Range's vice president averred in general terms that Lipsky's statements caused Range to suffer "direct pecuniary and economic losses and costs, lost profits, loss of its reputation, and loss of goodwill in the communities in which it operates . . . in excess of three million dollars."
12 The court of appeals concluded that the affidavit, "by stating that Range had suffered direct economic losses and `lost profits,'" was sufficient "to raise a rational inference. . . that Range lost `trade or other dealings' as a result of statements made by Steven Lipsky."
Id. (quoting
Hurlbut, 749 S.W.2d at 767).
Lipsky argues, however, that the affidavit is conclusory and therefore insufficient to satisfy the TCPA's requirement of "clear and specific evidence," and we agree. Bare, baseless opinions do not create fact questions, and neither are they a sufficient substitute for the clear and specific evidence required to establish a prima facie case under the TCPA.
See Elizondo
[460 S.W.3d 593]
v. Krist, 415 S.W.3d 259, 264 (Tex.2013) ("Conclusory statement. . .[are] insufficient to create a question of fact to defeat summary judgment.");
City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex. 2009) (holding conclusory, baseless testimony to be no evidence). Opinions must be based on demonstrable facts and a reasoned basis.
Elizondo, 415 S.W.3d at 265. We accordingly disagree with the court of appeals that general averments of direct economic losses and lost profits, without more, satisfy the minimum requirements of the TCPA. Although the affidavit states that Range "suffered direct pecuniary and economic losses," it is devoid of any specific facts illustrating how Lipsky's alleged remarks about Range's activities actually caused such losses.
See, e.g., Burbage, 447 S.W.3d at 262 (noting that a jury could not reasonably infer that cancellations for a funeral home business were caused by defamation when any number of reasons could have caused the cancellations).
