Culture China’s Combative Nationalists See a World Turning Their Way

In one Beijing artist’s recent depiction of the world in 2098, China is a high-tech superpower and the United States is humbled. Americans have embraced communism and Manhattan, draped with the hammer-and-sickle flags of the “People’s Union of America,” has become a quaint tourist precinct.

This triumphant vision has resonated among Chinese.

The sci-fi digital illustrations by the artist, Fan Wennan, caught fire on Chinese social media in recent months, reflecting a resurgent nationalism. China’s authoritarian system, proponents say, is not just different from the West’s democracies, it is also proving itself superior. It is a long-running theme, but China’s success against the pandemic has given it a sharp boost.

“America isn’t that heavenly kingdom depicted since decades ago,” said Mr. Fan, who is in his early twenties. “There’s nothing special about it. If you have to say there’s anything special about it now, it’s how messed up it can be at times.”

China’s Communist Party, under its leader, Xi Jinping, has promoted the idea that the country is on a trajectory to power past Western rivals.

China stamped out the coronavirus, the messaging goes, with a resolve beyond the reach of flailing Western democracies. Beijing has rolled out homegrown vaccines to more than a million people, despite the safety concerns of scientists. China’s economy has revived, defying fears of a deep slump from the pandemic.

“In this fight against the pandemic, there will be victorious powers and defeated ones,” Wang Xiangsui, a retired Chinese senior colonel who teaches at a university in Beijing, averred this month. “We’re a victor power, while the United States is still mired and, I think, may well become a defeated power.”

The firm leadership of Mr. Xi and the party has earned China its recent success, say newspapers, television programs and social media.

“Time to wake up from blind faith in the Western system,” said a commentary in the state-run China Education News last week. “Vicious partisan fighting has worsened in certain Western countries, social fissures have deepened, and a severe social crisis is brewing.”

The theme of China as triumphantly vindicated against critics also has real public appeal these days, including among the youth, as reflected in a stream of online commentary and the work of artists like Mr. Fan, who has described his style as “People’s Punk.” In Mr. Fan’s depiction of communist Manhattan, displayed on the ArtStation website, a caption describes a tour guide as saying that Asia and Europe are where the future is.

“To take in the changes of history and feel the afterglow of the imperialist era,” the guide says, “head to North America.”

China’s current swaggering mood could add to the challenges facing Joseph R. Biden Jr. when he takes office as president. President Trump’s defeat in the election has done little to ease Chinese suspicion of the United States, said Liu Jianqiu, a businessman and online commentator, in a telephone interview.

“I think China has gained the psychological edge,” said Mr. Liu, in his 40s, who described the pandemic as a turning point in his attitudes. “The performance of the West was completely out of my expectations and shifted my thinking even more — the facts prove that the American system really has no superiority.”

Combative national pride surged in China in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008, and after the United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Now there is a sharper sense that the Western powers are in perhaps irreversible decline, and that the pandemic has confirmed China’s ascent.

“Most ordinary Chinese people previously were more admiring of the United States, but in recent years, the advantages of the Chinese system have become clearer to them,” said Jin Canrong, an international relations professor at Renmin University in Beijing who has become a popular commentator under the nickname “Commissar Jin.” “There’s greater self-confidence.”

China’s diplomats and its state-run media have responded to criticism from Western governments with scornful disdain. Chinese supporters of a more muscular foreign policy call for hitting back against Western critics, especially in the wake of the pandemic.

Le Yucheng, a Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs, said in a speech last week that China was not spoiling for fights, but he also warned other governments not to underestimate its resolve to push back against criticism.

“Faced with this suppression and containment without scruples,” Mr. Le said, “we’ll never swallow our pride or stoop to compromise.”

Critics worry that hubris could lead China to overestimate its strengths and misjudge how far it can push the United States and other Western countries.

“These ideas aren’t sealed off in the halls of Zhongnanhai,” the Communist Party leaders’ headquarters in Beijing, said Julian Gewirtz, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who has written about Chinese perceptions of American decline.

“Their triumphalism is shaping both popular nationalism and official diplomacy,” he wrote in an email. “It is fueling ever-sharper demands for deference to China’s wishes.”

Online, Chinese commentators have plumbed the depths of history to capture the current moment. Some likened the United States to the crumbling British Empire of the last century, overstretched and exhausted.

Others are reaching back further, comparing America to China’s own Ming dynasty, which crumbled in the 1600s under the weight of corruption, insurrections and invasions. In this view that spread online this year, China should take the role of the “barbarian” Manchu armies who — in the commentators’ vivid, not-always-accurate retelling — swept over the Asian steppes, breached the Great Wall, and crushed the Ming rulers.

Modern-day China must act like the Manchu forces, advocates of the analogy say, and prepare to “break through” a ring of geopolitical hostility by dominating vital seas around China.

Geremie R. Barmé, a Sinologist in New Zealand who has followed the rise of “break-through studies” — rùguānxué in Chinese — says the historical comparisons reflect anxiety “about China’s great nation status and its place in the world.”

