Stop trying to turn Null onto anime. There are only two good animes; one is Cowboy Bebop and the other is King of the Hill. The rest can be entirely discarded. Yes, this includes Akira, Ghost In The Shell, Fullmetal Alchemist: Brotherhood, all that nonsense.
Josh already has admitted he likes an anime—The Boondocks.
I recall reading awhile back -- I think even before Trump's first term -- about existing case law that limited the ability of the President's power to remove federal employees. The way I recall this being couched was that there was a concern that if Presidents could just fire everyone, there could be extreme vacillations where every 4 years, all the agency's staff would be fired and then replaced; placing certain staff as being 'immune' from Presidential changes was supposed to provide some stability. As I write this, it really comes across as an obvious argument supporting the administrative state, which I'm personally not a fan of, but I can see the concern. I can't recall what case they were referring to that supposedly established this precedent; it might be Humphrey's Executor v. United States, as I thought it was a Supreme Court case. Maybe someone more well read in federal matters can correct me.
There is some case law about this, just as there is some case law about impoundment. But a lot of the constitutional questions have never been adjudicated seriously because nobody has tried before, especially not in an environment overrun by uncontrolled administrative agencies. And the concern about vacillations is a policy concern, not a constitutional concern. Sometimes policy concerns get constitutionalized—Miranda rights, for example, are made up entirely to address a series of policy issues with policing. But just because something seems like good policy doesn't mean it's constitutionally mandated. And just because a policy is reified over many years of different administrations doesn't mean it's protected under the Constitution.
Humphrey's Executor is a weird case from the 30s that confirmed certain protections for certain congressionally created agencies. But what some people forget is that the case is ultimately about backpay, not about undoing the removal of an officer. I don't want to emphasize that too much, but we just have to remember that the relief being sought there was not "restore this guy to office" but "this guy was removed improperly which means his estate, because he's now dead, is entitled to his withheld salary." So when you have people today arguing that Humphrey's Executor means a person can't be removed by the president, it doesn't exactly mean that they have to be restored to office. And even then, the agency at issue was fairly unique in its structure. The case may not apply with the same force to the horde of novel agencies and positions that exist today.
It gets even more complex when you start linking up Humphrey's Executor with the recent case of Seila Law and the Unitary Executive Theory. I'm not a huge proponent of the popular idea of the unitary executive because I've read the Federalist Papers, and it's clear from them that the branches of government are melded together rather than being independent pillars. The different branches have some powers that theoretically should belong to other branches—the Senate confirms presidential appointees, the President vetoes congressional bills, the President can overturn a judicial conviction with pardons, etc. If a unitary executive were maximally true, then there could not be a melding of some parts of the executive with the legislature and judiciary, which the Framers by their own words intended. But at its core, the theory is that the executive power is vested in a president, not in an executive apparatus, according to the text of the Constitution. That is true and I don't know how you get around that. With the judiciary, you can get around it to some extent because Congress is given the power to create and control courts inferior to the Supreme Court, in which is explicitly vested "the judicial power." Maybe you can argue that the reference to "executive departments" in Article II of the Constitution implies some division of executive power, but I would hazard that a common law investigation of that clause and comparison with, e.g., Article III giving Congress power to create inferior courts, would militate against that conception.
We live in constitutionally exciting times. My main concern is the left returns to committing terrorism like it did in the 30s and 70s when they don't win politically and judicially. We get told the right is dangerous even though it's historically the left who bombed cities regularly when they couldn't get their way.
