Resurrecting this thread, since the NTSB released their preliminary report and recommendations involving the accident, and I just want to vent a bit. It pretty much confirmed what we already know, that the blackhawk crew (PAT25) deviated above the altitude restriction of their planned helicopter route (Route 4) that already has a
very slim margin for error when there is traffic landing on Runway 33. Report is linked below if you want to read it for yourself, or just watch one of the hundred aviation youtube channels that have already summarized it.
Aviation Investigation Report AIR-25-01
Key Takeaways so far:
- FAA followed the recommendation to prohibit Route 4 operations between Hains Point (due East of DCA) and Wilson Bridge (~2 miles south of DCA) when Runway 15/33 is in use, barring exceptions like medivac or presidential transport
- Possible inaccurate readouts from PAT25's barometric altimeters (instrument that reads altitude above sea level), a big deal with the high potential of traffic conflict along that section of Route 4
- Investigation hasn't yet delved into other causal or contributing factors for the accident, so analysis into crew experience/performance history/toxicology/etc. from either aircraft or ATC manning issues weren't discussed
Also want to add some points of my own in response to pretty common questions/concerns that I've seen thrown around social media:
1) Why was PAT25 performing a military training flight at night in such busy airspace?
They were flying a periodic checkride for the Capt pilot with the CWO2 pilot acting as evaluator pilot. Military aircrew are required to be evaluated, typically annually, to ensure they are capable of performing their crew duties safely and effectively and execute the basic mission set of their aircraft without the need for excessive intervention. For example, a pilot eval might consist of doing various instrument procedures and landings with low-level navigation.
The overall idea of military flying training is to "train how you fly", and it makes sense to not expose pilots to brand-new procedures in an operational environment where failure is less of an option. In this case, the Capt pilot was likely being evaluated on her capability to navigate at night through the Washington DC airspace, which is the same airspace her unit is assigned to fly through every day for Continuity of Government Operations. You can't evaluate a pilot's ability to fly that specific mission set by flying around farm fields in Nebraska for the sole purpose of lowering risk of traffic conflict. Again, train how you fly.
2) Why were they flying with NVGs on such a clear night? Don't the NVGs restrict their vision to only 40° FOV?
Most military pilots are trained on using NVGs as visual aids when flying at night. If you live near an Air Force base and there are planes flying around at night, they are most likely flying under NVGs. When trained, a mil pilot can do all the same things they do during the day (takeoff/land, fly low-level, shoot weapons), but now at night when completely under NVGs. Also, flying at such low altitudes as 100-200' over water at night can create a really nasty visual "blackhole" effect, where it becomes really difficult to visually gauge your altitude. NVGs can really help mitigate night visual illusions, so it's almost universally preferred to fly with them, especially when doing low-level visual navigation.
Mil aviation has also pretty much standardized on the AN/AVS-6 or -9, which have incredibly high-fidelity and auto-gain systems that allow you to use them during the day if you really wanted to, so flying around even a dense city like DC under NVGs is non-issue. Do they have only 40° FOV through the lenses? Yes. Do they restrict your peripheral vision? No. The eyepieces don't cover your eyes, peripheral vision is almost completely unobstructed, and you can peek around the lenses to see instrument panels if needed. Can the lenses still get bloomed out by staring straight at a super-bright airplane landing light? Sure, but in this case it wasn't a factor due to PAT25's relative angle off the CRJ.
3) Whose fault was it?
For crashes like the 2015 Germanwings Bane impersonator, the answer is pretty obvious. For most other accidents like this, the answer is always more layered than simply blaming one person. In this case, the majority of the blame can be placed on the crew of PAT25, though ATC procedures played a contribution.
PAT25 had 3 crew: the CWO2 evaluator pilot, the Capt pilot, and a crew chief. The CWO2 was most likely the Pilot in Command (PIC) being the evaluator, meaning that the overall responsibility for the execution and safety of the flight lies with him, regardless of whether or not he's on the controls. Highest pilot qualification, not rank, is the primary method for determining PIC, though this can change depending on crew complement and mission. This is standard practice in all of aviation, military or civil.
We know the end result of the accident, that the helo deviated from an altitude restriction and flew through the glidepath of R33 at the worst possible time with the Capt at the controls. The CWO2 also didn't intervene in any way, likely because he also didn't notice the impending collision, but he also didn't correct the Capt for being off altitude. What led up to this pilot deviation is still under investigation by the NTSB, and I'm certain the Army Safety office is doing their own as well. Task saturation, external distraction, target fixation, or lack of intervention from the CWO2 pilot could all be named as causal factors.
Can we blame ATC for allowing this situation to happen in the first place? Maybe, but there was no procedure in place to stop Route 4 ops to give way for R33 traffic at the time. Also, ATC aren't the ones flying the aircraft. If a pilot states that they have positively acquired a traffic conflict and requests visual separation, ATC can't play the role of a lie-detector and verify on the pilot's behalf. The controller is supposed to trust that these trained and qualified pilots are capable enough see and avoid other aircraft, while also abiding by their altitude restriction. There was no way for the tower controller to see this collision happening until the fireball.
4) lol, woman pilot!
I'll just refer to what I previously wrote about the responsibility of PIC. Regardless of the experience-level or speculated proficiency of the Capt pilot, a blackhawk is a crew aircraft, and everyone on board is responsible for its safe operation with the buck ultimately stopping at the CWO2 evaluator, who happened to be male. For any number of reasons, both the Capt and CWO2 pilots nor the crew chief didn't recognize their impending doom. Pointing the chud's finger solely at women in aviation is just a distraction, flying hasn't become as safe as it is today due to investigators determining causes of plane crashes as "erm... fucking F*MOIDS amirite".
Just felt the need to post my thoughts somewhere, and Xitter is gay and retarded.