Teshub
kiwifarms.net
- Joined
- Jan 15, 2022
Hicks v. Feiock USSC 1988:
(This part is about a state criminal contempt charge)
Thus, if the relief provided is a sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial if the defendant stands committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by the court's order, and is punitive if the sentence is limited to unconditional imprisonment for a definite period. If the relief provided is a fine, it is remedial when it is paid to the complainant, and punitive when it is paid to the court, though a fine that is payable to the court is also remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the act required by the court's order.
If applied in a civil proceeding, however, this particular statute would be constitutionally valid. There were strong indications that the proceeding was intended to be criminal in nature, such as the notice sent to respondent, which labeled the proceeding as "criminal in nature," and the District Attorney's participation in the case. However, if the trial court imposed only civil coercive remedies, it would be improper to invalidate that result merely because the Due Process Clause was not satisfied. The relief afforded -- respondent's jail sentence, its suspension, and his fixed term of probation -- would be criminal in nature if that were all. However, the trial court did not specify whether payment of the arrearages (which, if timely made, would be completed before expiration of the probation period) would have purged respondent's determinate sentence, thus making the relief civil in nature. Since the state appellate court, because of its erroneous views as to these controlling principles of federal law, did not pass on this issue, it must be determined by that court on remand for its further consideration of § 1209.5. Pp. 485 U. S. 637-641.
Hicks v. Feiock (https://archive.is/VxRgC)
Sounds like the person was charged with contempt in state court and overturned in the appellate court. You're in federal court now. Supreme court kicks it back to state court to find out if the fines were criminal or civil in nature. Cant find the later ruling.
Ward v Smith 8th 2013:
In civil cases, there is no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. Edgington v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 52 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir.1995). Rather, a court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). ..... We review the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel for an abuse of discretion, according the district court “a good deal of discretion to determine whether representation is warranted given the nature of the case and the litigants.” Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 909 (8th Cir.2011).
In most circuits, an order denying a motion for appointment of counsel in a § 1983 action is not immediately appealable, because there is no final decision of the district court.
The district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in denying Ward's motion.
The order of the district court is affirmed.
WARD v. SMITH (archive)
Stabby is pulling his right to appeal before answering from a ruling from the 8th circuit. A ruling which upheld the denied counsel.
Only thing I can find in the 9th on appointment of counsel is about employment discrimination and civil rights.
Neither of his citations help him. Truly an exceptional lawyer.
(This part is about a state criminal contempt charge)
Thus, if the relief provided is a sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial if the defendant stands committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by the court's order, and is punitive if the sentence is limited to unconditional imprisonment for a definite period. If the relief provided is a fine, it is remedial when it is paid to the complainant, and punitive when it is paid to the court, though a fine that is payable to the court is also remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the act required by the court's order.
If applied in a civil proceeding, however, this particular statute would be constitutionally valid. There were strong indications that the proceeding was intended to be criminal in nature, such as the notice sent to respondent, which labeled the proceeding as "criminal in nature," and the District Attorney's participation in the case. However, if the trial court imposed only civil coercive remedies, it would be improper to invalidate that result merely because the Due Process Clause was not satisfied. The relief afforded -- respondent's jail sentence, its suspension, and his fixed term of probation -- would be criminal in nature if that were all. However, the trial court did not specify whether payment of the arrearages (which, if timely made, would be completed before expiration of the probation period) would have purged respondent's determinate sentence, thus making the relief civil in nature. Since the state appellate court, because of its erroneous views as to these controlling principles of federal law, did not pass on this issue, it must be determined by that court on remand for its further consideration of § 1209.5. Pp. 485 U. S. 637-641.
Hicks v. Feiock (https://archive.is/VxRgC)
Sounds like the person was charged with contempt in state court and overturned in the appellate court. You're in federal court now. Supreme court kicks it back to state court to find out if the fines were criminal or civil in nature. Cant find the later ruling.
Ward v Smith 8th 2013:
In civil cases, there is no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. Edgington v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 52 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir.1995). Rather, a court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). ..... We review the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel for an abuse of discretion, according the district court “a good deal of discretion to determine whether representation is warranted given the nature of the case and the litigants.” Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 909 (8th Cir.2011).
In most circuits, an order denying a motion for appointment of counsel in a § 1983 action is not immediately appealable, because there is no final decision of the district court.
The district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in denying Ward's motion.
The order of the district court is affirmed.
WARD v. SMITH (archive)
Stabby is pulling his right to appeal before answering from a ruling from the 8th circuit. A ruling which upheld the denied counsel.
Only thing I can find in the 9th on appointment of counsel is about employment discrimination and civil rights.
Neither of his citations help him. Truly an exceptional lawyer.
