Wuhan Coronavirus: Megathread - Got too big

Status
Not open for further replies.
I wonder if they are specifically designed so that they can simply spray clean a room with a hosepipe once one person/group locked inside die and are hauled off to the crematorium and then shove the next load in
Chinese "Efficiency" at work.

I hope everybody that worked on these damned constructions willingly and the people who green lighted the idea for this gets the bug.
 
It looks so drab and lifeless...

And the fact that the fucking windows have bars in them tell everything we need to know.

This ain't no hospital.

It's an honest to god modern DEATH PIT.
I find it interesting that when the chinks build a hospital out of what are effectively containerized building site offices, people are pretending to be surprised that those offices have bars on the windows by default. I just love the idea that the Chinamen tasked with engineering it would figure out their layout, rush to start laying the pads out and build the second floor access, order their prefabs to be trucked in from some factory that has hundreds of them sitting out back and right at the last minute they stop and go "Wait... these don't look mean enough to Western doomcopers. We've got to weld some bars over the windows, even if it means delaying construction!"
Despite the speculative tone of this article, I have to thank you for what I consider one of the the most informative treatises on the possibility that this strain of corona was a breach in containment from the Wuhan lab. If I could give you an achievement award, I would.
Though this is way early in the arc of this virus, and the accuracy of all the claims this article makes are not clear, I am now leaning more towards thinking that the possibility that this virus was lab created cannot simply be dismissed as hysteria.
This is the 'harvardtothebighouse' blogpost, no?

I mean, that blogger may or may not be a raving lunatic. But if you look at his other writings, he certainly writes like a raving lunatic.
 
Last edited:
View attachment 1128691
Remember, incubation is 2-14 days
China restricted travel as countries closed their borders. we'll know by Valentine's Day if the decline will continue.
 
No shit. Take a look at the windows. They all have bars over them. What the fuck. Those places will be charnel houses in no time at all. God help those poor people.
The worst thing is, I think I know exactly whats going to happen assuming china has been lowballing as much as we all think....

Once its up and running the central government appointed medical staff will try to do the right thing house as many coronavirus infectees there as comfortably possible, and despite being under insane pressure they will try to do it humanely as they can. In a week or two however they will be called away to another crisis area, and local officials will be left in charge, and once the initial buzz of press and central government attention fades, they will inevitably start thinking...

"how many possibly infected problems can I squeeze into this, and how can I make this reflect well on me?"

...and from here shit will go to very literal hell. Backed by terrified armed guards, strongarmed doctors and nurses and orderlies will begin throwing absolutely everybody who "is definitely" infected as their bosses try to exceed some quota of "quarantine this many infected ASAP" sent from above....then everybody who "might be" infected.....then everybody who has had contact with either of the previous two groups....unless of course any of the above can bribe their way out of it, in which case they can go along their merry way no matter how infected they actually are.

Men, women, and children will be locked in cold metal rooms, packed tighter and tighter together as more are forced in, with no bathroom, no air flow, and no way out.

When people try to escape, they will be threatened with guns or beaten back into the cells. Eventually food and drink stops being given out because nobody wants to go near the diseased rooms full of shit, puke, and steadily rotting corpses. Those within begin to die of thirst as their bodies try to fight the disease. Eventually if things go really badly they wont even bother emptying the bodies from the rooms until they physically cant fit anybody else inside

By the time Local Administrator Ping is proudly giving a report on how he has successfully quarantined fifty thousand infected, there will be fifty thousand corpses either burned out in the open or lying rotting in the "field hospital". The party will believe this because of course they fucking will, and assume shit is more or less resolved, all while the virus continues to spread unabated in the wider population thanks to everyone who bribed/talked their way out of quarantine.
 
I find it interesting that when the chinks build a hospital out of what are effectively containerized building site offices, people are pretending to be surprised that those offices have bars on the windows by default. I just love the idea that the Chinamen tasked with engineering it would figure out their layout, rush to start laying the pads out and build the second floor access, order their prefabs to be trucked in from some factory that has hundreds of them sitting out back and right at the last minute they stop and go "Wait... these don't look mean enough to Western doomcopers. We've got to weld some bars over the windows, even if it means delaying construction!"