“The underpinning is that China is morally superior — we the Chinese people under the Communist Party — because we have none of the failings of America,” he said.

China’s leader, Mr. Xi, has not commented on the recent pronouncements of American decline. But he sees China and the United States as locked in ideological rivalry. Since coming to power in 2012, he has called for Chinese schools, textbooks and websites to inoculate youth against Western values that could erode party rule and the country’s “cultural self-confidence.”

“Our schooling must never nurture wreckers or gravediggers of socialism,” Mr. Xi said in a speech in 2018 that was recently published in a book of his comments on ideology.

Some warn that China risks underestimating the strengths of the United States. In recent months, Chinese scholars have debated how Beijing should handle the post-Covid world, with a good number urging restraint as the best way to win lasting influence.

“China’s high-volume nationalism at home is making the United States feel that China is getting aggressive,” Xiao Gongqin, a historian in Shanghai wrote in an essay that was published last month, prompting wide discussion.

The United States is far from the only country feeling the lash of official and public anger from China. Australia has drawn China’s ire for criticizing Beijing, initiating laws aimed at reducing Chinese government influence-building efforts in Australia, and urging an investigation into the origin of the pandemic — a touchy subject in Beijing.

Last month, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman tweeted a Chinese artist’s fabricated image of an Australian soldier poised to slit the throat of an Afghan child. Australia’s prime minister, Scott Morrison, demanded an apology from China over the image, which was a reference to an inquiry by the Australian military that found that its troops had unlawfully killed more than three dozen Afghan civilians.

The Chinese foreign ministry scoffed at Mr. Morrison’s demand, and the artist who created the image, Fu Yu, created another one mocking the Australian leader. Mr. Fu, who works under the name Wuhe Qilin, had made a reputation with his scathing images of the United States as a blood-soaked, irrational medieval realm.

“Chinese values and American values are totally at odds,” Mr. Fu said late last month on a Chinese online talk show broadcast last week. “These values are in fundamental conflict.”

Amber Wang contributed research.

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That's.... not a bad thing; They're starting to make tentative video games, for example, that are about some of their mythology which could blow up in the next few years. There is a giant untapped market there.

On the flipside, your examples for the west have all completely stagnated. Oh boy, I can't wait for the 10th version of the same media because creativity has died and no one can make any new IP on the same level of Halo.
It certainly would be, but CCP would make anything remotely popular riddled with pro-CCP propaganda. Not to mention make a video game that actually has a story and isn't just a free-to-play whale harvester. The difference is that the West can access a body of stories that stretches back millennia too, but most of it has been preserved. Gilgamesh, Greek tragedies, the Bible, medieval stories, Canterbury Tales, Shakespeare, Don Quixote, Dickens, Twain, Wells, Lovecraft, Tolkien.

Off the top of my head, China has Journey to the West and the Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Who knows what was lost during the Cultural Revolution?
 
It certainly would be, but CCP would make anything remotely popular riddled with pro-CCP propaganda. Not to mention make a video game that actually has a story and isn't just a free-to-play whale harvester. The difference is that the West can access a body of stories that stretches back millennia too, but most of it has been preserved. Gilgamesh, Greek tragedies, the Bible, medieval stories, Canterbury Tales, Shakespeare, Don Quixote, Dickens, Twain, Wells, Lovecraft, Tolkien.

Off the top of my head, China has Journey to the West and the Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Who knows what was lost during the Cultural Revolution?
Nothing worth keeping.
 
So China has politisperg autists all over the place and they're in charge too just like the West

Bodes well for them
 
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It certainly would be, but CCP would make anything remotely popular riddled with pro-CCP propaganda. Not to mention make a video game that actually has a story and isn't just a free-to-play whale harvester. The difference is that the West can access a body of stories that stretches back millennia too, but most of it has been preserved. Gilgamesh, Greek tragedies, the Bible, medieval stories, Canterbury Tales, Shakespeare, Don Quixote, Dickens, Twain, Wells, Lovecraft, Tolkien.

Off the top of my head, China has Journey to the West and the Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Who knows what was lost during the Cultural Revolution?
A million billion Mulan remakes, anti Japanese propaganda movies set in the 30s, and the entire genre of historical dramas. Last year, they made The Wandering Earth. A cultural wasteland, Chinese culture is not despite the Cultural Revolution.
 
