Very few bombs actually hit the factories. That the strategic bombing campaign was ineffective genuinely isn’t controversial.
Did you read the entire text you linked? Early RAF bombing was indeed ineffective, and that point is uncontroversial. They managed to kill some civilians and burn some towns, but this had little effect on the war. "Morale bombing" is worthless unless you're going to use atomic weapons. However, once the Americans showed up with better bomb sights and a more effective strategy (a story that repeats itself over and over in WWII), that changed:
Germany lost 3-5% of its potential arms production in 1943 and 11% in 1944. These numbers are relatively low as production was often only briefly off set by raids, instead greater impact occured when aircraft industry had to be dispersed which cost them months of production time to recover. More concerning was american focus in 1944 on synthetic fuel plants which could not be relocated and resulted (in combination with the loss of Romanian oil fields to the Soviets) the grounding of much of the Luftwaffe in 1944. More important was the impact bombing had on forcing Germany to divert significant resources to defending its cities. At its peak in August 1944, over 39,000 anti-aircraft batteries were setup in Germany maned by over 1 million personnel. Max Hastings goes so far as to say that almost the entire German fighter force had to be diverted back to Germany from 1943 onwards to challenge the bombers. It is also worth mentioning that many of these anti-aircraft batteries were reliant on 88mm guns which also served as powerful anti-tank weaponry. The more that were kept away from the Eastern Front the better the situation for Soviet forces.
The gist of what you linked is that gross numbers don't tell the whole story. Specifically what was affected, and how, is critical. There are some good examples in the post, e.g. grounding the Luftwaffe and diverting Flak 88s back to Germany from the Eastern Front was hardly a big fat nothing. Importantly, this happened in 1943 - after Kursk, the USSR had air superiority on the Eastern Front, and American bombing played a role in that.
An example of why we need to look at specifics is the destruction of Alkett, which crippled Stug III production in 1943 (notice how often that year comes up as a turning point), which was one of the most important AT guns the Germans deployed against T-34s. The vehicle was so important that Panzer IV lines were converted over to StuG IV, but this was at the cost Panzer IV production. This is in turn important because the Panzer IV was the only tank Germany produced in high volumes at the time that could face off against a T-34. The Panzer V didn't hit volume production until 1944.
Which is another thing the raw numbers don't tell. Allied bombing reduced German arms production by 3%-5%, but the German target was 25%+
growth that year. But instead of building new factories so they could the desired 600 Panthers/month target by 1943, most of their resources went into rebuilding factories the Allies destroyed, and Panther production never hit this target. So while the USSR kept ramping T-34 production up, and up, and up, the Germans were fighting just to keep what they had going.
Although certainly strategic bombing fell greatly short of its original intent - many theorists before the war believed that bombing alone could win wars - there is anything but a universal consensus that it accomplished nothing. In fact, you will find plenty of military historians arguing that Germany's complete inability to put pressure on Soviet tank production due to not developing a long-range bomber until far too late played a nontrivial role in their defeat.
Anyway America doesn't make artillery munitions or anything in volume, so you guys are fine now.