I have yet to see any major construction site use those style of sea-cans for offices, and even major modern construction that revolves around using prefab components doesn't use sea-cans, they use what amounts to trailers, in essentially the same style as an actual trailer park.
 
XRWlkB4sd0.png

 
The ones in spanish news were definitely stereotypically drunk germans wearing socks and sandals, it can infect non-asians, it just infects asians faster and harder.



Many hospitals have SOME barred rooms in case of suicidal patients. The poor craftsmanship, (the fucking windows are visibly crooked!) lack of proper insulation (and isolation outside of physical distance) and poor building code in display make this indeed much worse than staying home. That's a fucking deathcamp.



Pandemic typically means its global though. And for the most part this is still contained fairly well outside of china, as far as I can tell this is an epidemic at least for now.
it's just hit India and if any country is more fucked when it comes to hygiene and healthcare than China it's India, the virus is going to go into over drive, hopefully India gets fucking blockaded
 
I find it interesting that when the chinks build a hospital out of what are effectively containerized building site offices, people are pretending to be surprised that those offices have bars on the windows by default. I just love the idea that the Chinamen tasked with engineering it would figure out their layout, rush to start laying the pads out and build the second floor access, order their prefabs to be trucked in from some factory that has hundreds of them sitting out back and right at the last minute they stop and go "Wait... these don't look mean enough to Western doomcopers. We've got to weld some bars over the windows, even if it means delaying construction!"

This is the 'harvardtothebighouse' article, no?

I mean, that blogger may or may not be a raving lunatic. But if you look at his other writings, he certainly writes like a raving lunatic.

the internal facing windows. The ones in the hallway from where the nurses can see into the rooms have bars too. The other big question is the Chinese Army has portable hospitals, specifically designed to deal with NBC. These aren’t them. Which begs the question, Why Not?
 
Believe it or not, I don't mind the bars on the windows. With people deciding "I"m the plucky hero!" and trying to escape quarantine, those bars make sense from a strictly direct point of view.

What bothers me is the fact they're using standard drywall with no moisture barrier, the windows are crooked, and the ventilation system is janked.

Those may not have intended to be what they're going to be, but it's gonna get ugly anyway.

China may be hearing Kyle Reese's voice before anyone else: "The incinerators ran day and night. We were this close to going out."
 
Many hospitals have SOME barred rooms in case of suicidal patients. The poor craftsmanship, (the fucking windows are visibly crooked!) lack of proper insulation (and isolation outside of physical distance) and poor building code in display make this indeed much worse than staying home. That's a fucking deathcamp.

People are surprised about shoddy construction and lack of adherence to safety codes? It was constructed in ten days (completely unheard of for such a project), there were a bunch of different companies involved, they were worked to the bone (increased chances of mistakes), and the CCP is breathing down their necks since they are using these hospitals as their propaganda push for the month.

They've always been about image. It is their downfall, to this point.
 
another article. I think they’re trying to run damage control.


Everyone loves the coronapocalypse
https://sneed.yimg.com/ny/api/res/1.2/xdPAv_dMyckc8uxJ9Ktxsg--/YXBwaWQ9aGlnaGxhbmRlcjt3PTY0MDtoPTM2MA--/https://sneed.yimg.com/uu/api/res/1.2/6ZOWj9LAUwS39c1SJm0O9A--~B/aD0xMDgwO3c9MTkyMDtzbT0xO2FwcGlkPXl0YWNoeW9u/https://media.zenfs.com/en/techcrunch_350/af8e56b0acb3ff4bb1eef704fbedb87f
Everyone loves the coronapocalypse
The 2019-nCoV coronavirus is a global public health emergency of significant concern. It is also, simultaneously, a fount of misinformation, wild conspiracy theories and both over and under-reactions. Whose fault is this? So glad you asked. I happen to have a little list.
Purveyors of misinformation. As archly observedby "The Atlantic," that misleadingly-self-described Harvard epidemiologist who tweeted "HOLY MOTHER OF GOD" followed by math errors was ... well ... wrong.