China lacks one very crucial thing to even begin to claim global dominance: culture
You are telling the truth. To be honest, the cultural censorship in modern China is a very important reason for this situation. Most of the people in the relevant departments are a group of old and stubborn people decades ago. They believe that foreigners will be interested in Confucius Institute, Peking Opera, facial makeup and other things, and even domestic people often laugh at this。

In my opinion, this kind of thing is totally boring imagination. In addition, some Chinese experts mentioned in the article will not even believe their own words。
There are still many problems and contradictions in China. The birth rate of the population is a great threat. I hope that our generation will have pension in the future, and that the financial bubble will eventually burst, and some local governments will not be able to afford their debts. I even believe that many of the Chinese who believe in these plans want a better future because of the pressure of reality. In reality, the extremely high work intensity, housing prices and more and more serious competition are the challenges we must face in the future。

However, the whole world today is in a mess. When I saw the news about covid for the first time in China on December 31, 2019, no one cared about it, and no one knew that this year would be like this. So no one can predict the future. Anyway, I hope tomorrow won't be too bad。

About OP, your portrait and introduction are very interesting. Chiang Kai Shek is indeed a very famous figure. Although I don't know what kind of mentality you use him as your portrait, I want to mention that Chiang Kai Shek's evaluation in China and Taiwan is somewhat poor. Even for those who hate the CCP, Chiang Kai Shek is a bad ruler, even a dictator. His decision led to the fall of Northeast China during World War II, the Yellow River flood in 1938 and the famine in Henan Province. Many of the cities he managed fell into serious inflation. In addition, his military talent was really poor, which also led to the Kuomintang troops having to retreat to Taiwan. The KMT and the white dictatorship also created terror in Taiwan。

I don't know if you understand Taiwan's politics. I know a little bit about it. Today's political parties in Taiwan are the Democratic Progressive Party and the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang is more disgusted and disgusted by people than the Democratic Progressive Party. It's not only because of its history, but also because its policies make Taiwanese dissatisfied。

I just want to talk about my comments on Chiang Kai Shek as a Chinese. If you like him better or are not interested in him, you can ignore this. Thank you。
 
I mean, they have their guy getting sworn in January, why wouldn't they feel like everything is going their way?
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That's.... not a bad thing; They're starting to make tentative video games, for example, that are about some of their mythology which could blow up in the next few years. There is a giant untapped market there.

On the flipside, your examples for the west have all completely stagnated. Oh boy, I can't wait for the 10th version of the same media because creativity has died and no one can make any new IP on the same level of Halo.
Yeah, but the majority of their work tends to also be often derivative as a result of both cutthroat capitalism and authoritarian CCP controls on cultural depictions, which often tends to produce very safe works. In fact, I'd say that the Western products are declining because of similar moves towards total capitalization like the Chinese models, which are slighly ahead of the curve in regards to the West.

I.e. the Chinese mobile game market, which sees one or two advances once in a while, and then a total flood of copycats (i.e. that same Empire-building mobile game)- I believe that F2P mobile games were one of the things perfected in the Chinese markets.

Sure, China is rapidly closing the gap in terms of quality (in fact, a lot of work is farmed out to Chinese studios), but I still believe that if there's a Chinese hit that transcends the Mainland-International boundary in the next while, I'd still expect it to be a perfection of an existing model (i.e. Breath of the Wild > Genshin Impact, Kantai Collection > Azur Lane, Pixar > Over the Moon), rather than anything truly revolutionary.

If we had let the rest of the world carve China up like a Thanksgiving turkey, at least we would have been spared CCP bloviation and grandstanding, plus zero risk of being sidelined by a bunch of overly aggro and overly ambitious slants.
On a tangent, it's an odd trend where relatively powerful countries which have 'lost' international standing/territory but remain mostly intact (Russia, China, Turkey) tend to have the most obnoxious ultra-nationalist narratives around, which tend to project both aggression and victimization at the same time.

It must be that these countries retain the ability to project power, which then demands a just cause- which is conveniently filled by these aggregated national 'tragedies'.

Lots of ways China can implode within sight of the finish line:
  • Three Gorges finally falls apart
  • PLAN gets a bit too fresh with USN and finally gets slapped
  • Supercharged economy finally runs out of gas
  • India pulls off an upset victory after PLA gets too frisky
  • Internal party strife spills over and China falls apart from within
  • China's demographic timebomb finally detonates
Just throwing some shit out there.
IMO that's overly optimistic about the odds of implosion vs stumbling, but these factors will likely play some role in a stumble (which might not even become apparent until years later).
  • Supercharged economy finally runs out of gas- the CCP stumbles in its attempt to to close the IP gap and transition China into the third tier of economy driven by innovation and domestic consumption before China's demographics become unfavorable. This will depend on International reactions/resistance towards IP theft and trade.
  • PLAN gets slapped- unlikely, but really depends on where they try to prod (i.e. SCS vs Taiwan)- but I don't expect fighting between the PLAN and the USN- likely PLAN vs the respective national navies + USN support. I also don't think it'll be crippling in case of a loss, but will generate party unrest and potential economic issues (boycotts/sanctions, stronger regional anti-China alliances).
  • Surprise Indian victory in the Himalayas- I don't expect any sort of major conflict, but if the Indians can rebuff the Chinese in any conflict, I expect party strife.
  • Divisions within the CCP (i.e. Xi vs the Guangdong elites)- I don't expect any open conflict, but I do expect palace intrigue if Xi cannot deliver.
  • The demographic timebomb only explodes if the CCP fails to deliver on its economic transformation.
Fundamentally, the economic/international outlook was favorable towards China keeping world sleeping and closing the IP gap from 1990-2016- while these issues above would have been imminent issues if Trump returned in 2020, if Biden gets in in January, I strongly believe Xi will have at least 2-4 years to address these issues with far less pressure from the US.
 
