Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer.
Though far from perfect, strategic planning from the 1973 Yom Kippur War until the formation of the sixth Netanyahu government in 2022 was relatively professional and institutionalized. Various strategic planning bodies, usually led by the Strategic Planning Division of the Israel Defense Forces or the National Security Council (since the late 1990s), initiated or were tasked with developing and presenting strategic recommendations to political leaders through established procedures. Though not necessarily adopted by the prime minister and the cabinet, they served as reference points for strategy making.
From its inception, the present Netanyahu coalition government has actively diluted the strategic planning ecosystem. Strategic issues have been perceived as linked to an obstructive left-leaning “deep state” that has opposed the more controversial ideological and political priorities being proposed by the more extreme members of the government. Strategic issues were also perceived as being linked to the government’s judicial overhaul agenda — also rejected by the so-called deep state.
Thus, strategy and domestic politics have become deeply entangled, leading to growing gatekeeping by the political echelon and a reduction in the influence of the strategic analysis planning process. In the wake of the Oct. 7 attack, strategic planning institutions and the government attempted to blame one another for the tragedy, further undermining trust between them. Netanyahu and his supporters have repeatedly emphasized intelligence and operational failures inside the Israel Defense Forces and security agencies rather than accept personal responsibility. The Israel Defense Forces’ own review cited some internal military failures, but it also pushed for an external inquiry to identify systemic issues across the government... (continued in link)