Carl T. Bergstrom
✔@CT_Bergstrom

· Feb 1, 2020
Please note: By recklessly publishing low-quality information about the #2019nCov outbreak, @DrEricDing has risen from a handful of twitter followers to over 75,000 in a matter of days.
View image on Twitter
89 people are talking about this
https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js

However, he pales in comparison to the bioweapon theorists at Zero Hedge (who were banned from Twitter as a result, apparently for doxxing a Chinese scientist), and let's not forget to shake a finger of blame at the people who posted / linked to the much-debunked, non-peer-reviewed "signs of HIV insertions in the coronavirus" paper online.

Science itself. Why would people link to that paper? Well, because non-peer-reviewed preprints are often mistaken by the general public for peer-reviewed science. Why are preprints so increasingly important? In part because awful, predatory scientific publishers massively overcharge for access to scientific papers, often even when they're funded by public money.

Social media. Not to belabor my dead horse here, but what you see on your social media is determined by algorithms optimized for engagement, which frequently means outrage. That viral HOLY MOTHER OF GOD tweet would have been more of a minor blip if Twitter still kept to strict chronological timelines. Note that this would also make "good" tweets far less viral. That would be the price we pay for abandoning the engagement algorithms, but it seems at least plausible that it would overall lead to a better world.

General innumeracy. I mentioned that people were underreacting, too. I have seen so many self-identified galaxy-brain thinkers notifying others that it's silly to be so concerned about the coronavirus when the flu is far more dangerous. I've even seen a handy Myths and Facts infographic wandering all over Facebook, "informing" us all that "the common flu kills 60 times more people annually than Corona."

People, the flu and nCoV-2019 are not comparable. It's apples to zebras. We know what to expect from the flu: We don't yet know what to expect from this new virus. That's why it's of concern. You especiallycannot compare annual death tolls, since we don't know what this new virus's is, since it's only existed in humans for two months. Sheesh.

Human nature. This is arguably the big one. On some level, everyone loves an apocalypse, in that it's a narrative they completely understand, one they can envision and have envisioned for themselves. So anything in the real world associated with an apocalypse gets clicks, commentary and reshares.

I should know: When not writing for TechCrunch I happen to be the director of the GitHub Archive Program, which includes a whole bunch of present-day archiving, as well as very-long-term 1,000-year storage, which is primarily intended for historical or recovering-abandoned-technologies usage ... and yet everyone's mind, whenever I talk about it, immediately jumps to "Canticle for Leibowitz"-style post-apocalyptic scenarios, and stays there.

Which is fine! I mean, I appreciate that everyone's interested in the project and has ideas about it, just as I appreciate that the coronavirus is a global public health emergency, and people should be paying close attention to it. But our collective fondness for apocalyptic narratives, combined with the other contributors above, may, if we're not careful, transmute that attention into belief in wacky conspiracy theories and blatant misinformation. Please stop to think before you believe, and before you share.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
It's worse than just random parents, it's culture-wide. Boys are on the hook to care for their aging parents. Girls are on the hook to be their husband's property and therefore not in a position to care for their aging parents. So if you're going to raise a kid, and remember you can only have one because otherwise the government will go out of its way to dick you as hard as it can, which is better to have? Eventually China decided, "Oops, gee, guess we'll let you have two kids," but by then the damage was long done. So it's the entire Chinese setup where if you don't have a son you're fucked as soon as you get old that led to this happening.

You're entirely correct about the perceived roles of sons vs daughters in Chinese societies - that the daughters would marry and not be there to care for their parents but rather their in-laws, where as sons would marry and have an obligation to do so for his own parents. But I've seen stuff that says it was rather more complicated than a total disdain for daughters; many parents didn't give them up easily or without a fight and there were parents who went to lengths to hide and keep daughters too, as well as families who would adopt them within China if the state allowed, which it often did not.