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Some more things...

China buys a LOT of food, meat and grain, from the USA. Gotta keep their people fed with the higher-quality diet they now expect.

China also puts a ton of resources into suppressing dissent, of any kind. There are real-time censors for the various Chinese social media, watching for anything that may embarrass the government.

Some say China holds a lot of US Government debt and they could hurt us if they sold it all. Right...US Government debt is in great demand because, among other things, the USA has never missed an interest payment. Those that hold US Government debt tend to keep it a long time, collecting the interest. That debt would find plenty of willing buyers.

So they have 100 new missile silos? Am sure they're already targeted by our ICBM forces, USAF and USN.

Those sharp-looking PLA troops, PLA Navy ships, PLAAF fighters? NO real combat experience since Vietnam, in 1979. Very little power-projection capability. We can send combat-experienced troops and air units just about anywhere, fairly quickly, and our carrier groups have a great deal of operational experience. Think the PLA can take Taiwan? LMAO They have NO experience in getting an invasion fleet across a contested strait, much less landing against prepared defenses. Ever hear of Dieppe, in WWII? Large-scale 1942 Allied raid against French coast. A debacle. But we learned, and made Overlord happen less than two years later. China won't get a second chance once they get their dicks knocked in the dirt trying to invade Taiwan.

Just saying...

China’s Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere
The current Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere is as dangerous—but also as vulnerable—as its failed Japanese predecessor.

By: Victor Davis Hanson
July 25, 2021
(emphasis added)

☆ Stonewalling investigations into the origins of COVID-19 in Wuhan?

☆ A hundred new hardened intercontinental nuclear missiles silos?


☆ Dressing down U.S. diplomats on purported American racism?

☆ Braggadocio about nuking non-nuclear and once-nuked Japan, if need be?

☆ Winks and nods that Taiwan will soon be Hong-Kongized?

☆ Hacking into Western institutions?

☆ No apologies for lying about the origins, nature, and transmissibility of the gain-of-function, virology-lab-engineered Wuhan SARS-CoV-2 virus? Or rather, an attitude of maybe/maybe not the virus leaked from a military-related lab, “So what are you going to do about it—this time or next”?

Recently China has sought to ramp up its now accustomed bullying and intimidation of the Western world, still reeling from a Chinese-born coronavirus.

Yet its new global badgering is as much predicated on its potential as it is on its actual power, at least in classical terms of a global hegemon. Even in our postmodern electronic age, the real stuff of an ascendant civilization remains constitutional stability, fuel, food, economic strength, defense, strategic security, and education. In all those areas, is China really on course to overtake us?

Beneath the Veneer of Strength​
A good indicator of the demographic advantage of large nations is not absolute numbers (otherwise India and China would have been sharing world power decades ago) but median age. Even in our increasing era of shrinking Western families, by 2050 the median age in America will be 44 years, but 56 in China. Indeed, China may already have 150 million residents over 65, nearly half the current population of the United States—at the very time the Chinese family is becoming Westernized, and the elderly increasingly dependent on the state.

There are currently more smokers in China than there are people in the United States. And Beijing is on a collision course with all sorts of costly expenditures for a population that might be characterized as excessively elderly and unhealthy, and yet never more expectant of quality state health and long-term care.

China’s population density is almost five times greater than that of the United States, in a country in which the effects on its cramped population from natural and man-made disasters—floods, draughts, earthquakes, unclean air, industrial waste, and polluted water—resemble more an early 20th-century than a 21st-century nation.

We talk of the Chinese economic juggernaut. And indeed it may one day soon overwhelm us. But currently nearly 1.5 billion Chinese produce only 60-65 percent of the goods and services of 330 million Americans. In terms of fuel, the U.S. economy produces three times as much oil and five times as much natural gas for a population a little more than a fifth of China’s. More importantly, in terms of social stability, Americans enjoy a per capita income four times greater than their Chinese counterparts.

Our Pentagon suffers from a huge overhead in clumsy and wasteful procurements, unsustainable retirement pensions and benefits, and often poor weapon investment choices. Too many of its top brass and retired officer corps have become politicized. Many of our four-stars seem more attuned to leveraging politically correct promotions and post-retirement corporate board memberships than focusing on military readiness and deterrence.

But, that said, America still spends three times as much per year on defense as the Chinese. In a strategic sense, we should be worried that China is building 100 new hardened silos for nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles pointed at America. Yet currently, the United States has about 20 times the number of deliverable nuclear weapons as China.

In terms of the strategic nuclear club, China’s only ally is mercurial North Korea. In contrast, nuclear France, India, and the UK are staunch American allies, while Russia and Pakistan—distant from us, but bordering China—remain unpredictable and opportunistic neutrals.

