Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 19 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. As an initial matter, and as Plaintiff concedes (Dkt. No. 28 at 4), Defendant Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., is the only properly named defendant in this action, because Plaintiff never sought and obtained leave from the court to add additional defendants. See Knight v. Metlife Inv'rs USA Ins. Co. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4952037, at *1 (D.N.H. Nov. 14, 2008). Accordingly, although this action is dismissed with prejudice as to Defendant Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., it is dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff's filing of a new action against the additional defendants Plaintiff sought to add in his amended complaint.On the merits, Plaintiff agrees to the dismissal of Counts 1 and 4, leaving only Count 2 (Defamation) and Count 3 (Civil Conspiracy). Plaintiff's defamation claim is based on Defendant's publication of the fact that it banned Plaintiff's username ("Abd") from editing or posting content on its websites. Defendant's published statement in this regard did not include the reason for this ban, in accordance with its Global Ban Policy, or any other information. (See Dkt. No. 28 at 10 ("Consistent with the Terms of Use, Abd has been banned by the Wikimedia Foundation from editing Wikimedia sites. Please address any questions to trustandsafety(at)wikimedia.org."); see also Dkt. No. 16 at 4 ("The Terms of Use ('TOU') provide that [Defendant] reserves 'the right to suspend or end the services at any time, with or without cause, and with or without notice.'").) Plaintiff admits that he was, in fact, banned, making Defendants statement true. (Dkt. No. 28 at 10.) Nevertheless, he asserts "the reasonable implications of the published ban... were clearly false," because "[t]he public will routinely consider a... ban as an indicator that a reputable organization has carefully investigated claims of harassment or other complaints and has concluded that a user is a serious risk." (Id. at 10-12.) The First Circuit (and this court) has rejected such an argument. See Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that, under Massachusetts law, "an objectively true statement can give rise to a libel claim if reasonable readers might infer from it other, untrue characteristics of the plaintiff or conduct by him"); see also Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 227 (D. Mass. 2017) (holding that statement announcing student was found by college to have violated sexual misconduct policy after full hearing was "objectively true," under Massachusetts defamation law, because the announcement "accurately stated what had occurred"). Defamation, of course, generally requires a false statement, although Defendant acknowledges a "narrow exception" under Massachusetts law whereby a true statement may support a defamation claim if made with "actual malice," in the sense of "ill will" or "malevolent intent." Noonan, 556 F.3d at 26, 29. Nevertheless, as Defendant argues, Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant acted with actual malice in publishing the statement is conclusory and he has not alleged sufficient facts from which the court can plausibly infer actual malice; instead, he relies on mere speculation, which is insufficient. See Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d at 27; see also Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2012).Lastly, as to the conspiracy claim, Plaintiff has not alleged facts from which the court can plausibly infer Defendant joined any underlying tort or knowingly provided substantial assistance or encouragement in the alleged scheme. See Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 15, 35 (1st Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Plaintiff's amended complaint is hereby dismissed and the Clerk is directed to close this case. (Lindsay, Maurice) (Entered: 06/05/2020)