Johnson began studying Chinese adoption after she adopted a Chinese daughter 25 years ago. This was a period when much of the U.S. was scandalized by media representations of China like those in the 1995 documentary The Dying Rooms: Asia’s Darkest Secret. The film was created during the harsh middle years of China’s “one-child” population control policy, the 1979 legislation that strictly limited family size. The goal of modernizing the country by sharply reducing births soon led to abuses. Parents found to have “out-of-plan” children were penalized, and government orphanages began to swell with “over-quota” children. The Dying Rooms brought attention to the warehouse-like conditions in some of these orphanages. But it did something else too: It popularized the image of deeply patriarchal Chinese families who blithely discarded their daughters in pursuit of a son, and of a Chinese culture so hostile to taking in other parents’ children that Chinese girls faced no other option than being adopted abroad.

What Johnson and her research associates found, however, as they interviewed thousands of Chinese families, was that this picture was far from complete. Talking to rural Chinese parents who relinquished daughters, other rural families who took those daughters in, and a third, almost entirely unrecognized category of parents—those who hid over-quota, unregistered children from population control officials—Johnson learned that few families in the region used the expression “more sons, more happiness” that was supposedly typical of Chinese son preference.By contrast, many of those two thousand families spoke extensively of their desire for both a daughter and a son, since having both, they said, would “make a family complete.” This idealized family was so important that, for years before and even during the one-child policy, many parents who only had sons adopted daughters in order to thus “complete” their families. And where daughters were given up, among the families Johnson met, it was never casual, but almost always an agonized decision that, in the context of government repression, could hardly be called a choice. It wasn’t the people, in other words, so much as the policy.

Parents in the 1980s and ‘90s represented the first generation of Chinese families that faced cyclical and forceful birth planning campaigns. Having an unauthorized, “illegal” child was punished with crippling fines sometimes larger than a family’s annual income. If families couldn’t pay, they might have to forfeit all their furniture or even their front door instead. Family homes were demolished and family heads sometimes imprisoned for having a child out-of-plan, and women faced forced sterilizations or abortions that could leave them maimed.

Local government officials tasked with enforcing the policies of the central government, and fined if their region surpassed its quota, vacillated between turning a blind eye to rural families’ unauthorized children and overly strict enforcement. It was a context in which local corruption could be a gesture of compassion, as sympathetic officials might warn pregnant women to hide from central government investigators or help arrange for an unauthorized child to be secretly registered to another family.

Local corruption could be a gesture of compassion, as sympathetic officials might warn pregnant women to hide from central government investigators.

Today, the secondary results of the one-child policy, and China’s alleged son preference, are notorious. China has one of the world’s most unbalanced sex ratios, and it faces the specter of a generation of bachelors who will likely be unable to find wives—something Chinese officials worry will lead to future social instability. The rural region where Johnson performed her fieldwork, moreover, has some of the most skewed sex ratios in China. Following the accepted narrative about China, its citizens might be expected to worship sons and disdain daughters. But even there Johnson found numerous stories of families going to great lengths to have, and keep, their girls.

In one crushing account, a couple named Jiang and Xu had an over-quota second child in 2003: the daughter they’d been wanting for years. It was a time of harsh family planning enforcement in their area, when married women were required to have four annual pregnancy tests to ensure they didn’t become pregnant outside of family planning guidelines. If they did, local policy mandated abortion and sterilization. Local family planning officials operated under the threat of docked salaries for over-quota births and offered rewards to anonymous tipsters who informed on their neighbors.