The United States has no serious nearby strategic rival, in terms of either conventional or nuclear capability. Yet a glance at a map of China reveals the world’s most unstable neighborhood. It shares borders with hostile and nuclear India, Islamic and nuclear Pakistan, and often unfriendly and nuclear Russia—in addition to unstable countries like Afghanistan and its client North Korea, and mostly hostile Vietnam, along with nearby island nations like the rearming Japan and the Philippines. In terms of international crises, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in theory (and if necessary) could become nuclear powers in less than a year.

Some 380,000 Chinese students enroll in American universities, a group ten times larger than their American counterparts currently studying in China. And why not? In various higher-education surveys of the top 20 universities in the world, American campuses rank preeminent—usually with 15-18 universities—such as Caltech, MIT, Stanford, Harvard, and Yale, along with the huge public multi-campus universities such as the University of California, Michigan, and Texas systems. No Chinese universities are ranked in the top 20.

Americans do not enroll in China’s colleges for superior math and science instruction. The United States has a sick and ailing higher education system—but even with all its maladies—its math and sciences programs and professional schools in medicine and business remain vastly superior to China’s, even if heavily reliant on foreign students and resident aliens. If 1-2 percent of Chinese students enrolled in U.S. universities are de facto agents of the Chinese Communist Party, that percentage is probably matched by those who either wish to defect and never return home, or will return to China mesmerized by the U.S. system and become dissidents.

America is said to be unpopular abroad, but that is a relative term in relation to China. America’s immediate neighbors, Mexico, Canada, and most of Latin and South America are either allies, friendly, neutrals or, if hostile, weak. During the recent COVID-19 crisis, America was transparent about both its successes and setbacks. Its Operation Warp Speed vaccination program ensured the world the most rapidly developed, accessible, safe, and effective inoculations in the world. In dire contrast, secretive Chinese vaccinations were mostly ineffective and sometimes dangerous. No one still has any idea how many Chinese really died from the virus.

The Muslim world seethes at the incarceration of over one million Uighurs largely on the basis of their Muslim faith and ethnicity. The Western world is furious that China shut down all movement in and out of Wuhan, while allowing direct flights to European and American cities, on the apparent theory that Chinese must not be further exposed to the strange virus, but Europeans and Americans could—or should?—be. Africa is tiring of both insidious and overt Chinese racism, both in its major cities at home and among its corporate legionaries abroad.

There are many ways to adjudicate world rankings in food production: by sheer tonnage, by particular crops and staples, by export value, and by dollar worth. But, in all such rankings, the United States and China dominate world surveys—with the important caveat that America’s farms are feeding 330 million, China’s 1.5 billion. And the degree to which China has radically increased its agricultural output has been entirely dependent on its bought and acquired farming expertise from the United States and Europe.

Co-Prosperity Spheres​
China believes that unity, defined by harmonized language, race, and coerced allegiance, not diversity, is strength. Its authoritarian communist government suppresses any hint of unrest, unlike the American airing of the rioting, looting, arson, and protests seen in the United States in summer 2020 following the death of George Floyd.

There is nothing publicly comparable in China to flights of collective madness such as “Russian collusion,” or “Trump derangement syndrome,” or the woke epidemic or the January 6 Capitol assault.

But, all that said, China is considered by most to be a xenophobic and racist nation. Its colonizing and overseas emissaries are about as welcome as the Soviet operatives of the 1950s.

In contrast, as long as the U.S. Constitution is not tampered with, America enjoys the stability and resilience of the world’s oldest constitutional and consensual system.

Note well, all the above characterize a Belt-and-Road, hyper-driven China versus a sleeping giant and complacent United States. Indeed, it is uncanny how closely both countries resemble the relative global status of, and relationships between, Imperial Japan and America circa 1938-40.

Westernization? Japan, after the introduction of American and European visitors, in the latter 19th century rapidly industrialized and Westernized its economy and military, and eventually rejected a brief and failed experiment with constitutional government. It sent hundreds of thousands of students to Europe, and to a lesser extent the United States, to master nautical and aviation engineering, and army and naval organization, logistics, and procurement. The immediate dividend was its shocking defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and a world-class military following World War I.

By 1938 Japan had coerced and bullied its Asian neighbors with the canard that they shared anti-colonialist, anti-Western—and kindred Asian—values. By 1941, its navy was in number and quality superior to the American 7th fleet. In terms of fighter planes, carriers, torpedoes, and destroyers, one could argue that Japan enjoyed qualitative and quantitative superiority in the Pacific even earlier.

A prickly Japan nursed and exaggerated grievances—its supposedly unappreciated role in World War I, its meager scraps gleaned from the Versailles spoils, and the racism of Western powers. So too China talks nonstop about 19th-century Western racism, colonialism, and Japanese occupation in World War II, as it tries to construct an eternal victimhood that justifies its violation of world norms and impending retribution.

Overconfidence fueled Japanese hubris, while a supposedly depression-bound, isolationist, and inward-looking America was written off as decadent, flabby, and confused. By mid-1941 Japan essentially controlled half of China, Southeast Asia, and eyed the recently orphaned European Pacific colonies, British Malaysia and Burma, and the U.S.-controlled Philippines and Hawaii.

