Except the two rights can't be assessed independently from one another, because one is in direct conflict with the other.
If you put them in conflict with each other, then yes, you're correct. But I can view a case where "bodily autonomy" is in conflict with "the state needs more bodies to throw into the jungle to kill Charlie" and get a sense of what the state thinks about the former and the latter independently. Hypothetically, if the law actually precludes either principle, then there's no need for juxtaposition to begin with, either-- alternatively, you can view it as a juxtaposition between said principle and literally anything else.
The law ultimately has to take a side
Except that it doesn't have to, given
Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Or are you discussing "oughts", this time?
My point to you is that if a person cannot be legally compelled to use their body to support another against their will in the case of organ/blood donation or parabiosis, then it logically follows that a person should not be legally compelled to use their body to support a fetus against their will. Thus far, you have neither provided a sound refutation to this point, nor have you provided an argument to support the notion that a fetus possesses extra rights which could usurp the precedent I have outlined.
I've cited case law
literally involving the question of abortion and abortion restrictions, even as I maintain that a conflict between specifically "right to life" and "bodily autonomy" is ultimately unnecessary to assess the consistency in upholding either. These examples are much more relevant than case law about organ donation, especially since pregnancy isn't substantially similar to organ donation as a concept, is occasioned by different processes that confer different levels of accountability, and involves different kinds of agents. Also human parabiosis has never been done, and Judith Butler is a hack and a hag.
The purpose of pointing out that bodily autonomy is readily selectively violated in various circumstances, as "facile" as you may see such point, is to point out that there's no special value in appealing to a principle that can be arguably arbitrarily violated as it is in other cases-- whether or not the violation is to protect the bodily autonomy of others.
Merely citing glaring inconsistencies in the corpus of law
you chose to cite as a primary justification for your position is sufficient for my case. It may have not been sufficient to point out that a perp's bodily autonomy is violated when he commits a violent crime and is subsequently arrested for it, but it certainly is sufficient to point out that you can be conscripted with close to zero ways of fighting against it and you can be arrested for possessing and ingesting certain substances even though the only bodily autonomy at hand (immediately, at the least) is yours and there isn't any clear conflict of principles beyond "we need to kill Charlie" or "we don't like that drug".
Ultimately, that's part of a greater issue I take in you appealing to the law, and it drives at what I meant when I said that your argument was just (one of) Muh Vagina's writ large: precedents can be established that, more than trying to "balance" the two principles pitted in conflict with each other, explicitly enshrine either principle over the other. The Constitution can be altered in order to explicitly do the same.
There is no value making your case wholly from malleable and selectively enforcable law (and certainly not with someone who's been arguing morality).
Simply pointing out that certain rights are inconsistently upheld is a facile observation, and it's not a refutation of my argument, but a confirmation of it: my entire argument to you has been that restrictions upon abortion are inconsistent with the general precedent which has been established in cases where these two rights have come into conflict
You continue to misidentify what said precedents actually are. You keep citing a case involving organ donation when we already have cases on the specific question of abortion and its associated restrictions.
And which precedents would those be? Because so far you have cited none which don't apply specifically to abortion, which entirely defeats the point: if the contention of the person you're arguing against is that a particular law is unjust, you can't just cite that law to support your case.
At that point, you're only selectively choosing cases in support of your position, even when said verdicts don't overturn anything else that I've cited.
The purpose of these verdicts is to establish precedent; I don't need to cite examples that don't specifically apply to the question of bodily autonomy re: abortion and abortion restrictions if there's examples that directly address the question of those very matters. You cited a case about organ donation in a discussion about abortion-- this may have been valuable in a world where the SCOTUS never answered the question of whether abortion restrictions are constitutional, but they
did, however nonsensically. Given that, not only is there there's no value at all in trying to infer a conclusion from a case about organ donation (which is, again, a multifariously distinct concept from pregnancy), there's no way you can dismiss those verdicts when you're making a case from law to begin with.
You can argue that the law is unjust and needs to be revised, but then drop the appeal to law you started with, because it's inconsistent.