When Jiang became pregnant, she hid it by eating little to avoid showing, using a non-pregnant friend’s urine at her mandatory pregnancy tests, and spending the last months of her pregnancy hidden at her mother’s home in another town. Jiang succeeded in giving birth, but when her daughter was nine months old, a group of seven men surrounded the house, forced their way inside and seized the child. The couple ended up in a standoff with the officials, pleading to pay any level of fine imposed and refusing to let the men take the baby from their arms. Ultimately, the officials prevailed. Years later, the couple would learn their daughter had been adopted internationally—a discovery that gave them some comfort, since they hadn’t been told anything about where she’d been taken, but which reopened old wounds and still left them with no contact beyond a few early letters from the adoptive parents.

As for the daughter, Johnson writes:

She will grow up outside China perhaps believing, according to the dominant discourse on Chinese adoption, that she was abandoned by Chinese parents who did not want her because she was a girl, even though, on the contrary, they struggled to keep her and gave her a name that means “victory” and “surpassing a gentleman,” the daughter of a strong woman who risked everything to give her life, and then lost everything in the gambit.
Birth families weren’t the only ones who suffered. Local adoptive families also lived under constant threat. In the 1980s, when the one-child policy was new, Johnson writes, rural families subverted family planning enforcement by turning to traditional practices of domestic adoption. Sometimes families agreed to take the unauthorized child of a relative or neighbor; other times, babies were left at the front door of unrelated families who were known not to have daughters, and who were thereby assumed to need one—itself a contradiction of the Western narrative. Far from dumping the infants on the streets, Johnson heard repeatedly from birth families that they had left children outside carefully selected homes, then set off firecrackers to make sure someone would come outside and find the baby—this subterfuge necessary so that the adopting family would not know who the birth family was, and therefore be unable to identify them to government investigators.

Many such families kept the relinquished daughters, but found they were not able to get the child a hukou—the official government registration record that enables children to be immunized, attend school, get a job as an adult, or inherit family land. Adoptive families who were discovered by officials could be fined or punished, as birth families were, and could even have their “illegal child” removed by the government to a state orphanage, from which, paradoxically, the child would be made available for adoption, whether domestic or international. Johnson and her colleagues traced more than a dozen children adopted to the U.S. who had first been taken from their Chinese adoptive parents.

Johnson writes of some bold parents who fought back in the face of government efforts to seize their adopted children. One family who’d invested in multiple surgeries to correct their adopted son’s cleft palate carried around a marked-up copy of the national adoption law—which made an exception for over-quota children with medical needs—and their son’s medical records to challenge any government officials who argued their adoption was illegal. Another single man, who’d adopted a daughter with his mother only to have the government take her away, later adopted again, and threatened local family planning officials that if they took another child from him, he’d kill them. (“I am a bachelor; without my daughter, I will have no family and nothing to lose,” he recounted to Johnson. “They know what I say is true and won’t dare come again.”)

The Western media’s exaggerated claims about China’s preference for sons gave cover to the systemic violation of human rights.
What this indicated to Johnson is that, were it not for official government suppression of Chinese adoption traditions, “nearly all relinquished healthy daughters in the 1990s could have found families who wanted them in China, leaving few healthy children available for international adoption.”

That’s a significant finding. International adoption in the U.S. began to boom in the mid-1990s to mid-2000s in large part because of the adoptions from China, which at their heyday in 2005 included 8,000 Chinese children coming to the U.S. in one year (part of the 120,000 Chinese children adopted abroad in total, including more than 85,000 to the U.S., since 1991). The availability of thousands of healthy Chinese infants for international adoption had a transformative effect on the entire international adoption field, and compared to large-scale “sending countries” like Guatemala, China stood out as a source of reliably “good adoptions”: unmarred by the stories of bribery or coercion that were beginning to emerge from other countries. But just because China’s adoption scenario didn’t resemble the more obvious market forces at play in other nations, Johnson demonstrates, doesn’t mean that its adoptions were clean.
Compared to much writing about adoption, which plumbs the motivations of parents who relinquish or adopt, or the local-level corruption of individual agencies or middlemen, Johnson’s focus is larger: on the government of a huge country and how its social engineering efforts created a widespread crisis for hundreds of thousands of children and their families. As Johnson writes, that’s a crime for which the central government of China has never been held fully accountable. The Western media’s exaggerated claims about China’s preference for sons gave cover to the more systemic violation of human rights embedded in government policy.