In the 1930s, returning visitors from Tokyo, in Tom Friedman-style, praised Japanese discipline, emphases on science, its collective efforts to create world-class infrastructure, and its affinity with fascist Germany and Italy as sort of paradigms of the future in contrast to the ailing and sloppy European and American democracies.

Then Nemesis followed from December 7, 1941. The United States, with essential help from Britain, while fighting primarily on a European front, in less than four years not merely defeated imperial Japan, and stripped it of its overseas possessions, but utterly destroyed it, occupied it, and force-fed it constitutional government, equality of the sexes, and land reform to ensure compatibility with its conquerors.

The lesson was that Japan was only superficially predominant in 1938-41 as a result of a breakneck single-minded effort to achieve parity with the West—preoccupied after World War I and spiritually exhausted. As now, the first Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was a thin veneer masking Japanese inherent weakness: constitutional weakness, fuel and food weakness, economic weakness, strategic and military weakness.

Feet of Clay​
China’s achievements and its stated intention to leverage them for regional and global dominance, like imperial Japan’s ascendence, should raise concern. But worry should not lead to western depression or resignation. In truth, in most categories of classical metrics of national strength, a much smaller United States is far superior to China—well apart from any consideration of Europe and its friends in Asia.

What we can learn from 1938-40 is to avoid matching China’s overblown rhetoric, while resting on past reputation and strength, much less to discount its insidiously emulative culture.

Instead, the way to avoid a Pearl Harbor-like event and the avoidable bloody years that followed is to speak quietly and carry a club, not loudly with a twig. Had the United States early on confidently, with resolve, and quietly apprised Japan of the obvious—American industrial, economic, military, and scientific strength, if maximized, could bury Japan—war might have been avoided.

Wars, after all, can be prevented by deterrence. But deterrence is complex and multifaceted. It is predicated on the reality that all parties to differences understand the relative strength of each. China, dangerously for itself and the world, has convinced itself that its newfound power is not just superior to others, but soon destined to ensure global mastery. It so far has interpreted American magnanimity as weakness to be exploited, rather than outreach to be reciprocated.

In truth, China is far weaker than the United States. It should be politely reminded of that fact, as the United States carefully recalibrates deterrence based on its superior military and economic strength, iron resolve, and confidence in its institutions. All that will require a return of financial solvency, a renewed national unity, and appreciation of American singularity, a commitment to stop pontificating to the world while reducing the clout of the U.S. military, and an end to the politicization of the U.S. officer corps.

The current Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere is as dangerous—but also as vulnerable—as its failed Japanese predecessor.
 
Some more things...

China buys a LOT of food, meat and grain, from the USA. Gotta keep their people fed with the higher-quality diet they now expect.

China also puts a ton of resources into suppressing dissent, of any kind. There are real-time censors for the various Chinese social media, watching for anything that may embarrass the government.

Some say China holds a lot of US Government debt and they could hurt us if they sold it all. Right...US Government debt is in great demand because, among other things, the USA has never missed an interest payment. Those that hold US Government debt tend to keep it a long time, collecting the interest. That debt would find plenty of willing buyers.

So they have 100 new missile silos? Am sure they're already targeted by our ICBM forces, USAF and USN.

Those sharp-looking PLA troops, PLA Navy ships, PLAAF fighters? NO real combat experience since Vietnam, in 1979. Very little power-projection capability. We can send combat-experienced troops and air units just about anywhere, fairly quickly, and our carrier groups have a great deal of operational experience. Think the PLA can take Taiwan? LMAO They have NO experience in getting an invasion fleet across a contested strait, much less landing against prepared defenses. Ever hear of Dieppe, in WWII? Large-scale 1942 Allied raid against French coast. A debacle. But we learned, and made Overlord happen less than two years later. China won't get a second chance once they get their dicks knocked in the dirt trying to invade Taiwan.

Just saying...

China’s Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere
The current Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere is as dangerous—but also as vulnerable—as its failed Japanese predecessor.

By: Victor Davis Hanson
July 25, 2021
(emphasis added)

☆ Stonewalling investigations into the origins of COVID-19 in Wuhan?

☆ A hundred new hardened intercontinental nuclear missiles silos?


☆ Dressing down U.S. diplomats on purported American racism?

☆ Braggadocio about nuking non-nuclear and once-nuked Japan, if need be?

☆ Winks and nods that Taiwan will soon be Hong-Kongized?

☆ Hacking into Western institutions?

☆ No apologies for lying about the origins, nature, and transmissibility of the gain-of-function, virology-lab-engineered Wuhan SARS-CoV-2 virus? Or rather, an attitude of maybe/maybe not the virus leaked from a military-related lab, “So what are you going to do about it—this time or next”?

Recently China has sought to ramp up its now accustomed bullying and intimidation of the Western world, still reeling from a Chinese-born coronavirus.

Yet its new global badgering is as much predicated on its potential as it is on its actual power, at least in classical terms of a global hegemon. Even in our postmodern electronic age, the real stuff of an ascendant civilization remains constitutional stability, fuel, food, economic strength, defense, strategic security, and education. In all those areas, is China really on course to overtake us?

Beneath the Veneer of Strength​
A good indicator of the demographic advantage of large nations is not absolute numbers (otherwise India and China would have been sharing world power decades ago) but median age. Even in our increasing era of shrinking Western families, by 2050 the median age in America will be 44 years, but 56 in China. Indeed, China may already have 150 million residents over 65, nearly half the current population of the United States—at the very time the Chinese family is becoming Westernized, and the elderly increasingly dependent on the state.

There are currently more smokers in China than there are people in the United States. And Beijing is on a collision course with all sorts of costly expenditures for a population that might be characterized as excessively elderly and unhealthy, and yet never more expectant of quality state health and long-term care.

China’s population density is almost five times greater than that of the United States, in a country in which the effects on its cramped population from natural and man-made disasters—floods, draughts, earthquakes, unclean air, industrial waste, and polluted water—resemble more an early 20th-century than a 21st-century nation.

We talk of the Chinese economic juggernaut. And indeed it may one day soon overwhelm us. But currently nearly 1.5 billion Chinese produce only 60-65 percent of the goods and services of 330 million Americans. In terms of fuel, the U.S. economy produces three times as much oil and five times as much natural gas for a population a little more than a fifth of China’s. More importantly, in terms of social stability, Americans enjoy a per capita income four times greater than their Chinese counterparts.

Our Pentagon suffers from a huge overhead in clumsy and wasteful procurements, unsustainable retirement pensions and benefits, and often poor weapon investment choices. Too many of its top brass and retired officer corps have become politicized. Many of our four-stars seem more attuned to leveraging politically correct promotions and post-retirement corporate board memberships than focusing on military readiness and deterrence.

But, that said, America still spends three times as much per year on defense as the Chinese. In a strategic sense, we should be worried that China is building 100 new hardened silos for nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles pointed at America. Yet currently, the United States has about 20 times the number of deliverable nuclear weapons as China.

In terms of the strategic nuclear club, China’s only ally is mercurial North Korea. In contrast, nuclear France, India, and the UK are staunch American allies, while Russia and Pakistan—distant from us, but bordering China—remain unpredictable and opportunistic neutrals.

The United States has no serious nearby strategic rival, in terms of either conventional or nuclear capability. Yet a glance at a map of China reveals the world’s most unstable neighborhood. It shares borders with hostile and nuclear India, Islamic and nuclear Pakistan, and often unfriendly and nuclear Russia—in addition to unstable countries like Afghanistan and its client North Korea, and mostly hostile Vietnam, along with nearby island nations like the rearming Japan and the Philippines. In terms of international crises, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in theory (and if necessary) could become nuclear powers in less than a year.

Some 380,000 Chinese students enroll in American universities, a group ten times larger than their American counterparts currently studying in China. And why not? In various higher-education surveys of the top 20 universities in the world, American campuses rank preeminent—usually with 15-18 universities—such as Caltech, MIT, Stanford, Harvard, and Yale, along with the huge public multi-campus universities such as the University of California, Michigan, and Texas systems. No Chinese universities are ranked in the top 20.

Americans do not enroll in China’s colleges for superior math and science instruction. The United States has a sick and ailing higher education system—but even with all its maladies—its math and sciences programs and professional schools in medicine and business remain vastly superior to China’s, even if heavily reliant on foreign students and resident aliens. If 1-2 percent of Chinese students enrolled in U.S. universities are de facto agents of the Chinese Communist Party, that percentage is probably matched by those who either wish to defect and never return home, or will return to China mesmerized by the U.S. system and become dissidents.

America is said to be unpopular abroad, but that is a relative term in relation to China. America’s immediate neighbors, Mexico, Canada, and most of Latin and South America are either allies, friendly, neutrals or, if hostile, weak. During the recent COVID-19 crisis, America was transparent about both its successes and setbacks. Its Operation Warp Speed vaccination program ensured the world the most rapidly developed, accessible, safe, and effective inoculations in the world. In dire contrast, secretive Chinese vaccinations were mostly ineffective and sometimes dangerous. No one still has any idea how many Chinese really died from the virus.

The Muslim world seethes at the incarceration of over one million Uighurs largely on the basis of their Muslim faith and ethnicity. The Western world is furious that China shut down all movement in and out of Wuhan, while allowing direct flights to European and American cities, on the apparent theory that Chinese must not be further exposed to the strange virus, but Europeans and Americans could—or should?—be. Africa is tiring of both insidious and overt Chinese racism, both in its major cities at home and among its corporate legionaries abroad.

There are many ways to adjudicate world rankings in food production: by sheer tonnage, by particular crops and staples, by export value, and by dollar worth. But, in all such rankings, the United States and China dominate world surveys—with the important caveat that America’s farms are feeding 330 million, China’s 1.5 billion. And the degree to which China has radically increased its agricultural output has been entirely dependent on its bought and acquired farming expertise from the United States and Europe.