As the number of Chinese infants available for either international or domestic adoption began to decline in the later 2000s, a new media narrative took over: that of local Chinese officials stealing children to sell into international adoption. But this new “child stealing” narrative seemed to excuse the central government again, focusing on paltry sums of money that might change hands between parents and government officials, but ignoring the much more substantial financial incentives that motivated local family planning staff. Their government jobs and salaries depended upon how closely they enforced the birth quotas. It’s a splinter versus a log.

This October, China’s government announced the end of the one-child policy. Going forward, all married couples will be permitted to have two children. International adoption from China has already shifted significantly in recent years, as a growing middle class increased domestic demand for adoption in the country and most international adoptions are now for children with special needs. But there’s still a reckoning to come regarding what happened in the three-and-a-half decades of the one-child policy: We need to think more about how the West bought into a narrative that denigrated so many Chinese families and to ask why the government escaped the full measure of blame.
 
View attachment 1128698
Can't wait to see their roller coasters
Hot dog! Look at all of that aluminum and rainwater and all those power tools and wires laying around. Makes me feel all tingly.

Really though, this picture has to be staged. Every worker has a hard hat on. I don't believe that this is a real Chinese work site.

This fucking guy.png
And then there's this fucking guy who doesn't give two single Communist fucks. He's wearing galoshes whist standing on wet metal. This is a man that has stared Death in the eye and Death moved on to the next guy.
 
I wonder if they are specifically designed so that they can simply spray clean a room with a hosepipe once one person/group locked inside die and are hauled off to the crematorium and then shove the next load in
Come on, we're talking about the Chinese, they are much more efficient than that.
They exchanged the insulation with thermite and once the coughing stops inside the cells, they'll just turn the whole area into one giant lake of molten iron.
"Corona Hospital? What Corona Hospital? Oh no, that giant pig-iron filled crater was always there - no hopsital to speak of... can't you remember this, do you need some time in the special camp where you can learn these facts? No? That's a good boy."

I find it interesting that when the chinks build a hospital out of what are effectively containerized building site offices, people are pretending to be surprised that those offices have bars on the windows by default.
Prefab Container Buildings like that exist without bars on the windows too. Don't pretend it's a fucking coincidence that every. single. one. has barred windows. On both the inside and the outside. If they were just using what was around, why don't we see variety (ie: some with and some without bars)?
Or is it a China-thing to have these containers around by the dozens with every single one of them havig barred windows on all sides?

It fucking reeks of being a deliberate choice to use those containers and those containers only.

Believe it or not, I don't mind the bars on the windows. With people deciding "I"m the plucky hero!" and trying to escape quarantine, those bars make sense from a strictly direct point of view.

What bothers me is the fact they're using standard drywall with no moisture barrier, the windows are crooked, and the ventilation system is janked.

Those may not have intended to be what they're going to be, but it's gonna get ugly anyway.

China may be hearing Kyle Reese's voice before anyone else: "The incinerators ran day and night. We were this close to going out."
Going by the reaction of some Africans during the Ebola outbreak, I wouldn't say putting bars on the windows is bad in and of itself, but overall it does look rally weird. Like it's a detention for infected rather than a hospital.

Here's the thing, a few pages ago, someone said they'd repurpose an empty building into being a hospital, doesn't that imply that they will use its existing infrastructure (ie: sewage)?

Just imagine a shoddily set up Hospital that is only a publicity stunt to go "CHINA STRONK! BUILD MUCH HOSPITAL IN SHORT TIME!" ending up dumping their contaminated sewage untreated out into the open, big, wide world.
 
There's a video floating around the net of a guy who can't open his door, since it has been welded shut by an iron bar... and there's already memes about that.
27ca568ff2240562.png

Honestly though, any decent toolbox should have all you'll ever need to get yourself out of this predicament one way or another. Who doesn't have a toolbox at their place?
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back