Co-Prosperity Spheres​
China believes that unity, defined by harmonized language, race, and coerced allegiance, not diversity, is strength. Its authoritarian communist government suppresses any hint of unrest, unlike the American airing of the rioting, looting, arson, and protests seen in the United States in summer 2020 following the death of George Floyd.

There is nothing publicly comparable in China to flights of collective madness such as “Russian collusion,” or “Trump derangement syndrome,” or the woke epidemic or the January 6 Capitol assault.

But, all that said, China is considered by most to be a xenophobic and racist nation. Its colonizing and overseas emissaries are about as welcome as the Soviet operatives of the 1950s.

In contrast, as long as the U.S. Constitution is not tampered with, America enjoys the stability and resilience of the world’s oldest constitutional and consensual system.

Note well, all the above characterize a Belt-and-Road, hyper-driven China versus a sleeping giant and complacent United States. Indeed, it is uncanny how closely both countries resemble the relative global status of, and relationships between, Imperial Japan and America circa 1938-40.

Westernization? Japan, after the introduction of American and European visitors, in the latter 19th century rapidly industrialized and Westernized its economy and military, and eventually rejected a brief and failed experiment with constitutional government. It sent hundreds of thousands of students to Europe, and to a lesser extent the United States, to master nautical and aviation engineering, and army and naval organization, logistics, and procurement. The immediate dividend was its shocking defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and a world-class military following World War I.

By 1938 Japan had coerced and bullied its Asian neighbors with the canard that they shared anti-colonialist, anti-Western—and kindred Asian—values. By 1941, its navy was in number and quality superior to the American 7th fleet. In terms of fighter planes, carriers, torpedoes, and destroyers, one could argue that Japan enjoyed qualitative and quantitative superiority in the Pacific even earlier.

A prickly Japan nursed and exaggerated grievances—its supposedly unappreciated role in World War I, its meager scraps gleaned from the Versailles spoils, and the racism of Western powers. So too China talks nonstop about 19th-century Western racism, colonialism, and Japanese occupation in World War II, as it tries to construct an eternal victimhood that justifies its violation of world norms and impending retribution.

Overconfidence fueled Japanese hubris, while a supposedly depression-bound, isolationist, and inward-looking America was written off as decadent, flabby, and confused. By mid-1941 Japan essentially controlled half of China, Southeast Asia, and eyed the recently orphaned European Pacific colonies, British Malaysia and Burma, and the U.S.-controlled Philippines and Hawaii.

In the 1930s, returning visitors from Tokyo, in Tom Friedman-style, praised Japanese discipline, emphases on science, its collective efforts to create world-class infrastructure, and its affinity with fascist Germany and Italy as sort of paradigms of the future in contrast to the ailing and sloppy European and American democracies.

Then Nemesis followed from December 7, 1941. The United States, with essential help from Britain, while fighting primarily on a European front, in less than four years not merely defeated imperial Japan, and stripped it of its overseas possessions, but utterly destroyed it, occupied it, and force-fed it constitutional government, equality of the sexes, and land reform to ensure compatibility with its conquerors.

The lesson was that Japan was only superficially predominant in 1938-41 as a result of a breakneck single-minded effort to achieve parity with the West—preoccupied after World War I and spiritually exhausted. As now, the first Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was a thin veneer masking Japanese inherent weakness: constitutional weakness, fuel and food weakness, economic weakness, strategic and military weakness.

Feet of Clay​
China’s achievements and its stated intention to leverage them for regional and global dominance, like imperial Japan’s ascendence, should raise concern. But worry should not lead to western depression or resignation. In truth, in most categories of classical metrics of national strength, a much smaller United States is far superior to China—well apart from any consideration of Europe and its friends in Asia.

What we can learn from 1938-40 is to avoid matching China’s overblown rhetoric, while resting on past reputation and strength, much less to discount its insidiously emulative culture.

Instead, the way to avoid a Pearl Harbor-like event and the avoidable bloody years that followed is to speak quietly and carry a club, not loudly with a twig. Had the United States early on confidently, with resolve, and quietly apprised Japan of the obvious—American industrial, economic, military, and scientific strength, if maximized, could bury Japan—war might have been avoided.

Wars, after all, can be prevented by deterrence. But deterrence is complex and multifaceted. It is predicated on the reality that all parties to differences understand the relative strength of each. China, dangerously for itself and the world, has convinced itself that its newfound power is not just superior to others, but soon destined to ensure global mastery. It so far has interpreted American magnanimity as weakness to be exploited, rather than outreach to be reciprocated.

In truth, China is far weaker than the United States. It should be politely reminded of that fact, as the United States carefully recalibrates deterrence based on its superior military and economic strength, iron resolve, and confidence in its institutions. All that will require a return of financial solvency, a renewed national unity, and appreciation of American singularity, a commitment to stop pontificating to the world while reducing the clout of the U.S. military, and an end to the politicization of the U.S. officer corps.

The current Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere is as dangerous—but also as vulnerable—as its failed Japanese predecessor.
Jesus H. Christ, sonny. Thread's like, seven months old.
 
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